

The Triple Challenge before Ghana

Part 2

AUSTERITY, PARTICIPATION AND DIALOGUE

These are the vital
needs that Ghana's
leaders must
satisfy now

REGINALD
HERBOLD
GREEN

THE WELL ORGANISED and powerful market women — who have, however, profited from and probably profited on short crops — have been hit by import controls and by the growing role of the Ghana National Trading Corporation. By 1965 the latter had become the largest importing unit and a successful commercial operation with a 25% return on capital. Any type of socialism or social democracy is anathema to the few thousand market women with £500-£5,000 net incomes. They appear to dominate their associations and also — regrettably — the CPP national women's organisation.

The food farmer, the new labour force entrant, the lower middle class (skilled workers, artisans, new middle school teachers, lower civil servants) and, counting free public services, the typical wage earners are marginally to appreciably better off in 1966 than they were in 1960 but all of these groups had expected far more rapid increases in their standards of living. However, both these groups and a substantial portion of the elite might well have accepted the necessity of austerity in the interests of development if the rationale behind it had been made clearer and there had been seen equality of sacrifices.

Despite valiant efforts by Planning, Statistical Office and Treasury civil servants (in reports and policy speech drafts) and occasional sound (but often too technical) newspaper feature series the true nature of the case for restraining present consumption and for higher taxes has not been made clearly and convincingly so far as most Ghanaians are concerned. Broad platitudes and denunciations alternating with sophisticated economic analysis will not serve.

Even more critical, there has not been equality of sacrifice. A conspicuous handful have waxed rich at least substantially through manipulation of controls, nepotism, access to official patronage, and outright corruption. That this is no part of President Nkrumah's or the CPP's policy is no longer an effective answer. The widespread involvement of the relations of politicians and officials in lucrative trading made possible by favouritism in allocations and the — narrow by West African but not Ghanaian standards — growing corruption of Ministry, state corporation, and Party officials revealed by the Abraham Commission have aroused intense anger parallel to the 1961 "one man, one house, one car" populist outcry which shook the establishment and contributed to hasty tax reforms and intensive (if unfortunately not sustained) efforts to root out corruption and conflict of interest cases. Unless "the rascals" — including certain key CPP and Cabinet figures — are eliminated root and branch and this action is seen to be serious and lasting, continued support for CPP goals (as outlined in the 1962 manifesto *Toward Work and Happiness* and in the 1964-69 *Plan*) may well turn into vehement reaction against the Party and government for betraying them.

The alliance of merchants with corrupt, nepotistic, or favouritistic elements in the state and party structures and the continued massive spending on useful and prestigious but scarcely urgent projects do not set an example of equitable sharing of necessary austerity. (The Accra-Tema expressway, reconstruction of Accra airport, the hotel-housing-office-assembly complex rushed through for OAU conference initial use, and five lavish new buildings at the University of Ghana have eaten up nearly £15 million, three VC-10's another

£10 million, and — one of the rarer cases of sheer waste — two frigates nearly £9 million or £34 million which could well have been deferred at least five years.) Unless seen equity in sacrifice, seen economy in prestige spending, and seen integrity by the entire political elite are attained rapidly the national will to act in support of development, the efficiency of the governmental structure, and the socio-political base of government authority could disintegrate rapidly. Already continued failure to act effectively on this front raises disquieting echoes of Milovan Djilas' *New Class*, Renee Du Mont's political-bureaucratic bourgeoisie, Dick Sklar's (Nigerian) political class, and Frantz Fanon's *Damnés de La Terre* vision of an apocalyptic reaction against the entire relatively privileged political, administrative, intellectual, business elite.

These spectres are rendered more frightening because the sense of open, mass participation which once marked CPP politics and government has been lost.

UNTIL 1957 THE CCP was a mass party whose unifying goal, attaining the political kingdom, knit together men of divergent aims. Until 1960 — and perhaps 1962 — some unity was maintained under the slogan National Reconstruction. The 1962 appearance of *Work and Happiness*, a widely popular non-doctrinaire socialist blueprint for national development, could have served as a basis of party rejuvenation and popular involvement. In fact, since 1961, attention has increasingly focussed on the structure of the Party and "wing" organisations (labour, farmers, youth, students, women). There have been confused gropings toward a unifying ideology without regard to maintaining effective mass membership, let alone involving it in the discussion.

