

actually sent troops to fight with the French army against the Algerians.

When it became clear that the Algerians were not going to be invited, Tunisia, Sudan and Libya, Monrovia group sympathisers, all left the Conference. This raised in exaggerated form, a further minor strand in the Pan-African web of ideas: the conflict between those who believe the Arabs are part of Africa and those who think black Africa should be united without the Arabs, who, to quote a delegate at Lagos, "always drag their own divisions into Africa." Perhaps the remaining delegates at Lagos felt an underlying sense of guilt about the Algerians, perhaps they were simply disappointed at the absence of so many others. Whatever the explanation, the departure of Tunisia, Libya and Sudan released a surprising flood of anti-Arab invective. Though it probably does not go very deep, it was symptomatic of an attempt to rationalise underlying emotions, which few were prepared to defend in public debate.

The Charter devised at Lagos is modelled clearly on the United Nations Charter, with the persistent emphasis on non-interference in each other's affairs. There is an elaborate three-tier structure of command: Assembly of Heads of States, Permanent Council of Ministers, and Secretariat. The Secretary-General's position is carefully spelt out very much on the lines of the U.N. Secretary-General—except that there is provision for his succession if he dies in office. The only important U.N. institutions missing are the Security Council and the veto. Much is made of the essential equality of all states, and the opposition to any "great powers" pretensions. The emphasis is upon isolating and building upon areas of common agreement, ignoring divisive differences. The Charter is to come into effect when three-quarters of independent Africa has signed it, when it will be registered with U.N. as a regional organisation like the Organisation of American States.

The prospects for the Lagos Charter depend upon two things. First, are the revolutionaries (Casablanca) prepared to work with the conservatives (Brazzaville) for functional unity—as the reformists (the middle states) have already indicated they can? Will Ghana and Guinea be willing, for instance, to sit round a conference table with the French advisers of some of the Brazzaville states? This problem goes much deeper than the question of which Charter everyone should sign: it is a problem of what price in terms of principles the Casablanca powers will be prepared to pay for unity now. It is a very real dilemma, not to be dismissed as a question of power-seeking or *amour propre*.

Finally, like all elaborate structures the success of the Lagos Charter will depend upon who is appointed as Secretary-General and what he is allowed to make of the position. If the new organisation is to amount to anything its Secretary-General must be able to speak with the authority of an international civil servant. It is hard to know at this stage whether a figure of real prominence and power is envisaged or would be acceptable in practice. No nation, no continent, has found it easy to unite or to accept a supra-national authority. It is hardly surprising that Africa, strongly charged as it is with nationalisms, should have failed so far to find a magic formula. ●

A "NEW AFRICAN" RE-VIEW

When men were "boys"

LEONARD BLOOM

IN 1950, Mannoni's *Prospero and Caliban: a study of the psychology of colonization* was first published in French. At that time, the imminent, speedy and sometimes violent overthrow of modern colonialism was unsuspected by the colonial powers, who were still motivated by a mixture of wishful-thinking and complacency. True, in 1947 India had won her independence and China had shaken off both the western powers and Japan. Yet the French, Dutch, British and Portuguese control of their colonies in the Far and Near East was only beginning to crumble, and Africa was barely stirring. Few questions were asked about less-known colonies: the Outer Russian republics and "satellite" countries, and those Latin American states that were economic fiefs of American business.

Not surprisingly, most studies made of colonial situations dealt with economic and political issues, and the handful dealing with psychological and sociological aspects of colonialism tended to be compulsively concerned with defending or attacking theories of the alleged intellectual, emotional and moral inferiority of subject peoples, and the equally illusory superiority of the rulers.

Mannoni's book has for its basic object the analysis of "the meeting of two entirely different types of personality and their reactions to each other, in consequence of which the native becomes 'colonized' and the European becomes a colonial." He argues that the assimilation of "European" culture by "native" (1) can succeed only if "the personality of the native is first destroyed through uprooting, enslavement, and the collapse of the social structure," (2) causes the "celebrated inferiority complex of the coloured peoples," which is the "key to the psychology of backward peoples, and their relationship of dependence upon the 'European,'" and (3) is hampered by the difficulty that "it is not yet clear how a personality originally constructed on the 'noncivilized' model can later produce a second, 'civilized personality'." Mannoni even appears

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to argue with the aid of quotations from and mysterious Jungian interpretations of a speech by Caliban, that the colonized peoples have *no* personality: either they are submissive, like Miranda, Ariel or Friday, or they rebel and oppose like Caliban, who was "mere bestiality."

