

most people will just stay where they are. If they do the minority problems become enormous—each White person in Black South Africa and each Black person in White South Africa a potential fuse to set off an international incident. White South Africa would be even less secure than she feels today.

HOW LONG WOULD IT LAST ?

Supposing in a moment of crisis, South Africa were to accept partition as her solution? How long would it last? Would White South Africa really be able to exist, each person taking in his neighbour's washing? For that is what it would come to. At the very best White South Africa would be a small corner of the African continent without any of the mineral and agricultural resources which at present make her rich. She would be an overgrown Group Area. It is highly unlikely that she would be more acceptable to the people of Africa because she was smaller than before. As long as her political philosophy rested on the same racial assumptions as those on which apartheid rests, she would be anathema to the whole continent. Pressure on her might be eased while partition was effected but it would be put on again as soon as the new state showed the slightest manifestation of White arrogance. Then White South Africa would be less able to resist. Her economic position would have been enormously weakened and her military position would not be much improved. She would have a shorter frontier to defend but more people to defend it against—including many new recruits who really knew what apartheid meant.

TEMPORARY PALLIATIVE

Partition should be seen now for what it is, an attempt at a moment of final crisis to preserve one small area of White domination at the bottom of Africa. It should be realised that partition means the bulk of the present Republic being absorbed into a Black state, and it should be recognised that it means a vast up-

rooting and removing of people and a general decline in living standards for all South Africans, Black and White. Most important of all, it should be realised that it can be no more than a temporary palliative, for, in the end, no state in Africa which is based on policies of White supremacy has any chance of surviving—however small it is.

In the end White people living on this continent will have to learn to live as individual members of the African community, not as members of a special group. It is time they started to learn that lesson, instead of being led up the garden path by partition theorists. The ordinary people of the Transkei have emphatically rejected racialism and come down on the side of race co-operation. What better guarantee for their future could White South Africans want than that? It is time they showed themselves brave enough to accept the hand of race co-operation, on a basis of equality, which African people have been holding out to them for so long.

THE TRANSKEI ELECTION

South Africa's English-language Press habitually interprets all national issues according to their meaning for White South Africans. Thus, when the Transkei's general election was held on 20th November, 1963, the newspapers had boiled down the extremely complicated issues at stake into a simple contest between "the multiracialist Chief Victor Poto" and "pro-apartheid Chief Kaizer Matanzima". It was made to seem that the Transkei's 880,000 Bantustan voters were going to the polls to vote simply for or against the right of White people to live and work in the Transkei as before.

The Press did, of course, by this means

effectively bring the Transkei election to the notice of White South Africa and to that of Black South Africa—which has to read White South Africa's newspapers or go largely newsless. Thus, when "multiracialist Poto" soundly defeated "pro-apartheid Matanzima" at the polls, the result was interpreted as a victory for integration over segregation, and celebrated or mourned accordingly, despite the later absurdity of Chief Kaizer's election to the Chief Ministership by the vote of the state-paid chiefs.

It was indeed a great victory for integration but it is equally true that this was only one of a host of issues with which the mass of Transkei voters were concerned. Without openly-organized political parties, with non-committal manifestos, with only the most guarded and moderate speeches made at meetings held by candidates known to oppose apartheid, it was hardly possible to assess the issues which were before the electorate. But though, in the unique "emergency" circumstances of the elections, observers often did not know in advance the interest of one candidate or another, the voters somehow did, and, in spite of the overshadowing Proclamation 400, in spite of a vastly complicated electoral system based on huge constituencies and multiple lists of candidates, a pattern of the popular will began to emerge as the results were announced.