In the event, the CPP has become a party hierarchy without a base and with ideological divisions as great as ever. Vague slogans create an illusion of unity but close reading of the four Accra papers shows a range from conservative African Fabianism mixed with economic nationalism, to vehement, ultra-orthodox Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism-Maoism. Meanwhile of a total of Party/Wing membership of 2,500,000 probably no more than 50,000 have participated (even in mass meetings or rallies) since 1962, no more than 10,000 have been active in Party posts and perhaps 200 have played significant roles in making Party policy.

Further, the Party has never been fully integrated into the governmental structure. This is partly because it was not fully trusted by the President (let alone the Cabinet-Civil Service-Armed Forces) and partly because Ghana's government was not a one man band (as opposed to Malawi) and President Nkrumah felt the need to balance conflicting state apparatus and Party groups against one another. The result, unfortunately, has tended to be immobilism, with the Cabinet largely composed of old line CPP politicians. Many had basically conservative reactions to change, high levels of self interest, and rather modest intellectual or administrative competences. The advisory and journalist entourage centred in Flagstaff House tends *per contra* to be exceedingly radical in tone, nebulous in proposals, and ill informed in practice.

Effective popular involvement is greatly hampered by the incompetence, corruption, unpopularity, and (justified) fear of public rejection of many of the Cabinet and of the entourage.

Some — like Nathaniel Welbeck, CPP administrative officer and Minister of Information and Propaganda — are hamhanded, stupid men who do more damage to the government and Party image than the entire exiled opposition. Others, like the now cashiered Minister for Trade Dr. Djinn, have a long record of ruinous incompetence and “mysterious” growth in personal wealth, both contributing to the nature and intensity of the austerity challenge. Able and dedicated ministers like Kofi Baako (Civil Defence), K. Amoaka-Atta (Finance), and Mrs. Susanna Al-Hassan (Social Welfare) are not lacking. But they do not set the tone or image.

Parliament — not an important political arena since the 1952-54 session — is virtually moribund. The 1965 attempt to create a more broadly based parliament with members from all major geographic, cultural, and occupational groupings, was turned into a revealing display of the fears and powers of entrenched mediocrity. The central CPP organs (dominated by sitting MP's) calmly nominated virtually all old members, a number of new Party-entourage members more noted for praise singing than incisive thought, and a few competent academic-journalistic members.

THE CPP'S FAILURE is perhaps best seen against the achievements of TANU: a party with aims and programmes relatively similar to those of *Work and Happiness* and a comparable level of participation and organisation at independence. TANU and the Tanzanian government have been effectively integrated, and participation in Party and state decision making — down to the village level — has been growing in overall quantity and effectiveness. The Party-government image is dominantly one of honesty, energy, concern, and openness. 1965's constitutional reforms were widely discussed before and during their formulation, and the 1965 election was a clear demonstration of the possibility of a competitive, participatory One Party election. The resultant Par-


liament is an exceedingly representative body. The contrast with Ghanaian realities should be appalling to any CPP or state official truly committed to the published aims and principles of his Party and government.

The Civil Service has come to occupy an increasingly anomalous position. Its overall level of competence is for higher than that of most politicians and political appointees. Many of the most able civil servants are in broad agreement with the strategy of *Toward Work and Happiness* and of the *Plan* and have substantial — but variable — influence on substantive policy decisions. However, these men are basically technocrats, repelled by the lack of competence, integrity, and vision they feel characterises all but a few of the political elite. They are increasingly doubtful whether the Party and government are any longer capable of or even seriously committed to their own stated aims and principles. As a result they are withdrawn from political life, failing to add the leaven of intelligence, insight, and practicality (all desperately needed) which their participation could supply.

Three specific threats to Ghana's development and stability arise from lack of broad participation. First, because the thrust of Ghanaian policy is such as to alienate entrenched interests, it is basically untenable without broad support. An elite interest coalition (like the *Parti Democratique Ivoirien*) can operate in a setting of public discontent and distrust; a mass oriented body like the CPP does so at great peril.

Second, the growing feeling that rule is by a narrow self-selected and self-serving elite, creates growing cynicism and perpetuates the colonial heritage of distrust of the state and of all activity not directly serving one's own interests. This is a hopeless atmosphere for attaining the willing and willed austerity needed for development.

