Goa and Walvis Bay

THE UNCTIOUS EXPRESSIONS of injured indignation with which white South Africans reacted to the Indian conquest of Goa hardly deserve to be taken seriously, except as an indication of National schizophrenia. After all, if they were taken at face value, we would be forced to believe that Mr. Nehru’s moral integrity is the primary interest of South African newspapers and politicians, that South Africa has paid strict attention to the resolutions of the United Nations on apartheid and the Indian question, that it had not incorporated South West Africa and that it had never expressed predatory territorial ambitions towards the protectorates.

As a colonial enclave in an independent state, Goa’s continued presence was a constant source of irritation to the oldest and strongest opponent of colonialism. India has pressed for its incorporation ever since it gained its own independence fourteen years ago. Its failure to achieve any co-operation from the Portuguese led it to use force when it appeared that Portugal would continue to disregard the attitude of the U.N. What may be difficult to understand is why it chose the present time in which to act. No complete explanation is, of course, available, but Mr. Krishna Menon’s comment on arrival in New York last month may provide a clue. He indicated that India does not discard the possible use of force in dealing with China if it continues to encroach on the Indian North-East boundary. Quite clearly it could not protect its territorial integrity against China, while continuing to tolerate a long-standing insult to it in Goa.

For South Africa, the whole episode may carry a significant warning if U.N. pressure results in an independent South West Africa in the future, as it may well do, the position of Walvis Bay as a South African enclave—and a vital one at that—may present an identical problem to the South African Government. And if agreement cannot be reached on its peaceful incorporation, the same methods may be used to acquire control of it.

Remote as this possibility may seem for the present, we believe that it has not been overlooked by the Nationalist Government. And this, together with the total rejection of South Africa’s policies by the General Assembly, may be the explanation for Dr. Verwoerd’s hysterical outburst against the U.N. as an agent of communism, in his New Year message. Perhaps it is meant to prepare the way for a withdrawal from the U.N., just as similar propaganda paved the way for our departure from the Commonwealth.
Exploding Non-violence

THE FIFTY-YEAR TREK towards political equality of black and white in South Africa was led by new ideals in the ANC’s Passive Resistance campaign of 1952.

They were interracial co-operation and non-violence. But new fears and the growth of the police state came out of it too. The disillusion they spread was too strong for the interracial ideal. By March, 1960 it was inevitable that a campaign like the one around Sharpeville should be racially exclusive, though it was still resolutely non-violent in intention. So, though to a lesser extent in both respects, was the 1961 “stay-at-home” campaign.

Now, in its turn, non-violence has been dropped—the strength of its lost appeal being measurable by its twenty-one months a-dying since Sharpeville.

Only in the future can we know whether the return to interracial action in the two sabotage groups which began operations in December, 1961 is a hopeless comeback, doomed by the forces which killed the once universal non-violence.

It may be that effective interracial action will now be confined to the sowing of destruction and death. If so, the continued success of White domination in its apartheid form will be to blame.

It may also be that even such interracial co-operation as survived Africanist exclusiveness will be rejected by Black racial dogma. The co-operation did survive—Sharpeville would have had half its impact had a white photographer not been there, and liberals of all groups fed the Africanist-led strikers at Langa and Nyanga. If even this is rejected in time, the continued success of White domination in its apartheid form, will, again, be to blame.

S.R. FRANCHISE

White Island, Black Ocean

SOUTHERN RHODESIA has an African population of about 2,380,000, and a European population of about 220,000. This is to say there are approximately twelve Africans to every European.

The Southern Rhodesian Parliament has been exclusively white for the last 38 years—i.e. since the granting of a responsible government in 1923. There exists in Southern Rhodesia a highly restrictive qualified franchise which enfranchises the greatest number of Europeans, but disfranchises the greatest number of Africans, and this has been the African’s sore-point.

The African people have no confidence in this qualified franchise because it has been used for almost forty years to deny them their political rights. They regard the present franchise law as a piece of political humbug from start to finish. In order to reverse this type of franchise, the African people demand universal adult suffrage—one man one vote.