The reviewer finished his rereading of the book, dismayed that so gifted a psychologist could fall into the same traps as the old-fashioned colonialist, for Mannoni's thesis is little more than a highly-sophisticated version of such tiresome myths that "the natives are only children," "the natives have only a thin veneer of civilization" and "the natives' have minds and bodies that operate fundamentally differently from ours"—views that are heard nauseatingly often in and out of parliament in this country and its neighbours. Mannoni, in his easy assumption of the odious term "native", tacitly subscribes to the belief that the world is divisible into two significant groups: *We*, the civilised, and *they* the "natives," the "uncivilised" whom we have come to set to rights—a belief at once unctuous, arrogant and with neither moral nor scientific justification.

What value has Mannoni's positing two antithetical groups: the "Native" and the "Europeans"? Is there a psychology of peoples, by which one can compare *the* "native mind" with that of *the* "European"? Or is this a novel version of the pernicious Group Mind Analogy that always appears to provide a spurious quasi-scientific buttress for the shady, shabby facts of economic and political exploitation? I have the gravest suspicions of any theory that discusses *the* mind of the X or Y group; it is highly questionable that any description of the behaviour of members of a group can be other than so abstract or superficial as to ignore the range of individual differences. Dr. Verwoerd and I are both no doubt "Europeans", but I shudder to think that according to Mannoni we have many deeply significant qualities in common *because* of our belonging to the same group. Apart from the many logical errors of the Group Mind view, grave dangers arise from its use in political argument. A. J. Toynbee condemns the humiliating inhumanity of the use of the blanket term "Native", a term that (like "Bantu") exacerbates the position of the inarticulate, unfranchised and underprivileged, for it lumps them into a congealed and formless group in which the individual is without character, individuality or worth.

In South Africa, the insulting assimilation of the African, Indian and Coloured individual to norms that are the fancy of the ruling-class is re-enforced by a psychological mechanism that Mannoni grossly under-emphasises: that it is often the coloniser who desires the dependence of the "native" upon him: the coloniser wishes to be the one adult in a world of children, a relationship lying behind the grotesqueries of some of the more repugnant institutions and prejudices of the white South African, such as the degrading term of address "Boy!", the African "house-boy's" uniform of coarse cloth that makes him a guy, an adult-child, and is a symbol of servitude, depriving him of his individuality. One does not *need* to understand an individual or to treat him as of equal humanity if he is as an indistinguishable part of a mass.

Mannoni fails to analyse motivation outside stereotyped, social, *external* behaviour, because he has accepted the myth of *the* "African personality", as he has accepted the myth of the "colonisers" and the "colonised" personality. It is arguable that much of the *apparent* conformity of the African and the *apparent* acceptance of discrimination are simply superficial defence-mechanisms, masking an inner seething hostility. It is difficult to rebel against a system that is imposed with the aid of armies and armed police. One has to thread one's way through the thickets of custom and the thorns of legislation, as best one can without too often being scratched. Because the cleaner calls me "Baas" or my university graduate friend goes quietly to the rear of the bus, does not imply their acceptance of the colonial situation nor that they feel inferior. Mannoni ought to wander through African townships, listen to road workers and labourers and have an African translate the songs and the jokes against the exploiting class.

Mannoni little appreciates the political difficulties of liberatory movements opposed by ruthless military and legislative machine. There is often a powerful political argument for non-violent resistance. This is no pathological sense of inferiority, but a shrewd appraisal of the present situation, and of the future after the colonial situation has been dissolved. In 1962, liberatory movements in South Africa cannot overthrow the system violently. After the overthrow of the system there will be an almost insatiable need for technicians and administrators that could not be met by the Africans, deprived of the opportunities for technical and higher education. It would be folly to argue from this technological inferiority, that Africans as a group feel, or in fact are, "inferior" in any significant sense.

Mannoni asks whether the turbulent situation of an individual struggling for assimilation into a society different from that into which he was born, does not make him subject to personality conflicts. This conflict is a product of the unwillingness of the dominant class to admit the essential equality of the subordinate class. The conflicts of so-called marginal men will vanish when society is itself integrated, and the hypocritical sobbing for the lot of the "detrified", educated African in fact is intended to drown the cries of Africans for equal educational and economic opportunities.

Mannoni, like others sharing the values of a colonising élite, is concerned with pseudo-problems: he assumes an altogether exaggerated rigidity of personality and a grossly underestimated power of social forces to achieve rapid and permanent change.

