

# Southern Africa: Internal Problems of The New Phase

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To have South African freedom fighters operating in Rhodesia represents an ideological advance of no mean importance not only in the liberation movement of Southern Africa but the whole spectrum of the African revolution. The significance of the event stands out from the welter of inter-party rivalries which have characterised the debate on these matters in the past nine months or so.

It is hardly necessary to restate the fact that the fragmentation of the liberation movement in each of the Southern African territories impedes the revolution. The launching of guerrilla activity jointly by the Zimbabwe African People's Union and the African National Congress of South Africa has thrown into bold relief the sterile and parochial attitudes which hold back progress towards united effort.

That is not to say ZAPU and ANC have been guiltless. On the contrary, they have until recently remained aloof from serious discussions on unity and in some respects they have actually stood in the way of progress toward united effort in the revolution. I may cite, among other things their lack of interest in the unity talks which took place in Ghana at the end of 1965.

Indeed, their going it alone in Rhodesia is itself partly a reflection of their own sectarianism. Their existing fighting capacity represents far less than a pool of ideas and resources would make possible in the effort to overthrow the Smith regime. But they deserve credit for breaking the ice of inaction in the direction of unity, however imperfect their brand of unity may be.

Insofar as their joint effort denotes recognition of the indivisibility of oppression in Southern Africa, and therefore the monolithic nature of the struggle against it, it marks a new stage in practical revolutionary consciousness. It is all the more praiseworthy when viewed in relation to the background against which it has been achieved.

There is considerable if unprincipled opposition to it. In both ZAPU and ANC the joint effort has been accompanied by sharp differences between groups for and against it. In some cases this has led to desertions from the ANC and disaffection with the ZAPU leadership, reflecting similar conflicts in the rival organisations, the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa.

Underlying the arguments advanced against it is a disturbing, persistent thread of chauvinism masquerading as military science. From this category I exclude the valid criticism that some of the initial battles in the Wankie area in August and September last year assumed the character of a modern positional war as opposed to guerrilla warfare.

Even this criticism, provided my information is accurate, should be tempered by the fact that the guerrillas, upon being intercepted, were forced into confrontation with the enemy and therefore had no option but to fight it out. This observation does not, however, absolve those responsible from the equally valid criticism that the men ventured into enemy territory without any advance planning of operations.

I made the latter criticism in 'AFRICA AND THE WORLD' (December 1967), basing it on a statement issued jointly by ZAPU and ANC which indicated that there was no coherent plan of operation before the combined force set out, nothing beyond recognition of the possibility of encounter with the enemy en route to their "respective fighting zones", that is, in South Africa and Rhodesia.

A study of that statement, reinforced by other random utterances, revealed that there was then only half-hearted acceptance by the ANC and ZAPU of the principle of South Africans fighting in Rhodesia. In these circumstances detailed planning of operations would be hampered. Hence the astounding assertion that the men were determined "to fight the common settler enemy to the finish at any point of encounter".

Fighting the enemy "to the finish at any point of encounter" flouts all the rules in the book of guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla starts off from a position of military weakness (otherwise he would not be a guerrilla) and this at once predetermines his tactics as a hit-and-run fighter. He is destined to play this role until he will have turned the scales in the balance of forces in his favour—a protracted process.

Having made that criticism in December last, it would be less than honest for me not to commend the ANC and ZAPU for their subsequent activities in the Zambesi Valley. By the end of March this year they and others in the field had hundreds of enemy soldiers, according to a newspaper report, "tied up in the drought-stricken bush, a prey to sickness, insects and snake-bites".

The same report, by John Worrall of the GUARDIAN (London), told of Rhodesians becoming "conscious of the dangers facing their young men, which accounts for the overwhelming flood of comforts for the troops now pouring into Salisbury and Bulawayo. It is the first time this has happened on a big scale". The report included a poser, "what happens if the invasion is stepped up?"

The reference to snake-bite is piquantly expressive of the inherent weakness in the long run—of the force pitted against the guerrillas. For while they may be a horror to the White lads of Rhodesia and South Africa who are commandeered in the fighting, snakes may be a source of sustenance for the true guerrillas, who would hunt them out for food rather than fear snake-bite!

Thus our original criticism of certain aspects of the fighting has been vindicated. But it is quite a different matter to be opposed to the very idea of South Africans fighting in Rhodesia. Certain elements in ZANU and PAC, opposed anyway as a rule to everything done by ZAPU and ANC, have invoked military science to camouflage what is basically a chauvinistic streak in their position.