On the other hand, however, Europeans are scared by this demand. Their political power has been based on limiting the number of African voters to a point of political ineffectiveness. The argument that the European does not want to give the African the vote because the latter cannot exercise his vote responsibly is a conscious or unconscious effort on the part of the white man to maintain his privileged position obtaining nowhere else in the world.

The present Southern Rhodesian franchise has given rise to a curious and dangerous situation—namely, the African people are governed without their consent. Their parliamentary leaders are chosen for and are thrust on them. The African people have no control over their European-chosen European leaders. They demand the vote so that they may elect and control their leaders. They want a government which derives its authority from the majority of the people, and not from a minority.

On 26 July last year a referendum for Southern Rhodesia's new constitution was held, and the new constitution, which had been rejected on 23 July in a separate National Democratic Party referendum, was accepted. There were over 41,000 European voters who registered on 26 July their “Yes” to the new constitution. But on 23 July there were over 476,000 Africans who recorded their “No” to the new constitution.

The new constitution provides for A and B rolls. The former has higher qualifications than those required for B and the latter has lower qualifications than those prescribed for A. The A Roll is predominantly European whereas the latter is almost exclusively African. The Legislative Assembly is to comprise 65 members, 15 of whom will be chosen mostly by the B Roll voters and the rest mainly by the A Roll voters.

Europeans have hailed this new franchise arrangement as revolutionary in the politics of Southern Rhodesia. “For the first time in the history of Southern Rhodesia,” they congratulated themselves, “we shall have at least 15 Africans in the Legislative Assembly.” They urged the supporters of the National Democratic Party to take full advantage of these 15 seats. The National Democratic Party had to answer the important question: Shall the N.D.P. participate or not in the forthcoming General Election under the new constitution?

REV. NDABANINGI SITHOLE, chairman of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, was treasurer-general of the National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia, and is the author of African Nationalism.

THE NEW AFRICAN JANUARY 1962
In a Conference of about 500 delegates from all over Southern Rhodesia—urban and rural—there was a unanimous rejection of any form of participation by the N.D.P. under the new constitution. The reasons for this rejection are very enlightening, and I may as well give them here.

One country delegate, amid loud applause, declared, "We reject rule by minority, be it black or white, even if it were to last for 24 hours only. To go in for those 15 seats is undoubtedly to endorse minority rule, and to repudiate majority rule."

Another country speaker followed up, "There is no question of even considering 'trying to work from within.' Only dead men work within the Lion's stomach, but only serve the Lion's interests. Hence, the N.D.P. cannot ever work from within, without being swallowed up for ever."

An urban delegate pressed his point of view thus, "The franchise under the new constitution aims at creating in Southern Rhodesia an island of white rule in an ocean of black rule."

Another urban speaker reminded the conference, "Sir Edgar Whitehead has assured the white electorate that under the new constitution Europeans will remain in power for a long time because of the mechanism of the franchise."

Various speakers drew the attention of the conference that the President of the Party had described the new constitution as white-man-to-white-man agreement, that the special Congress of last June had completely rejected the new Constitution, that the N.D.P. referendum of 23 July, had also overwhelmingly rejected the new constitution, and that it would therefore be inconsistent to participate under the African-rejected constitution.

Non-participation by the N.D.P. under the new constitution meant that the N.D.P. as a party would not sponsor any of its supporters as parliamentary candidates, that it would not sponsor any independent candidates with N.D.P. backing, that it would not encourage eligible Africans to register as voters under the new franchise, and that all presently registered African voters should return their "voting cards" to the returning officer. This is to be total non-participation in the forthcoming General Election under the new constitution.

This decision has been criticised by liberal European elements as unfortunate. It affects the C.A.P., the N.A.P. and United National Front which could easily capture some of the 15 seats if the N.D.P. had not decided to discourage Africans from voting and from registering as voters. If this boycott of the General Election succeeds, it means the next Southern Rhodesian Parliament would be based on the consent of the white electorate only.

Last October the U.F.P. held its Congress and came out with proposals to dismantle the colour bar, to end all racial discrimination, to throw open some hotels, restaurants, and cinemas to people of all races. The Congress also suggested big land reforms. Following these wide-sweeping changes, Sir Edgar Whitehead and his U.F.P. supporters have embarked on what they have called "Build-a-Nation" campaign. They have set aside £250,000 to sell their policy to what they have described as "the moderate African" in urban and rural areas.