Third, lack of dependable or comprehensive information, combined with both real and fancied evidence of incompetence and corruption, causes the government to be blamed both for the inescap-



East Africa Journal (PO Box 30492, Nairobi), March, prints a discussion between Ezekiel Mphahlele, Gerald Moore, Okot P'Bitek, Rajat Neogy and David Rubadiri on East Africa's literary drought. Is it a drought of writers or willing publishers? Opinion was divided, though the chance of the creative writer in an African language of being published was as always rated low. (A somewhat fantastic exception will be the BBC's Third Programme broadcast of Alexis Buthelezi's Italia-prizewinning play *Nokhwezi* in May in Zulu, though an official South African entry for the prize, this is to be welcomed — provided there are no apartheid nuances in it.) Perhaps our reviewer David Thompson, formerly of the English department at Roma, Lesotho, now of King's College, London University, was too hard on Heinemann's batch of new African novels last issue. Their faith in new African novelists carries out common publishing practice of taking a chance on a first novel for the hope it offers of real success with its successors. Many English novels find a publisher on this basis: it is hard that African

writers should be blamed for immaturity on a first book when non-Africans get by. “This is by an African therefore it has to be better” is as stupid as “therefore it need not be as good”.

HEINEMANN'S are soon to publish a collection of new writing from Nsukka — poetry, drama and fiction by students of the University of Nigeria (and a selection will be featured here in advance of publication). No drought there, of writers or a publisher. While *Black Orpheus* appears less frequently, Ibadan University is to publish an occasional *African New Writing*, the first in about September next year. The editors are Professor Desmond Maxwell and Christopher Okigbo, both prominent (with S. B. Bushrui) in Ibadan University and Nelson's *W. B. Yeats — Centenary Essays* a cosmopolitan collection with only Okigbo's “Lament of the Masks”, a praise-song on Yeats in the Yoruba tradition, speaking of the poet in an African voice. From the same imprint have come *Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, “a handbook for teachers and students” edited by Joseph C. Anene and Godfrey N. Brown and a companion volume *A Thousand Years of West African History*, edited by J. F. Ade Ajayi and I. Espie, which will be reviewed here by Thomas Hodgkin, in July. A progress report on modern African history-writing by Hodgkin in the special history issue of *The Times Literary Supplement* on 7th April, provides an excellent background to these books. It also listed techniques of research similar to those described by his former pupil Martin Legassick in *The New African*, March 1966 (an article which brought Legassick, who is at the University of California, Los Angeles, an immediate enquiry from a London publisher, after a book on pre-1800 South Africa).

Longman's, London, come near the subject with *The Mfecane, A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa*, by J. D. Omer-Cooper, professor-elect in history in the University of Zambia, and formerly senior lecturer in history at Ibadan, where he wrote the South African chapters in the Anene-Brown volume above.

WILLIAM COLLINS, ONE OF THE GIANTS of British publishing, did well out of Trevor Huddleston's *Naught for Your Comfort* and Chief Luthuli's *Let My People Go* is still selling well for them. Rev. Charles Hooper, who collaborated on the Luthuli book, also published his *Brief Authority* with Collins, revealing the full horror of the Afrikaner Nationalist government's repression of the Zeerust risings in 1957. Their subsidiary Harvill Press are publishing the *Jail Diary* of Albie Sachs, compiled from his notes and letters after 90-day imprisonment in 1963-4 (he has just been released after a further agony of solitary confinement under the 180-day clause which has replaced 90-days). Small wonder that Collins's South African agents wanted to appease white South Africa by showing “the other side”, and Douglas Brown of the right-wing, London, *Sunday Telegraph* was commissioned for the job. His book *Against the World* has come out to applause from radical anti-apartheid critics like Kenneth McKenzie (in *New Society*, London) and his wife Myrna Blumberg (in *The Guardian*, London), though they and other critics have sharply disagreed with his conclusion that, as McKenzie paraphrases it “the outside world can and should do nothing about South Africa, except perhaps pray”. But the South African government is not even grateful for this crumb: the Board of Censors has banned *Against the World* in South Africa.

able fact that development is a long and arduous process and for basically uncontrollable factors such as the 1963-65 food price rises following droughts. (The Party purists and a group of foreign ideological advisors with a remarkably poor grasp of reality added to the confusion in the latter case by denying the reality of the short crops and charging profiteers with deliberate mass spoilage and destruction of food. Not only is this patently false — and so seen by the public — as a basic explanation, but it diverts attention from needed policies of augmenting food production and improving transport, storage, and distributional facilities.)