The survival of the guerrilla and consequently his prospects of ultimate victory depends on the support he can get among the oppressed as a whole. Thus, to enlist that support, to win the people's confidence and trust, is basic to guerrilla warfare. Viewed against this background, the following assertion by ZIMBABWE NEWS, the Lusaka-based organ of ZANU, must be persuasive to the unwary:

"The historical fact, if we must be honest with ourselves, does not allow us at this point to pretend that a South African, even though he may be black, can automatically find acceptance among the people of Zimbabwe."

Indeed no stranger finds automatic acceptance among any people, even if he is a fellow countryman. But neither does he get automatically rejected. He may have difficulties of communication and adaptation before he can be fully integrated into their way of life. Of course this is not the problem which ZIMBABWE NEWS had in mind, but one which it actually poses in its over-eagerness to pick on straws.

The real problem for the guerrilla in Rhodesia, be he Zimbabwean or South African, is one of political acceptance, and its solution depends not on whether he is South African or Zimbabwean but on the level of political consciousness among the people there. Going by ZANU's own claims about the "revolutionary zeal" of Zimbabweans, it shouldn't be much of a problem!

Like so many of its arguments, the raising of this question of acceptance by ZIMBABWE NEWS stands exposed as legerdemain when juxtaposed with the blatant chauvinism of the following statements made in the same editorial:

"To shed our blood for our country and liberate ourselves is an honour which we Zimbabweans would never want to share with anybody at this stage." And this' "There are four million Zimbabweans and they are enough to defeat 200,000 whites in Rhodesia. To bring mercenaries to help Zimbabweans is to insult the revolutionary zeal and the ability to fight of every Zimbabwean."

No such insult was intended by either ZANU or ZAPU not so long ago when they were pressing Britain, herself never enamoured of untrammelled Zimbabwean freedom and independence, to intervene militarily in Rhodesia. What is an insult, an unpardonable insult of a counter-revolutionary nature, is the description of selfless freedom fighters as mercenaries.

It is also ideologically incorrect to say South African freedom fighters are in Rhodesia to "help Zimbabweans". The men are there to fight a common enemy. This is so self-evident it does no credit to the intelligence of those who deny it. I have dealt with the position exhaustively enough in the past.

Again, from the fallacious "help" premise, military science is invoked almost convincingly:

"In guerrilla warfare we must strive to spread the enemy forces so that we can wipe them out one by one. The greatest help we can get from ANC is for ANC to wage intensive guerrilla warfare in South Africa. If ANC can pin down the whole South African force inside South Africa, then Zimbabweans shall be left with Smith alone without South African aid . . . As it is now, the ANC and PCC (SAPU) alliance has made it easy for Smith and Vorster to unite and concentrate their forces to slaughter Zimbabweans . . ."

Spreading enemy forces is certainly one of the basic requirements of guerrilla warfare. The idea is to over-extend the enemy's resources so as to more effectively deal with and liquidate his military superiority. The extent to which it can be done on a region-wide basis in Southern Africa is clearly a question of logistics and must ultimately depend on the spreading of the guerrilla movement itself.

At certain early stages in the development of the struggle, to pursue the "spreading" principle as if it were a fetish could only result in over-extending one's own resources and therefore be self-defeating. To pursue it merely to satisfy the urge of territorial chauvinism ceases to be military science.

In the true application of that principle, it means that a highly mobile guerrilla band, however small, can achieve the effect of dispersing an enemy force by circling round within any radius, given favourable terrain conditions. In that case there would be no enemy concentration, Smith-Vorster or any other, "to slaughter Zimbabweans", to use the highly emotive words of ZIMBABWE NEWS.

A little learning is a dangerous thing. But certain elements in the ZANU-PAC alliance suffer from a surfeit of ill-digested revolutionary theory. One recognises the type by their rhetoric, lifted from Mao's selected works, often word for word, line by line and

even paragraph by paragraph—all too often without any bearing on conditions prevailing in their own countries.

This is no reflection whatsoever on the Chinese. They cannot help it if some of our comrades turn out to be revolutionary misfits without the ability to absorb what they learn. The position of China as the world's leading anti-imperialist country, with a glorious history of struggle for liberation, rightly places it high in the estimation and admiration of oppressed people everywhere.

And China has a lot to teach us. It has contributed more than its full share to the world heritage of revolutionary literature, through the great works of Chairman Mao. More directly, it is making an invaluable contribution to the liberation of mankind by offering the African liberation movement courses in guerrilla warfare, thus placing at our disposal the benefits of its unsurpassed experience in this field.