The U.F.P. programme aimed at removing the soil from underneath the feet of the N.P.D. They hoped to liquidate altogether the N.D.P. as a political force.

On the other hand, the N.D.P. have been quick to point out that while these reform proposals are good in themselves, they did not solve the basic problem of Southern Rhodesia. In Northern Rhodesia, in Angola and Mozambique, for instance, the African has most of the land (about 99% of it), but this has not solved the basic problem in these countries. Multi-racialism cannot solve the problem in S.R. The only solution to the present problem is the granting of the vote to the majority of the people.

With regard to Sir Edgar's "Build-a-Nation" campaign, African nationalists have severely questioned his sincerity, and have gone to the extent of accusing him of trying to dupe the African people. In substance, "Build-a-Nation" campaign is "Build-the-U.F.P." campaign. It is far from being national in its approach and ideology. It aims at catching the limited African vote. It is clearly a political campaign as the following facts reveal:

1. At the U.F.P. Congress of last October, neither the white U.F.P. nor the black U.F.P. delegates said a word about the country's franchise. This is based solidly on racial discrimination and is heavily weighted against the African people, who are in an overwhelming majority.

2. The denial of the vote to the majority of the people is synonymous with the denial of the same people to national status. Hence the U.F.P.'s "Build-a-Nation" campaign is either a "Build-a-White-Nation" campaign, or, "Build-a-Nation-of-Hand-picked-Voters."

3. In some of his recent political pronouncements, Sir Edgar Whitehead has frankly told the white people that "Straightforward white supremacy" must go. This is to say that the appearance of white supremacy must go. What remains? Of course, the reality of white supremacy. Hence the shrewd observation of African nationalists that these window-dressing solutions will not solve the political realities facing this country. The country should be engaged in tackling realities rather than appearances.

4. The U.F.P. Government has not made any effort whatever to repeal the obnoxious Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, the Preventive Detention Act and the Public Order Act which aim at suppressing the African politically. If their intentions were sincere they would repeal these Acts, and thus demonstrate to the African that their "Build-a-Nation" campaign was truly national and not political.

5. There are many government-created elements which build walls between the major racial groups of this country, and hence militate against the whole theory and practice of nationhood. Unless these divisive elements are removed, the African will continue to regard the "Build-a-Nation" campaign as a piece of political humbug from start to finish.

Southern Rhodesia's basic problem is one of franchise. Unless that is solved tension will continue to grow.
The Stolen Fruit
Promise
TREVOR BUSH

Does Communism, or even sympathy with the Socialist bloc, exist in South Africa? If so, how far-reaching is such influence likely to be?

WE CANNOT MISINTERPRET the official policy: “South Africa is the bastion of the West on the Continent, in fact the only real friend that the West can count on”. It is represented as the champion and saviour of white Christian Democracy, feverishly preparing to resist the onslaught of the godless black masses who, both to the North and within the country itself, are secretly indoctrinated by Moscow and Peking and prompted to erase the white man from the Continent and to substitute a massive dictatorship of the proletariat. We are not understood or appreciated by those whose true interests we are preparing to defend: The great Western powers are woefully ignorant of what is going on and consequently misled by the “liberalistic” press into active support of black nationalism and misunderstanding of South Africa’s true motives.

To give effect to this impressive foreign policy, this universal exercise in altruism, Verwoerd demands absolute and complete extirpation of all remaining communistic elements at home. Anything which may “further the causes of Communism” must be firmly squeezed out, and it is the Government’s sole prerogative to decide whether a person or movement falls into this category or not. Underlying the execution of this prerogative is the conviction that all left-tending attitudes must inevitably assist the growth of Communism and its ultimate victory. So a Liberal is on the second or third rung of the downward ladder. The important fact is that he is on it and that his gaze is downward. In similar condition is the lady of the Black Sash, the member of the Institute of Race Relations, most members of the Anglican Church, all Roman Catholics and all members of the Progressive Party. Some are much further down than others: members of the Congress of Democrats, the Indian and Coloured People’s Congresses and the S.A. Congress of Trade Unions have descended to the limbo of the completely lost, perverted and depraved. It is all a matter of degree of lostness. But one thing is certain from the start: All opposition to Dr. Verwoerd, in view of the sacred cause upon which his government has embarked and the critical struggle upon which his knights have set out, is treachery; flirtation with the scarlet lady of the Apocalypse, i.e. with International Communism itself.