LACK OF PARTICIPATION is linked with the absence of any effective, broadly inclusive, overall dialogue on national aims and policies. The problem is not primarily one of overt repression (although this does exist) but rather of a failure on the part of the state and Party to create operational forums for dialogue or to supply information and proposals on which it could be based and of fear, cynicism, and withdrawal on the part of the public. Of Ghana's perhaps 200 political prisoners (not a high number compared to Nigeria's pre coup 2,000-2,500, India's 2,000 plus but also Tanzania's 15-20) only a handful (most notably the late Dr. J. B. Danquah) have been held for expressing critical views or representing an alternative viewpoint. On the contrary most have engaged in basically subversive or terroristic actions. As mentioned, the range of published viewpoints is wide — if skewed. The failure of a dialogue to develop stems partly from a false view of unity as monolithicism, partly from over sophisticated and technical presentations. Perhaps it stems most of all from the extremely shoddy way in which ideas and positions are frequently expressed, and the resultant (justified) fear of their authors that they could not stand up to public discussion.

Ghana has been extremely ill served by a band of hack publicists, journalists, and ideological advisors, both Ghanaian and foreign. Their combination of fulsome praise without explanation or analysis, undigested and ultra-doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism and rote blaming of *all* failures on treason or foreign intrigue, repels rather than convinces, and stifles rather than stimulates discussion. As in the Cabinet and Party there are notable exceptions but — except on rare occasions — they have not succeeded in setting the overall tone.

A striking illustration is the Bureau of African Affairs which — despite some competent staff and occasional incisive analysis — has repeatedly supplied the government with erroneous data, and antagonized conferences and technical working parties (in Ghana as well as internationally) by substituting rote polemics for creative thinking.

The exceptions suggest that in dialogue — as in participation and austerity — the true failure lies in implementation. President Nkrumah's major addresses and most of his books are discussable, and they set a high standard of content and presentation. However, much of the President's writing, like the genuinely thoughtful features which appear erratically in all four papers and on Radio Ghana, is too difficult and complex to serve as the basis for truly broad understanding or discussion.

ECONOMIC STRATEGY and policy, partly because of civil service and university participation, has remained a fairly lively area of critical thought and discussion. Advocacy of laissez faire capitalism would not be printed, but basically anti-Marxian neo-Fabian positions and proposals, and a substantial range of radical viewpoints, do appear. Economic policy has been explained much more coherently than any other area of government endeavour, not only on a technical level but also in broadly intelligible terms. While the parallel stream of hack adulation and polemic damages the overall results, a basis for public understanding and discussion of economic strategy and policy does exist and could fairly readily be strengthened and expanded.

The one major forum for serious discussion on a broad basis is the Institute of Public Education. Its participants are largely from the new lower middle class. Both seminar sessions and addresses cum questions have normally resulted in intelligent commentary and discussion and sharp disapprobation for incompetence, and rote

polemics. It is unlikely to be accidental that IPE participants (who, alas, number perhaps 2,500 for programmes of this type) showed a decided increase in support for national aims *and* a more critical understanding of the real obstacles and official failings which hindered their attainment between 1960 and 1965 — a pattern not apparent elsewhere. The IPE's attempt to float a discussion quarterly is useful, but the needed broadening of dialogue requires a basic reconstruction of attitudes to the dissemination and criticism of information and ideas down to the local unit level.

These internal challenges have reached a level at which their resolution is essential to Ghana's continued progress. The civil service can substitute its expertise for effective Cabinet-Party-Parliament policy making (and may be increasingly called upon to do so) but it cannot provide information on popular demands. Much less can it provide the mass enthusiasm needed if the price of development is to be made bearable.

POST-COUP CONCLUSION

What courses are open to the new regime in regard to these central challenges? Are its choices likely to consolidate a broad base of support or to lead to greater discontent and either political instability or sharply increasing repression? The second question clearly cannot be answered definitely. But it is difficult to be optimistic, partly because of the intractable nature of some of Ghana's problems (especially on the austerity front), and partly because of the group interests of those who made the coup and their potential core of exile supporters and associates. In the short run a number of popular moves are relatively easy but ultimately, very serious thinking and painful decisions will be necessary.