Though the Chinese have never presumed to do more than impart their technical know-how of prosecuting a liberation struggle, many of our comrades have made all-round gains from the Chinese experience and are able to use that intelligently. But there are some for whom the result has been confusion, which accounts for much of the ideological muddle that has set in in certain sectors of the African revolution.

Two cases from ZANU exemplify the contradiction. The first (and positive) is the case of Hassan Chimutengwende, who was one of the first batch of guerrillas sent into Rhodesia by ZANU shortly after UDI. He was trained by the Chinese in Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana. He used his training effectively not only to organise sabotage and other guerrilla activities but for his own survival in the face of great odds.

He has survived to tell the story of his experiences as a guerrilla operator inside post-UDI Rhodesia; which constitutes factual raw material far more valuable than any amount of book-learning so beloved of the egg-heads. He was one of the only two out of the original 37 to escape capture, faced with "quite a few informers in the villages, including chiefs . . ."

"But I stayed at large for eight whole months in Rhodesia, moving from village to village, and I learnt that if a freedom fighter can convince a villager that he is genuine he will be helped, whether he is ZAPU or ZANU . . ." In trying to track him down, the police detained his mother and elder brother several times and interrogated them, to no avail.

In an article in the SUNDAY TIMES (London) Hassan gave first-hand information about the extent of sabotage activities following UDI, in many of which he himself participated. More to our point, this is what Hassan has to say about his Chinese instructors: "They refused to discuss politics or Communism, about which I was curious, saying one day that they had not come to teach us their ideology but how to liberate ourselves".

Contrast that with the views of an un-named guerrilla who was interviewed for THE GUARDIAN (April 8, 1968) by Musosa Kazembe, himself a ZANU man. The guerrilla had been trained in China under the auspices of ZANU, but on his way to Cuba for further intelligence training he deserted and came to London. Subsequently dubbed "bed-sitter revolutionary" by angry Kenyans, he said in the interview:

" . . . But, most important, I want a revolution, not just a nationalist armed struggle. You can't have it halfway. I am a Maoist. The Party should control the whole movement, military as well as political. If I am going to be killed in Rhodesia I want to know that I am dying for a real revolution, not just a change of regime like there has been in Kenya . . ."

The Party, in this case ZANU, does "control the whole movement". So our "Maoist" cannot possibly have any reason for offering this aspect of his criticism, except to show off his "learning" by parroting Mao, who had emphasised the role played by the Chinese Communist Party in quite different circumstances. Moreover, the Chinese were for a long time engaged in a nationalist armed struggle against Japanese imperialism, in a united front of all classes and strata in China.

If the un-named guerrilla were a true Maoist (and we need Maoists in Africa by the hundreds), the lessons of this portion of Chinese history would not have been lost on him. The nationalist

armed struggle was an instrument of deliberate policy for the Chinese Communist Party, but they did not thereby lose sight of their socialist goals nor neglect the ideological and political education of cadres and the masses in the crucible of struggle.

Similarly, a nationalist armed struggle in Rhodesia should be safe in the hands of ZANU which the deserter had joined, as he himself said, "because it promised not only liberation but also socialist programmes to follow victory". If it is not safe under the present nationalist leadership, it is the business of the revolutionary to make it so. It is the duty of the guerrilla, who is essentially a political missionary, to propagate and demonstrate in practice his revolutionary ideas as he goes along.

"Once you start the revolution", the unheeding bed-sitter revolutionary was told in China, "they (the nationalist leaders) won't be able to control it. It will destroy everything that stands in its way". This is the correct attitude to take, assuming that the deserter's claim is true that the Rhodesian nationalists plan merely to fight "so that they could take over Parliament and the whites could run the whole economy as usual".

#### THE BEST GUARANTOR OF REVOLUTION IS THE REVOLUTION ITSELF.

A particularly bad case of ideological muddle in the PAC made its appearance since around December last, throwing the whole organisation into a traumatic upheaval, with far-reaching repercussions throughout Southern Africa. The product is a hybrid that is neither internationalist nor nationalist, a cross between ill-digested Maoist concepts and adulterated African nationalism.

It was made possible by one of the severest internal crises which have gripped the PAC during the past five years, revolving round the personality of Potlako Kitchener Leballo, recently expelled leader of a minority faction who had been placed at the head of the organisation by an accident of history.

These internal difficulties have been aired publicly elsewhere, but I will discuss them here only insofar as it is necessary to place the ideological crisis in perspective. They have spilled over into a vital sphere of Pan-African policy, affecting the whole direction of the revolution in Southern Africa.