So much for the official attitude. But in a country which claims to have a democratic system of Government, albeit a minority monopolistic one, the question certainly arises: “What of the electorate? What does the average white man in South Africa think about Communism in his own country?”

Ignorance, Government-inspired, is the primary answer to the question. The white South African is unable to understand and therefore incapable of recognising, let alone judging, Communism when he sees it. No Communist literature is permitted to enter the country, no Communist journals or papers are tolerated on the home front, and no Communist may air his views in public or explain his standpoint.

South Africans do have indirect contact with the “real thing”, however, through the columns of newspapers which present a one-sided commentary on events emerging from the cold war. But there are no cultural exchanges with Communist countries as in Britain, no trading contacts and no ecumenical relationship with the great Russian Orthodox Church. So the public knowledge of Communists and Communism is generally limited to such items as Soviet test-bomb series, the space-flight of Yuri Gagarin, Mr. Khruschev’s more dramatic announcements, the memory of the Hungarian rising, Tibet’s disappearance behind the Bamboo Curtain, the Amethyst incident and paper-back rapings of German frauleins by Russian soldiers at the end of the last world war. For background must be added what was there all the time, almost a part of the local folklore: Russia remembered as the poverty-stricken godless jungle of 1919 and the early twenties, a vast territory tyrannised over by blood-thirsty cossacks and containing a peasant population constantly fearful of the Siberian labour camps or the out-of-hand executions of the O.G.P.U. firing squads. It is the country which swallowed Napoleon’s armies long ago and Hitler’s more recently, and which can therefore never be fully understood but always feared.

Only a small number of intellectuals and abnormally curious people succeed in crossing the news barrier in search of wider and more dependable information. Clandestine study of smuggled copies of World Marxist Review, China Reconstructs, Labour Monthly and other journals; the occasional, almost accidental, opportunity to read a full Khruschev speech or books such as Woddis’s Africa, the Roots of Revolt; an odd Marx, Lenin or Engels classic dug up in a University library cellar, or the contact with reality inevitably consequent upon travel abroad... these are the lot of the privileged few who can weigh up the two sides of the question in the Western democratic manner and cast their vote for or against what is at least a vitally important world philosophy.

No study of the subject would be complete, however, if confined to the hot-house and unreal atmosphere of the whites-only electorate. South Africa is a country of fifteen million people, not three million. It is therefore necessary and important to discover the attitude of the black man towards Verwoerd’s Bolshevik bogey.

Since 1912 non-white South Africa has struggled and pleaded without violence for a reasonable share of the good things of the homeland: for the basic freedoms, for education, for enough land to support the farming community, for employment at a decent wage and for the right to enjoy security and peace when life’s work
is done. But throughout the fifty years each request or demand has evoked the opposite of what was desired, the reduction rather than the increase of basic human rights; until now even the organisations through which past approaches were made have been outlawed and driven underground. Despair is inevitable in such circumstances, and despair, in a proud and suffering people devoted to its children can only prompt new and stronger measures of resistance. "What do we do next?" "To which source do we turn for help?" Not spoken assistance. Words, as Macmillan has stated in another context, cannot solve all problems. True, United Nations resolutions condemning South Africa have a limited effectiveness; so have boycotts and the breaking off of diplomatic relations. But these things are not enough. It is not only sympathy and conditions that are required. Malnutrition cannot be reduced with fine speeches, however much they may move the emotions and stir the compassion of the whole civilised world. There must be action. There must be a future for the children who are at this time being indoctrinated for the underdog and his emancipation. And the few individual Communists he has known in South Africa, the seeds of the possible future. Thanks to Verwoerd's Nationalists themselves, and their evident fear of free and open discussion and information, the stolen fruit from behind the iron curtain promises to be a more welcome and life-giving diet than the bitter grapes of three hundred years of Western neglect and starvation.