Austerity is a necessity for rapid development. Possibly the new government can alleviate it somewhat by securing additional foreign aid — though this is by no means self evident. The following of a policy basically in keeping with the IMF recommendations (in fact this trend began a year before the IMF Mission made its proposals) was a major cause of unpopularity. If even more stringent deflationary and depressive measures are the condition for IMF-OECD assistance, the price of such assistance will be discontent and possibly, mass demonstrations.

Unless consumer import levels are raised sharply it is difficult to see how the elite calls for salary increases (likely to be granted) can be consistent with even a constant level of inequality — let alone avoidance of even graver shortages of mass consumed imports. On the other hand, such an increase in consumption imports — unless achieved by rigid economy in government consumption and postponable investment imports — would tend to reduce effective levels of productive investment.

In the short run the removal of corruption and nepotism tied to CPP-government figures will be popular and the vacant posts created will satisfy some demands. However, the disparate elements of the United Opposition (as opposed to the army-police-civil service) were never characterized by scrupulous honesty or impartiality in appointments. If the freedom for competition announced by Lt. General Ankrah results in a business-political-civil service alliance prospering while the rest of the population sees no increase in their welfare, the best of intentions or statements could not head off broad and bitter opposition.

Present levels of sacrifice — slightly alleviated by 1965's end to the 1963-4 crop failures and more basically reduceable as increasing returns on 1960-65 investment are achieved over the next five years — could be made acceptable if upper income group profits were held constant. Price control and distribution of key consumer imports would have to be handled more efficiently. With scrupulous honesty, rigid levels of austerity imposed on prestige or postponable government spending, and genuine impartiality in appointments must be maintained by politicians (whether military or civil) and public officials. The early marginal increase in the income tax exemption (from 180 to 200, affecting about 200,000 taxpayers) is in accord with such a policy, and it combines a popular and visible benefit with a minimum reduction in public resources.

Participation will be a more intractable problem for the new government than it was for the old. Military regimes seldom attain either mass enthusiasm on a sustained basis or mass involvement in government. The old opposition had a mass base only in Ashanti and southern (then) British Togoland — about 20 per cent of the country. There is little reason to suppose its popularity has risen in any way parallel to decline in support for the CPP. Indeed its emergence as a dominant force in the National Liberation Council — should it occur — might very well make mass confidence and support harder to attain.

Success may depend largely on whether the basic aims of the CPP (with a shift from revisionist Marxian socialism to some form of African social democracy, a change which would almost certainly be genuinely popular) are accepted. If they are not, the Nkrumah government will — in retrospect — increasingly become the era of expanded education and health, of

visible signs of development, of the 1952-60 economic and political boom. The new government will become the unpopular owner of an image of mass stagnation and narrow self interest.

The basis for a dialogue also remains in doubt. The opposition — vide D. Austin's *Politics in Ghana*, a work highly critical of Dr. Nkrumah and the CPP — has never been notable for a coherent set of national policy and strategy proposals, nor for effective presentation of what ideas they did have. At best their cautious advocacy of conservative Fabianism à la John Stuart Mill and a curious blend of Adam Smith — P. T. Bauer-Neo Mercantilist economics has always seemed totally out of touch with present African realities and even with their own specific claims. For example their 1961 outrage at higher taxes on — their examples — Mercedes, refrigerators, £100 watches, and Scotch as grinding the faces of the poor.

Equally disquieting is the opposition record of *de facto* political and ideological intolerance, almost certainly worse than that of the CPP. Their actions when in power in Ashanti, and the more recent views expressed by many of their elite supporters, give little cause for hope that their admiration of John Stuart Mill extends to liberation, freedom of expression or organisation for those in substantial disagreement with them. Their mass literature has been at least as polemic as that of the CPP but notably less marked by any leaven of positive stands.

Oddly enough, the military are in a much better position to create the intellectual and programmatic base for a dialogue. Their initial actions — including creation of an Economic Council headed by Government Statistician E. N. Omaboe — suggest heavy dependence on civil service advice and technocratic skills in policy formulation. The creation of a rationalised and dynamic national strategy and programme is possible if this trend continues.