All told, Leballo was for all practical purposes a one-man National Executive Committee of the PAC. There is hardly any one of the original executive members who has not been either chopped down or stripped of his responsibilities at one time or another during the past five years.

He operated by converting into sycophancy stranded South African refugees or politically discredited functionaries who usurped the functions of the Executive. The axe fell swiftly and without ceremony on anybody who dared question his practices. Expelled, suspended or disaffected were countless young rank-and-file militants who came abroad for military training, and are now scattered all over the world.

These constitute the vast majority of the trained men, in addition to a big number of the untrained, who none the less remain loyal to the Party and its policy and programme. Left were a mere handful of trained men, in addition to the bureaucrats, who could be said to be strictly inside the Party fold. Yet Leballo saw nothing odd in continuing to brandish his colourful, self-awarded title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

In September last year an aborted reorganisation and reconciliation executive committee meeting was held at Moshi, Tanzania. But hardly three months later Leballo reached a new dimension in precipitating crises, setting his remaining colleagues at each other's throats. It is this latest crisis which, with climactic suddenness, plunged the PAC into the present ideological convulsions.

This time his designs were to get rid altogether of the Executive by rendering it completely impotent. He installed a "Revolutionary Command" of hand-picked personnel at external headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, and decreed that henceforth the Executive would function at the pleasure of the command, meeting when and only if instructed to by the latter.

He chose as chief aide in the command Enoch Makoti, whose political background is such that he would be completely at Lebal-

lo's mercy. To enhance Makoti's political status, he had him sent to China for military training first, for such training has sadly come to mean little more than a status symbol for Leballo's minions.

Makoti had deserted from the front line during the PAC's 1960 Positive Action Campaign in South Africa. In the immediate post-Sharpeville period, as that campaign catapulted the PAC into the international spotlight, solidarity funds began to come in. Those, like Makoti, who had remained behind when militants went to prison easily took over the reins in the absence of the leaders.

Shortly afterwards, Makoti was expelled from the PAC for financial maladministration by none other than Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, the President, who was acting from behind prison walls. Subsequently the President considered a plea for mercy made on Makoti's behalf, and revoked the expulsion. But, of course, Makoti had irretrievably fallen from grace, or so we believed. Two years later Leballo, in characteristic fashion, resurrected Makoti . . . to make of him one of his hangers-on, nay, chief of the dacoits.

Makoti assumed the position of chief aide in the command around December last. Like his master, he soon began to don several colourful titles, among them PAC Top Policy Maker, Chairman of the Finance Control Board, and so on. It is in the first mentioned role that he concerns us here, though his activities were many and varied and equally fascinating.

He had come back from the Far East capriciously intoxicated with the spirit of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Frog-jumping the many decades of Chinese revolutionary history, he set about to apply the mechanics of the cultural revolution in the PAC. His first action was to usurp the official organ of the PAC, *AZANIA NEWS*, published from Lusaka for general circulation amongst the public.

All propriety thrown to the winds, Makoti used the paper to launch scurrilous attacks on other Party members and leaders, and as a vehicle for a torrent of abuse against the ANC for having its guerrillas fighting in Rhodesia. Trumpeted as "leading PAC ideologist" by Elias Ntloedibe, Leballo's praise-singer, Makoti attempted theoretical disquisitions, in which he repudiated PAC's own Southern African policy. A short sojourn in China, a smattering of Maoist concepts, a few trite slogans and—hey presto—a revolutionary was born!

His repudiation of PAC policy on Southern Africa was most curious, to say the least. Without the repudiation it was not possible to attack the ANC for fighting in Rhodesia—an attack made without offering any alternative. Makoti confesses helplessness as to how to get back to South Africa. He writes: "The serious problem facing us all is one of getting back to our country."

But fighting in Rhodesia, never! He writes: "There can be no question about the international outlook of our struggle, or its continental orientation. We believe however, that every revolutionary must be prepared, in his own country, to defeat first his own oppressor, and then combine with his fellows and comrades-in-arms to defeat the remaining oppressors."

Shorn of the rhetoric and verbiage, what Makoti is saying is that Makoti does not want to fight. For he has no way of leaving Zambia to fight in South Africa without having first to fight his way through Rhodesia or Mozambique. This interpretation is at least of a piece with his desertion from the 1960 campaign in South Africa, when the predictable penalty for defying the enemy was mere imprisonment.

