

alone, which will apparently fail to inflict a penalty against rebels, is an open admission of the authority of the illegal regime. And sanctions merely test that authority as a *fait accompli*, to be brought to amiable terms in future negotiations rather than seek to break it and bring it to the judgment of the courts. Economic sanctions as in the modern recorded cases of Ireland, Italy, China, and Cuba are insufficient to lead to a change of regime or even a major change of national policy. If British policy is still rapid constitutional development to African majority rule, a swift arrest of the illegal leadership and a return to legality ought to be its logical accomplishment. A rebellion cannot be brought to heel without physical action.

Military intervention by Britain, the Commonwealth and the United Nations is supported here as it provides a realistic approach to illegal action and the means to fulfill the primary objective. From a military point of view, Rhodesia is a small country and cannot provide a prolonged resistance organised internationally. The intensity of the struggle is reduced by the fact that the extent of Mr. Smith's control over the Rhodesian army is a marginal one. Recently, for example, he ousted the Army Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff because of their vehement opposition to UDI. Their successors—a General and an Air Vice-Marshal—hold similar views and it was their allegiance to the Queen that withheld them from taking action against the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs who is, on behalf of Her Majesty, their military superior as Rhodesia's Commander-in-Chief. Further, UDI has crystallised the struggle that continues (the results of which are unknown) between Sir Humphrey Gibbs and Mr. Smith for the loyalty of the armed forces.

The question of loyalty of the armed forces is an irrelevant one either in the case of British or international military intervention. It is, indeed, relevant to Mr. Smith as he is aware of divided loyalties even after the purge and his forces in combat might be reduced to a mere handful. But even if the whole Rhodesian army were on his side, Rhodesian forces are insignificant in comparison with any international army, as assessed by the Institute of Strategic Studies after UDI.

There are, according to the assessment 3,400 armed men in Rhodesia—as against, for example, 2,500 in Zambia, 9,000 in Ghana; 34,000 in Ethiopia and 180,000 in the U.A.R.—two-thirds of whom are African; and some have been disarmed as “unreliable.” Mr. Smith relies on his Minutemen. In addition to regular forces—two battalions (one of them all white), a Special Air Service Squadron, and six squadrons of aircraft—there is a Territorial Army of four battalions, territorial reservists of at least another four, plus, 2,000 white police and 20,000 white police reservists.

REGARDLESS OF THE SOURCES of an inter-

national force against Rhodesia military intervention is logistically practicable. On the British side, a lot is heard about the expected refusal of the British soldier to fire on his colonial kith and kin. But the reverse might be true. Rhodesia is a British colony and if British soldiers seek to subdue a rebellion, they would fire back as they would if faced with an armed mob in England. None the less, to avoid another Curragh incident, Britain would have immediate military support from the United Nations.

Strategically, vertical envelopment would be feasible. There would be at least three brigades required, with a follow-up of another two and this is an excessive estimate. Expeditions of short-haul aircraft like Argosies would be flown from Tanzania to Lusaka from where helicopter-borne and airborne operations could be launched. Unlike an economic war, dangers of armed intervention by South Africa and Portugal would most likely be averted.

The immediate objective of the armed forces would be control of strategic centres, chief sources of power (Kariba and Wankie colliery), telecommunications, protection of the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs as well as release of Joshua Nkomo and other political detainees and arrest of rebels. Damage would be inversely proportional to the number of troops deployed and the operation undertaken within not more than a week.

International control would make provisions relating to the administration of the territory. The 1961 Constitution of Southern Rhodesia would be suspended. Government would be vested in an executive council for at least six months while a representative constitution incorporating objectives of democratic African majority rule was being devised. Internal conditions that would otherwise be disrupted by economic sanctions would be strengthened for rapid economic and social development.

The course of events in Rhodesia for which Britain is responsible raises questions of doubt and anxiety in the consciences of mankind—as to the sincerity of British policy and action towards the development of Rhodesia to democratic rule. And democracy, regardless of difficulties to define it embodies, in a wide sense, *consent of the governed* without regard to race, colour, or creed. This principle ought to take precedence over all other considerations. When Her Majesty's Government fails to enforce just processes of law and reason, there inevitably appears to be a connivance with its colonial leadership and deceit of international judgment so as to maintain domination of 4,000,000 Africans by 200,000 Europeans. After all what has been done cannot be undone, Britain will go down in history as chief architect in the construction of the colour curtain among the nations. Without immediate firm action in Rhodesia, a more violent situation will occur that will hurt the cause of inter-racial and international co-operation for generations to come.

## The Exile

*Perseveration is a theory I prove  
Every time I leave  
My country. In my difference from others  
Tall krantzies cut clean through me with  
their echo  
Table Mountain, Hex River  
Distances that give my love its tune,  
The aloe's intimate accordance with the sun.*

*But the mixing of people  
Out of simple friendliness and courtesy  
And the friendships between individuals  
Forged out of interests in common  
And not the colour of skin, the cruel  
Channelling of one or another Apartheid law  
Loads me with regret for the history I am.*

*Whenever I travel I am faced once more  
With the architecture of heaven  
And the anatomy of hell;  
Like two snakes they plait themselves  
Into a glittering ring  
That coils about me smothering my freedom  
Till I burn in my bones like a tree in a  
storm.*

*To purge the night from my nailed estate  
I have to bridge a full-featured nightmare:  
The abyss in my land between black and  
white  
And jail or death is the price for that.  
O my country, I have tried in vain to forget  
The red brand of your shameful darkness,  
The dear deep shapes of your prodigious  
light.*

*Only when your ice-making separateness  
Crawls back into a hole of the sun  
Shall I find peace who now am forced to  
roam  
Crossed with an anguished tenderness,  
The disgrace of those who stayed to fatten  
And the lean way of those who stayed to  
blast  
The high walls that keep their country poor.*

PERSEUS ADAMS