REJECTION OF WHITE GOVERNMENT RULE

Transkeians were voting for a variety of things, of which the clearest was the acceptance or rejection of time-honoured White Government rule. When the Fingoes elected four anti-apartheid members, they reversed a trend going back to 1835 when, after fleeing from Shaka's wars, these remnants of Zulu tribes united under British protection and took up their place beside the White man, producing that Victorian stereotype, the "loyal" Fingo. Fingoland—around Butterworth and Nqamakwe—was always the first region to

implement Government policy, always the most subservient, the source of a never-ending supply of functionaries to operate new forms of White rule. Among the defeated Fingo candidates on November 20th, was Mr. Cecil W. Monakali, who deputised regularly for Chief Kaizer Matanzima in the now dissolved Transkeian Territorial Authority. The Fingoes resolutely defeated the pro-Government men, the "old guard" who had sat on Government bodies for many years, and replaced them with men such as Mr. Silberbauer Zokwe, a detainee for four months in Nqamakwe gaol during the Pondoland Emergency of 1960, and Dr. P. H. Bala, a medical practitioner of Butterworth, whose entry into local politics only a year or two back, made him an object of constant Security Police attention. The Fingoes may even not have been unduly concerned over the Poto-Matanzima struggle. Both held successful meetings in the area. Their concern was to make a sign that said "Enough!", and after 128 years adherence to "the Government" in its ever-changing, but ever White, forms, they were finally ready to give their support to men whom they knew were opposed to the status quo in South Africa.

THE CONSTITUENCIES

In neighbouring Gcalekaland, a possible five out of seven candidates were anti-Government men; Paramount Chief Sabata's ticket-of-seven in Tembuland proper (Dalindyebo Region) overwhelmed their thirteen opponents. Seven of these, linked together in support of Chief Matanzima, seemingly affluent and appearing to enjoy unseen help, all lost their deposits. In Nyanda and Emboland all except one of the victors were said to be supporters of Chief Poto of Nyanda or his ally Chief Sandy Majeke of the amaBhele in Emboland. In Maluti almost every candidate, and 3 out of 4 of the successful ones, were pro-Poto; in Qaukeni, only one of the eight men returned was a known Matanzima man and he came a very bad last. It is said that he only got in because he shared his surname with a success-

ful pro-Poto man and a number of people voted for him by mistake!

Success for the Government, which had expected Bantustan triumphs everywhere, came only on the southern and northern borders of the Transkei. In Chief Matanzima's Emigrant Tembuland his own four nominees came home, amidst grave rumours of coercive measures and polling irregularities. Umzimkulu returned two Matanzima men.

THE NEW MEN

In many places the "old guard" went out, but what was as significant was the calibre of their successors. A few were uncommitted seeming advocates of simple bread-and-butter policies. But most were men known to have stood up in opposition to Government policy, some of whom had been banished at some time or had been detained in the Transkei's gaols under the Emergency Laws. **What happened in fact was that the Transkei's voters chose, wherever they safely could, the representatives of the modern world, of progress, of the new Africa, of democracy rather than traditionalism, of African freedom in the whole republic rather than of Bantustan isolation.** Like the Fingoes, they looked at the conditions of their lives and said "Enough!"

This must sound painfully obvious to those used to politics in conditions of freedom, but it must be remembered that the Transkei has no experience of such conditions. A massive change has taken place in the area, where so short a time ago, opposition to the Government was openly voiced or even inwardly felt only by an uppercrust of intellectuals, many of them now exiled or otherwise removed from Transkei politics, and by some peasant victims of harshly enforced land schemes.

THE ROOTS OF CHANGE

The Nationalist Government's Bantu Authorities forced commitment on Transkeians, as did its other repressive laws on the rest of the

country. Extremely important in the canalising of this new commitment have been the activities of those colourfully described by B. A. D. Minister de Wet Nel as "wolves who sow hate and suspicion with the purpose of getting you into their clutches" and "jackals coming from all directions". These "jackals and wolves" are the Transkei's own political thinkers and doers. The outstanding early leadership of those chiefs and commoners who, often in loneliness, risked and suffered gaol, banishment and almost intolerable official pressure, and the national political organisations, amongst whom the Liberal Party has played a major part, and who have helped the Transkei to take up the struggle against an oppression in whose success it seemed destined to play a key part.

To all who have worked in this cause, the General Election, for all their condemnation of its motive, arrangements and circumstances, has meant a great step towards the achievement of their aims. The African people of the Transkei have found a voice, and whatever the Government's efforts to silence it may be, this voice can rally all who want democracy in South Africa, at a time when so much of their work seems to lie in ruins. In the Transkei itself the opposition party that has emerged may give the lead to a non-violent, even constitutional, movement against South Africa's unequal and unjust society, for which half a million votes have given a clear mandate.

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