All else seems to fall into character, too, even his pilfering and indiscriminate use of Maoist phraseology. Or isn't there a connection between plagiarism, the fraudulent use of other men's literary brains, and the political crime of living off the blood and sweat of the Sharpeville martyrs and militant activists of 1960 fame?

For three years the PAC, in advocating united effort for Southern Africa, has in Makoti's words been "combining reactionary substance with revolutionary phrases to make a counter-revolutionary proposition sound revolutionary". This, according to the sage, "is the traditional mechanism of the adventurist who shows great ability in seeing how a revolution can be run in every place except in the camp of aggression."

It is immaterial that Makoti substituted my name for that of

the PAC. The only apparent reason for doing so is that I had done most to popularise that policy in the last three years. It did not even matter to Makoti that the policy he was repudiating had been laid down in a document which the PAC had submitted to the third conference of the Organisation of African Unity, held in Accra in October 1965.

The document was submitted together with a covering letter, dated October 22, 1965, and signed by Leballo, though I cannot guarantee that the latter had mastered more than a superficial understanding of the policy statement. It had been presented to him—and others—for his perusal two days in advance, and he read the letter before signing it. The letter said:

“Your Excellency,

“The Pan-Africanist Congress (South Africa) has pleasure in presenting the enclosed statement to the Heads of State and Government now assembled here in Accra for the third conference of the Organisation of African Unity.

“We commend the statement as a blueprint for the liberation of Southern Africa. We earnestly implore this conference of the OAU to do everything in its power to further the objective of Unity among the liberation forces of Southern Africa as outlined in the Statement:

“Long live African Unity!

“Potlako K. Leballo, Acting President.”

The essence of the proposals was contained in a four-point formula which insisted that a realistic plan for action against the fortresses of White domination in Southern Africa and the last vestiges of colonial rule elsewhere in Africa should take into account the following propositions:

(1) The whole of Southern Africa should be regarded as a single unit for political and military purposes in the present phase of the struggle for liberation.

(2) Recognition of the necessity of an inter-territorial strategy, with or without a completely unified liberation movement, but certainly cohesion and co-ordinated action.

(3) The setting up as soon as possible of a supreme political authority to co-ordinate the activities of the liberation movement in the various territories, with the possibility that this might evolve into an inter-territorial provisional government.

(4) A crash programme for training guerrillas from Southern Africa and volunteers from the rest of Africa and elsewhere, with the possibility that this may evolve into an inter-territorial army of liberation under a joint high command.

Immediate active interest in this plan was taken by Ghana under President Nkrumah, who undertook to sponsor a conference of freedom fighters early in 1966 to work out a unified strategy and explore ways and means of concerted and co-ordinated action. But the move was knocked out by the Ghana army rebellion of February 1966.

President Nkrumah was fully aware of the fissiparous tendencies which plague the liberation movement in every territory, but was willing to use his enormous influence in Africa and among freedom fighters for the realisation of the plan. The fall of his Government left the field open for degeneration and decline, as we now know only too painfully.

Although it has been a policy of the OAU since its inception to create common action fronts in each of the unliberated territories, nowhere has this vital intermediate goal of liberation been achieved. Gone are the faith and vision which once gave impetus to the African revolution. But the principles upon which the PAC plan was based remain incontrovertible.

The realisation of that plan would bring unity in each territory, transcending narrow party loyalties and parochialism, and concerted action on an inter-territorial scale, including co-ordination of activities cutting across artificial territorial frontiers, and concentration of the main thrust of the revolution upon the enemy's weakest links.

Lately all sorts of diversionary arguments have been raised involving alleged language differences and non-familiarity of terrain in relation to problems of organisation and deployment of

manpower. And all this in the name of Maoist theory of a people's war! Those who raise them seem to have learnt nothing from China's historic 3,000-mile trek to the northern province of Shensi, a route cluttered with various dialects and nationalities.

Such comparisons are often odious. But those who choose models for guerrilla warfare have a duty to study in the minutest detail all the factors which make such a choice possible. Take the sacrifice of space to buy time and manoeuvrability, a basic tenet of the anti-imperialist war in China. And of space China had plenty, conceding much of it to the enemy as part of a grand military strategy.

None of the individual territories in Southern Africa, considered separately, can be thought of as being even remotely similarly endowed, but together they begin to make some sort of comparison feasible. China's different nationalities spoke diverse dialects; it was only after liberation that a single official national language was developed.