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A More Timid Scapegoat

R. N. NORDAU

Jewish South Africans after Verwoerd's letter

WHEN DR. VERWOERD used the Liberian motion of censure on South Africa at the United Nations as an opportunity to revive Afrikaner Nationalist anti-Semitism, few people who remembered his earlier activities can have been surprised. But quite a number were shocked at what they thought was a combination of political ineptitude and thick-skinned bravado: after all, it requires something bordering on courage to be an anti-Semite in the 1960's.

As several newspapers were quick to point out, Dr. Verwoerd is an old-hand at Jew-baiting. During the pre-war years he was an active advocate of immigration quotas for Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany, and, until it became clear that Hitler was going to be defeated, his newspaper (Die Transvaler) poured forth a stream of anti-Semitic propaganda. All of this was perfectly consistent with Nationalist Party policy, which refused membership to Jews in the Transvaal, demanded restriction of Jewish membership of the professions and suggested a boycott of Jewish business. The cry was taken up enthusiastically by the Blankwerkersbeskermingsbond, the Reddingsdaadsbond, the Greyshirts, the Ossewa-brandwag, newspapers—which will be remembered for the "Hoggenheimer" cartoons—and even by leading members of the Dutch Reformed Church. (The present scriba, of the Cape D.R.C. is on record as having called for a "second trek"—of Jews and Jingoes" in 1940.)

It would be only too easy to explain the whole unpleasant incident which occurred recently in terms of the case-histories of leading members of the Government, but to do so would be to ignore both the obsessive pre-occupation with race which marks the Nationalists, and the careful thought which Dr. Verwoerd must have put into his decision to send a reply to Mr. East's letter. Like most obsessions, the Nationalist feeling about

R. N. NORDAU is the pseudonym of a young Jewish lecturer at a South African university
the Jews bears no relation to the facts. South African Jews constitute a small proportion of the white community, incapable of influencing economic or political trends to any substantial degree, even if they wished to do so. In terms of economic power, the middle-class status of the vast bulk of Jews makes it virtually impossible for them to exert any real influence over the economy: they are as much at the mercy of big industry as anyone else, and their dependence on Government permits and similar regulatory measures is perhaps an added reason for insecurity. In terms of political activity, all the evidence points to an overwhelming fear of becoming involved in any issue that will make them conspicuous as a group.

On the few occasions on which they have, as an organised group, indicated any attitude to the Government or its leaders, it has been a rather pathetic sycophancy. Thus the Jewish Board of Deputies has studiously avoided committing itself on any political issue, content to let its members and steadfastly refuses the numerous invitations extended to it by outside bodies to associate itself with protests in which other religious groups have joined, while the Cape Town Jewish Community took great pride in inscribing Dr. Malan's name in the Golden Book of the Jewish National Fund.

In like manner, those Jews who expressed themselves publicly when Dr. Verwoerd's letter was made known hastily dissociated themselves from Israel's vote on the motion of censure or apologised for it. In private, many chose to criticise Mr. East's frightened exculpation as having "provoked" the reply in the first place, bemused the fact that Israel had let them down as part of White South Africa, truculently announced their intention to stop contributing money to Israel, and talked of the fine things that Dr. Malan and a group of D.R.C. predikants had done by visiting Israel.

All this suited the Prime Minister very well. He was able to stage a strategic withdrawal, characteristically made in what was described as a 90-minute impromptu speech to Witwatersrand Nationalists, and to leave the Jewish population thoroughly cowed and content to show their anger by protesting to Israel behind the scenes.

Meanwhile, Dr. Verwoerd had achieved a number of very useful objectives. He had successfully turned attention away from the condemnation of South Africa at the U.N., and Holland's vote for it. He had aroused old memories among loyal supporters of a battle that could be used if economic conditions in the country really took a turn for the worse in the future. He had found another scapegoat, and a much more timid one at that, which could be substituted for the "English Press" after it had been dealt with. And he had shown that feeling on race in this country need not be confined to colour groups.

Whether he will choose to take the matter any further for a little while is something on which it is fruitless to speculate. No doubt he will, when it suits him to do so, and when he has made up his mind quite what he wants to do.

Then we shall know whether the Jews have lost another tribe or merely gained another ghetto.