Mannoni does not appreciate that as the balance of political power changes, so too will the ethos of society, and the mass-media of information will be compelled to swing into line. Many people will be unwilling or unable to change their values and style of life. Some will welcome change. Many more will be indifferent, and will live and believe as they see society dictate. Given massive shifts in power and changes in law, it will be possible to combat the evil hangover of colonial attitudes, and the dichotomy of "coloniser" and "colonised" personality will be readily seen to be the fiction that it is. Further, many members of the dominant class cannot move, and therefore will be compelled to adjust

to changes in social evaluations of the members of society. Even in 1962, "Boy!" is slightly less respectable than it was 10 years ago. But as homogeneity becomes marked with the rising social, economic, and educational standards of the formerly dominated classes, so it will become less strain for the formerly dominating classes to accommodate. The common humanity of erstwhile exploiter and exploited will be demonstrated and reinforced by economic and political integration. ●

Jazz Could Use

A "new thing" out of Africa

JOHN BARKER

WHAT HAS BEEN Africa's contribution to modern music? In modern classical music a purely African influence would be hard to detect. Stravinsky, Ravel, Malhaud and Debussy have all written works inspired by jazz, but their flirtations with the music have been temporary and of little importance.

It is in jazz music alone that a pure African influence is clearly discernible. Of all the creative arts, jazz, owes its greatest debt to Africa and it is through jazz that African music has reached a high point in its development.

If an art form can be considered the sole property of any one group, then jazz belongs to the Negro. Without wishing to sound like a member of the Race Classification Board, I must qualify this by the use of the term, 'American Negro'.

For obvious reasons, mainly his closer contact with European music and its instruments, the African in America was able to translate his musical language into what has now become a universal form of artistic expression, but the African element is, or should be, basic to the music.

I say "should be", because there are ominous signs that these basic elements are in danger of being discarded in a search for more freedom of expression often associated with the term "far-out".

One such exponent of "the new thing in jazz" is Ornette Coleman, a saxophonist, who claims—among other things—that his instrument is only an imitation of the human voice. No one can quibble with this. Louis Armstrong has achieved the same effect without ever claiming to do so—but Armstrong has never lost contact with the beat, which is the life blood of jazz. By contrast Ornette Coleman could dispense with his rhythm section which provides him with his only real contact with jazz and we could then rightly speak of a "new thing", but it would not be jazz.

All this has great relevance for the aspiring African jazzman who, with his daily contact and instinctive feeling for the music of his people, could put back into

jazz all that is most vital to its healthy development. At the same time he could give a lead to his American counterpart, who is seeking a cure for the malaise in which the new music now finds itself.

Up till now African jazz has been little more than a carbon copy of the American "thing". In a sense this is understandable and much the same can be said of Swedish or British jazz—but the African musician is in a unique position. The modern American or European jazzman must, in all fairness, seek his inspiration in the somewhat sterile atmosphere of Greenwich Village or even Brighton Pier whereas every African musician has a ready-made supply of exciting rhythms and harmonies begging to be incorporated into his music.

It would obviously be fatal for African jazzmen to follow a line of separate development or to create a "music within a music", but they should not be blinded or more appropriately deafened to the fact that many of the exponents of the "new thing in jazz" would receive a much needed lesson in harmony from any Zulu road-gang.

Any African musician, who ventured to criticise the modern American jazzman, would lay himself open to the jibe which Eddie Condon, a White guitarist from Chicago, delivered at Hugues Panassie, the French critic: "How come these French cats are telling us how to play jazz? Do I tell Panassie how to jump on a grape?"

So far, with the possible exception of Kippie Moeketse, an alto saxophone and clarinet player of considerable promise, no African jazzman has successfully introduced even the most basic elements of African folk-song into his music.

Recently, Quincey Jones, one of the most advanced composer-arrangers in jazz, reviewed a record which featured a South African group, on the Voice of America Jazz Hour. The group concerned were "The Jazz Epistles" and contained probably the finest line-up of local talent available, including Kippie Moeketse and the Cape Town pianist, Dollar Brand. Quincey Jones was favourably impressed but he pointed out that "The Epistles" were only a reasonable facsimile of the average modern American group. Where, he wondered, were the yet unplumbed resources of African tribal music and why were they not reflected in the music?

This is evidence that the American jazzman is looking to Africa for inspiration. He has been responsible for the phenomenal development of a basically simple tribal music into a highly sophisticated art form and he has every right to expect a contribution from the African jazzman.

When Tony Scott, a leading American clarinetist, visited South Africa, he was quick to sense the jazz quality in the playing of the young penny whistlers, who are so much a part of Township life. These same penny whistlers can be heard stopping the traffic in most of our cities and Tony Scott was not the "only cat who flipped." White office workers, whose taste seldom rises above Elvis Presley, have shown more than a passing interest in this exciting music.

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