The various nationalities (it is more correct to say tribes) in Southern Africa speak different dialects, upgraded to languages, derived from the so-called Bantu family of languages, The Matebele of Rhodesia, who trekked from the Zulu kingdom of Natal not so long ago in history, speak a dialect similar to those spoken by the Nguni-speaking groups in South Africa.

There has been constant inter-territorial movement of people in the wake of industrial development throughout Southern Africa, particularly since the discovery of gold in South Africa last century. What “historical fact”, then, is there to make a South African, “even though he may be black”, unacceptable to the people of Zimbabwe? What have they to protect from him—their oppression?

Yet, leaving nothing to chance, the PAC plan envisages the integration of guerrilla units in their training camps to obviate whatever difficulties can be anticipated of a sociological nature, apart from meeting the obvious need of a common ideological mould even for those from the same territory or villages. They begin here to forge the bonds of comradeship which will be steeled in the course of the war. But they are already joined by a common historical experience of oppression and repression which has known no territorial frontiers. This is also true of the broad mass of people living in the zones in which the guerrillas will be operating, shooting their way into the hearts of the oppressed.

Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, dynamic President of PAC, was wont to quote departed brother George Padmore on this point, that there is “a growing feeling among politically conscious Africans throughout the continent that their destiny is one, that what happens in one part of Africa to Africans must affect Africans living in other parts”. And so let it be.

If the current chauvinistic vapourings represented the authentic voice of PAC, as Makoti and his type would have the world believe, we would have the sorry spectacle of a Pan-Africanist organisation narrowing down the “camp of aggression” from the Zambesi to the Limpopo.

Someone, commenting in *AFRICA AND THE WORLD* on my previous articles on this issue, in another example of chauvinism masquerading as military science, talked glibly about “the foreign terrain” in making disparaging remarks about South African freedom fighters captured in Rhodesia. Like all purveyors of confusion he did not even have the guts to write under his own name but unethically used the name of the PAC to lend authority to his views.

Guerrillas, as a rule, spring from among the poor, and have probably never travelled beyond a few miles of their localities—at least until they come abroad for military training, if even that. For the most part, therefore, their own countries are “foreign” to them. Show me a man who knows every part of his country well and I will show you a creature cast more in the mould of a counter-insurgent than a guerrilla, for tourists do not make freedom fighters. The guerrilla, who like all mortals hasn't got the means of recreating nature, adapts his principles of military doctrine (or evolves new tactics to suit conditions) to any topography.

The stubborn refusal of this element to consider the whole of Southern Africa as a “camp of aggression” has led to their committing the crime of adventurism of which they would like to accuse

others. In the beginning, as we have shown, the ANC committed certain military mistakes, because of half-hearted commitment to the common enemy view, but has since learnt from these mistakes.

The ANC, however, had few if any pretensions to being a Pan-Africanist organisation. The PAC not only has these pretensions but a firm commitment which it proclaimed before the eyes of all Africa at an OAU conference. Yet the Leballo-Makoti element went and committed the same crime of adventurism in Mozambique of which they accused the ANC in Rhodesia.

This element had lambasted the ANC for what they called "the tragic long march" involving its guerrillas in Rhodesia, saying:

"The point of our criticism is that they have been permanently and prematurely deprived (of the opportunity) of making a decisive contribution to our people's struggle for self-determination on the altar of satisfying the personal caprices, political whims and military ineptitudes of nervous little-men in the ANC leadership."

Subsequently, the self-same Leballo-Makoti element were to send a guerrilla band on a long march through Mozambique to South Africa in similar circumstances, guided by members of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee as the ANC guerrillas had been escorted by ZAPU men. At the time of writing, it was reported that three or four of the guerrillas had been killed in a clash at Vila Pery, on the Mozambique-Rhodesian border.

It would be an insult to the memory of these PAC guerrillas in Mozambique, as to that of the ANC men killed in Rhodesia, for anyone to say they had no business to be there. What is deplorable is that because of the chauvinistic refusal to regard either Mozambique or Rhodesia as part of the camp of aggression the "little men" in the liberation movement are unable to plan accordingly.

This does not mean that attempts to reach South Africa should not be made before either Rhodesia or Mozambique is liberated, but that these should be made as part of a grand strategy involving the whole region, dictated by logistic and other crucial issues which cannot be discussed here.

Referring in general terms to the PAC plan in my AFRICA AND THE WORLD article of December last, I wrote:

"If we accept, as we must, that we are fighting a common enemy, the logical step is to pool our limited resources and utilise them to the best advantage in a united front, to rationalise our planning and execution of our responsibilities. The situation in Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa in particular cries out to the heavens for such a plan of action.

