

had time to build up capital, if we want to construct the country we need not only technical resources but also financial resources." He couples with this an explicit preference for UN-IBRD, bilateral public, and private capital, in that order. He concludes, perhaps somewhat sanguinely, "I think that, so far as we are masters of our programme and our legislation, the concessions which we can make to public or private capital are concessions freely made by us".

Nigeria exemplifies a less radical approach in seeking both public and private foreign funds. The latter are sought particularly to complement private and public Nigerian investment in mixed corporations with Nigerian majority control. The theory is that substantial foreign private technical and managerial resources and training combined with substantial—but minority—ownership interest offers a speedy way to develop efficient industrial units; these have built-in technical-administrative Nigerianisation programmes. To date this appears to be working well.

There has been a growing responsiveness by industrialised countries to the concept of aiding industrialisation and accepting manufactured goods from the *Tiers Monde*; for previously even the Soviet Bloc has been hesitant about the latter despite tentative Czech and Polish commitments to Cuba and Mali. This new outlook was articulated in the 1963 US *Economic Report of the President*:

Systematic economic development . . . will result in large shifts in the structure of world trade . . . these [poor] countries cannot develop without an increasing demand from abroad . . . diversify their economies without export markets for their new products—especially light manufactures.

Three growing beliefs on the part of large expatriate companies are also hopeful in their implications. As expressed by Taylor Ostrander of American Metal Climax they are:

1. No company can afford an open break with the government in power (a position that in transitional and independent states has favourable, but in more "firmly" colonial, troublesome results);
2. The training of local technicians and managers combined with high wages leads both to high productivity (and low labour cost per unit) and to a more substantial domestic market (based on the higher purchasing power) thus putting profit and national development motives in at least basic alignment;
3. "Stability and order" based on repressive measures by unpopular governments create a *bad* climate for business investment and expansion [*vide* Zambia vs Zimbabwe today].

TO ASSUME these views are universal or that general congruity of interests will avoid hard bargaining and occasional clashes would be absurd. However, to view "Africanisation" of the economy as a philosophy rejecting needed foreign resources or current private and public investor attitudes as in inevitable conflict with national economy building, is luckily, equally unrealistic.

The most vital elements in creating African national (or supranational) economics are institutional and economic unit building. The Senegalese economist Mamadou Dia has centred his work on the economic aspect of this question, although this is often overlooked in concentration on the social aspect.

Properly speaking, there is no development of an independent economy—in so far as that can exist—without a network of economic, financial, and technical facilities, and above all, without a total reconversion of relationships between evolved economies and younger economies—of whichever camp, of whichever ideology. We know now that neither examples taken from the socialist camp nor those from the capitalist camp can serve as models without serious modification or thorough and profound readaptation.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PHASE of economic building in Africa involves, as the author of this article has argued at greater length in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, four major principles:

1. The creation of flexible policy-implementing institutions designed in the light of both present and desired economic structures;
2. A deliberate interrelated approach to sectoral institutions and policies to create reinforcing rather than competitive structures;
3. Progress toward functional multi- or supra-national economic co-ordination-integration in the areas of economic plan formulation, common services, exchange of data, and joint production (not *merely* vis à vis continental free trade);
4. A constant realisation that policy-institution complexes in emergent African economies *must* be different from those of the evolved economies for historic and cultural, as well as stage and goal reasons; and that a patchwork of diverse borrowings without national adaptation, synthesis, and creation is often little better than a unified copy. ●

## Self-Portrait

*I, the light in this long house  
Of bone and little muscle,  
Must praise this cancer of words  
Which lurches through my body;*

*(So curse on my father's blood  
For the lie of my country  
That jabbars in my image,*

*On the myths gone howling  
From my five hard masters  
Who teach me all by blows*

*And on my brothers of Africa  
Who preach freedom to my pulse,  
With time's mock and thorning.)*

*Where the cells of my ancestors  
Are buried in the church's burial,  
Are burned in the body's burning,  
I shall burn too in this bone-dry house.*

C. J. DRIVER