The problem in that case will be on the one hand involving broad elements of the population in understanding, discussion, and support of the new policy and, on the other, convincing the elite that rapid bettering of its relative position is not in its own long run interests. Officers and technocrats have nowhere been conspicuously successful in this. Nor does the fact that the civil service itself forms a substantial portion of the upper middle class make it easier to formulate and implement policies of equitable division of austerity. On the other hand at least some of the senior civil servants are effective publicists and educators and many are genuinely dedicated to national welfare. The same is true of a small but potentially significant number of intellectuals who are deeply critical of the CPP's record, but equally unwilling to identify with any existing opposition grouping.

Even if the most hopeful course is taken at highest levels, implementation (and even honest support) by the middle and lower levels of the new establishment, may be lacking. Probably the greatest contributing factors to the erosion of the base of the past government were failure by President Nkrumah and his more able colleagues to impose their own standards, on the Cabinet, entourage, and Party hierarchy. They allowed the fulsome praises and ill-considered doctrines of second-rate advisers and publicists to dull their own contact with and perception of popular aspirations, real needs, and weaknesses in actual government-Party action. The same danger of increasing isolation is likely to confront the National Liberation Council regime.

The Council's actions in its first six weeks give rather limited ground for optimism. Although the initial protective custody figures (a new name for preventive detention which has been "abolished") were on the order of 2,500-3,000 they now appear to have fallen to 500 or less. General

Ankrab has indicated that he expects a significant number of these to be found innocent of any improper act and released soon while the rest will be charged. These figures are not directly comparable with the old preventive detention total (750 odd judging by NLC figures on release) because that included 400 odd thugs whom the police believed guilty of armed robbery and kidnapping but could not secure evidence against because of intimidation; at least claims to this effect have been made both in public and private by senior police officers (including a present NLC member) since 1960.

The messages of congratulation and the "conversions" of CPP leaders are rather less impressive. They look more like reflex integration with the powers that be than serious evidence of deep support or conviction. This is perhaps particularly true of ex-CPP leaders of modest competence and even more modest reputations for integrity such as Kojo Botsio and E. Ayeah-Kumi. Of more importance may be the statements critical of the fallen government for failing to adhere to its own goals by at least two of the more able and honest CPP figures, Alex Quaison-Sackey and Kofi Baako.

It now seems clear that the United Party in Exile — which the NLC has proscribed — will not return home in triumph. Its claim to have masterminded the coup have been sharply denied and its leaders warned that any political action in Ghana on their part will be suppressed. However, some of the men who have appeared in or around the Council's delegations and apparatus raise doubts as to its wisdom albeit not its desire for broad involvement. Two opposite examples are Joe Appiah, spokesman par excellence for the elite, whose self styled Fabian socialism seems compounded of an intellectual arrogance and contempt for the common man worthy of J. S. Mill at his worst and a social and economic philosophy Lord Beaconsfield would have deemed short-sighted selfishness, and *per contra* J. K. Tettegah of the All African Trade Union Federation, able demagogue, infinitely ambitious and ruthless, opportunist (he has completely reversed his views on union-state relationships), self styled "next Osagyefo" who was booted upstairs from Ghana TUC in a 1964 CPP anti-corruption sweep.

Economic policy appears — at least for the formulation stage — safely in the hands of able technocrats including the returned Plan author J. H. Mensah. However, the abandonment of the *de facto* one-third Western contractor, one-third Eastern state trading corporation, one-third long term international institution (or Western government) aid goal of the CPP is likely to hamper, not help, long run fund procurement. While Czech, Polish and Yugoslav technicians and projects remain in operation (in aggregate they exceed Soviet) the whole logical policy of trade and aid diversification seems abandoned. If this results in a sharp USSR reduction in cocoa consumption (as opposed to a shift to other sellers) major problems will ensue as the current strength in the cocoa market is very largely the result of a 150,000 ton, £170 per ton USSR contract in December (when the market was lower and rather soggy) which pushed estimated consumption past estimated crop. Certainly the expulsion of most (whether all is not clear) Soviet technicians reducing the Eastern per cent in expatriate personnel from perhaps ten to little more than five is potentially damaging economically and hardly necessary to effectuating the NLC's distinctly pro-Western version of an independent foreign policy. Negotiations for IMF-IBRD-US Aid interim balance of payments, re-financing of short term debt, and longer term soft development loans do appear to be proceeding toward at least a covering of the £15-20 million short term needs estimated by Omaboe and Ankrab.

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