"There are two main organisations in each of these countries and all of them claim to fight for freedom. They are all in a state of revolt against the status quo. They may each have a different plan for organising society after liberation, each a different set of ideas how this should be done, but this is not a practical question at the moment. What matters now is that all desire a drastic change in existing social systems in their respective countries."

This clearly referred to the existence of favourable subjective and objective conditions as a springboard for launching revolution its motive force, and went on: "Such a motive force, expressed in a thousand and one slogans covering as many themes elementary to social ferment, exists throughout Southern Africa. What is needed is a detonator and the whole region will go up in flames . . ."

Reactions to this formulation have been interesting. Where he is not using outright swear words, Makoti correctly makes the point that the foundations of the future society are laid during the course of the revolution. He writes:

"In the process he (the revolutionary) lays down the groundwork of the society he envisages, and lets it take its course during the whole period of protracted struggle . . . It is quite naive to hope that this development is not now practical and must wait until after liberation."

In fact, the point has already been made in relation to the Rhodesian nationalist armed struggle. But the immediate practical question raised in my December article is the quite different one of finding a common basis for united effort in launching revolutions, and I considered it as a common denominator among the various organisations that "all desire a drastic change in existing social

systems in their respective countries".

Here, again, Chinese history is instructive, and should help us rid ourselves of all tendencies towards left sectarianism. In "Problems of War and Strategy", Mao Tse-tung writes:

"When imperialism is not making armed attacks on our country the Chinese Communist Party either wages civil war jointly with the bourgeoisie against the warlords (lackeys of Imperialism) . . . or unites with the peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie to wage civil war against the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (also lackeys of imperialism) . . . When imperialism launches armed attacks on China, the Party unites all classes and strata in the country opposing the foreign aggressors to wage national war against the foreign enemy . . ."

All this time, from the 1924-27 wars in Kwangtung Province and the Northern Expedition through the 1927-36 War of Agrarian Revolution and the 1931-45 War of Resistance against Japan to the end of the 1945-49 War of Liberation, the Chinese Communist Party was uniting all who could be united on a common basis that needed not necessarily be socialist, while nonetheless laying the foundations of the future socialist society.

The present Chinese Cultural Revolution, almost 20 years after the War of Liberation, is eloquent testimony to the protracted nature of the birth-pangs of a socialist society sired mainly by guerrilla warfare in some countries, as distinct from a Bolshevik-type insurrection. From this type of revolution, especially in its fledgling stage as in Southern Africa, left sectarianism must be banished completely.

Makoti's is similar to the reaction of Maeng Letromaca, said to be the nom de plume of a South African freedom fighter who, in the April 1968 issue of 'Africa and the World', emphasised in capital letters "Unity for the sake of unity is completely alien to revolutionary socialist principles."

One is tempted to retort that there is no such thing as unity for unity's sake, but one recognises that the words are used merely to emphasise that the revolution must be socialist in character and that unity is possible only when it is from the outset based firmly on socialist principles. It is an old Trotskyist phraseological trap, so ably characterised by Regis Debray in his 'Revolution in the Revolution?' as follows:

"Trotskyism attributed great importance to the socialist character of the revolution, to its future programme, and would like it to be judged by this purely phraseological question, as if declaring a thousand times that the revolution should be socialist would help call it into existence . . ." Again: "At bottom Trotskyism is a metaphysics paved with good intentions."

In conclusion, it is well to note that the "my country" type of mentality which has reared its head among certain elements on the ZANU-PAC front is completely at variance with the trend of developments in Southern Africa. Portentous signs of a developing war situation have appeared on the not too distant horizon in South and Central Africa, which present a challenge that can only be met through a minimum all-Africa revolutionary consciousness.

These storm signals may not yet shake the rest of Africa out of its torpor, but they are menacing enough to warrant an agonising reappraisal of the position by the liberation movement and all its active supporters and well-wishers.

While details (as distinct from the theoretical framework) of the PAC plan referred to earlier cannot be discussed here, I can point out that it has from its conception in 1965 anticipated the present developments.

Among these developments have been Portuguese air attacks on Zambian villages along the Angolan border, the blowing up of a Zambian bridge by an unidentified enemy, an attempt by Rhodesian planes to ferret out freedom fighters in Zambia through ground-illuminating flares, and threats of retaliatory action by South Africa against countries accused of providing bases for guerrillas.


In the face of all these, it is a sad commentary on our revolutionary awareness that we should still be arguing over which is the camp of aggression. A decisive halt must be called to the squabbles among the rival organisations, so they can get on to serious discussion and planning. Don't let the chauvinistic tail wag the revolu-

ionary dog.

At this stage and perhaps for a long time to come, no one can pretend to know all the answers to the very great problems involved in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa. Their magnitude calls for humility on the part of all concerned. The mutually destructive attacks that are going on betray lack of appreciation of

the stupendous tasks that lie ahead.

The OAU's Liberation Committee, is uniquely placed to influence the course of events. It could rise to the occasion by at once enforcing a moratorium and setting up machinery for dialogue among the various liberation organisations. It could imbue the liberation movement with a dynamic sense of purpose and direction.



"... He that gathereth not with me scattereth."

—Christ

In the first place what do we mean by African Unity? The term is not far from being ambiguous today. It had been used to advocate a continental organic Union. The civilian government of Ghana was among others the chief exponent of this form. Hence the now suspended republican constitution of Ghana states that Ghana is prepared at any time to surrender her sovereignty, in whole or in part in the interest of a Union of African States. But others like the civil Federal Government of Nigeria seemed opposed to this view and used the term to refer to a loose association or confederation of African States. But I am going to treat the obstacles of African Union having these two forms in view. The obstacles of African Unity in my view are constituted under two major groups. There are the external forces and the internal factors. And I will begin with the former.

#### 1. The External Factors,

I sit on a man's back, choking him and making him carry me, and yet assure myself and others that I am very sorry for him and wish to lighten his load by all possible means—except by getting off his back.

—Tolstoy

Since it was the colonialists who held the blackmen under by keeping them divided, it is a very natural course that the major obstacle of African Unity should be Africa's former colonial masters. It is very interesting to note how the big powers are divided among themselves but how unified they become when they face (black) Africans. Also note the attitude of these same powers in the United Nations. Always when an African issue comes across the table and one of them is affected she with one other is likely to abstain in order to block the matter.

These big powers or more specifically Europe and America are still exercising a great influence in Africa. Africa is the arena of the Cold War and this has its devastating effects on her. Julius Nyerere

of Tanzania has beautifully summarised it as "the second scramble". He rightly notes that Africa is successfully emerging from the phase of the First Scramble for Africa and that she is entering a new phase The Second Scramble. As in the First Scamble he points, tribes were torn from each other in order to make the division of Africa easier, in the Second Scramble for Africa one nation is being divided against another so as to make the control of Africa easier by making her weak and divided against herself. So it seems that the aim of these big powers is to keep Africa forever balkanised so that the idea of African Unity should ever remain remote. And we remember the admonition that a house divided against itself cannot stand.

Neo-colonialism is one of the most destructive elements of African Unity. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia defines it as "the attempt made by great powers to undermine the sovereignty of an African State by the use of subtle economic and political tools to replace the physical domination of the old colonialists..." As long as the diabolic interests of the colonial nations remain undivorced in Africa many African countries would remain client-states through which the embers of division would be fanned. It is time African States should begin to question their membership in those associations where their former colonial masters remain heads. Many African States are still bound with apron strings to either France, Britain or America. Hence some former French African colonies are in many cases closely linked to France as independent states than they were as dependent territories. So that through France they have all gained associate membership in the European Common Market, (Fred G. Burke, 'Africa's Quest for Order'). Britain continues to treat her former colonies in many respects with spite and contempt.

The external economic assistance to Africa also requires examination. In many quarters external assistance to Africa is regarded as "aid". But how much of this bulk of aid comes without strings attached? Sometimes money is loaned to African States in the guise of aid at very high interest rates that on the long run the aid is transformed to a burden from which the recipient cannot escape. The only resort becomes to buy their goods at highly imposed prices. The effect is that Africa continues to be under economic slavery. And under such circumstances Africa remains unfree to determine her destiny. Africa must look before she leaps!

Let me now turn to the delicate issue of Africa's foreign policy. To this African states have repeatedly offered non-alignment and positive neutralism. This policy is supposed to represent freedom of decision and choice on international issues. It means that Africa must exercise her influence over both sides namely, East and West, in order to achieve universal peace. But to what extent has Africa remained on these principles? Some have succumbed to one of these power blocks or the other. No wonder Julius Nyerere has said Africa is in a mess. He said that the Organisation of African Unity has demonstrated that Britain and France had more power (in Africa) than the whole Africa put together.

There are two examples to prove this. When a call was made that African states which had any relationship with France should sever them due to her frequent bomb tests in the Sahara how many responded? Only one—Nigeria. And recently in 1966 when the OAU