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**Uhuru—A Liberal Twilight?**

**ANTHONY DELIUS**

**IT IS NOT EASY** to be a liberal in emergent Africa. In fact as we face 1962 we must ask whether it is possible to be a liberal at all, any kind of liberal, rash or cautious, on our continent in this era. Liberals may sneer at the tough expediency of Communists and Nationalists, yet without a slide-rule of priorities and tolerances their own chances of recognisable survival are going to be slender among the protean realities of Freedom and Uhuru. But is liberalism with a slide-rule any longer liberalism?

The question is not asked out of dialectical perversity. A clear means of making public sense out of events in Africa, and therefore of acting with logic according to the interpretation, is absolutely necessary for liberal survival with self-respect anywhere on the continent. For we have arrived at a very curious position.

The whole of Dr. Verwoerd's case for moving with gathering speed into a completely authoritarian state now rests upon an eagerly anticipated 90 percent 'failure' of liberal democracy in independent Africa. Contrariwise, the liberals, whether consciously or otherwise, are nevertheless relying upon at least a 51 percent "success" of liberal democracy in Africa to help the revival of liberal democracy in South Africa. The lower percentage expectation shows the basic realism of liberalism as against the romanticism of Nationalism.

Of course, from the beginning it was obvious that the coming of national independence and democracy to Africa was going to be no more orderly than the arrival of the same blessings in Europe. Nobody in his right historical senses would have believed that Africa would achieve in a couple of easy stages what it took Europe from the French Revolution till World War II to achieve. But somehow the crash of tottering thrones and collapse of effete aristocracies seems different to the departure of colonial administrations and the destooling of chiefs. In the resultant confusion it is beginning to appear even to some liberals, that the Africans are letting the side down.

After two years experience of independence at full-speed-ahead there is general horror at the lack of finesse of Africans at home and their appalling stridency abroad. Chaps whose lives were once bound by colourful ceremonies of ethnic good manners and even ate their mothers as a gesture of filial piety, are now discovered to be bristling with left-wing boorishness. Indeed, the one huge casualty of the African scene at the moment appears to be liberal democracy, the Great...
White Mother of independence—and the Black politicians who are so busily gobbling her up show no filial piety whatever.

Lament over this development generally concentrates on the demise of democracy in Ghana. The previous over-praise of the charming Kwame Nkrumah has now been replaced in the Western press with an almost equally exaggerated disillusion. But the tally doesn’t stop there—Nasser’s Egypt, Toure’s Guinea, Keita’s Mali, Abboud’s Sudan, Ahidjo’s Cameroons, Houphouet-Boigny’s Ivory Coast and a dozen more besides are there to fill out the depressing picture of liberal inviability.

To the question of just where does liberalism appear to have some hold in Africa, including South Africa, the answer can only be a tentative one. With a certain temporary assurance one may say Nigeria, Senegal-Gambia, Gabon, and Tanganyika are actively concerned with it. With less certainty one can add that Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, about half a dozen ex-French territories, Liberia and Ethiopia are in various tenuous ways endeavouring to beat a path towards liberal democracy.

I have seen only one statesman in Africa described firmly as a liberal, and that is Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria. Two others give the impression that in their heart of hearts they might be, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika. It may be that Tom Mboya is one as well. But they all make pretty strange liberals to the orthodox eye.

For instance, Sir Abubakar is a member of the dominating Northern People’s Congress. This party is the instrument of the powerful Fulani aristocracy. Although Sir Abubakar can in no way be described as a stooge, he is to a certain extent the nominee of the Sultan of Sokoto, the Northern Region’s Premier. Traditional loyalties are still so strong that the NPC holds 160 out of 170 seats in the Northern Parliament, and the Northern Premier refuses to recognise the remaining 10 as an official opposition.

However, whether Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigerian Governor-General and once leader of the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), or Chief Abofemi Awolowo of the Action Group, could have led Nigeria so successfully through its first year of independence is debatable. Yet both lead parties which are far more liberal democratic in outlook, though neither numbers among its members the most convinced opponents of bribery in all Africa. It is Sir Abubakar that has had to invoke the solid Bill of Rights and even the integrity of the Federal Police Force against the Action Group.

Although Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia of Senegal are not prepared to accept the Marxist methods of Guinea or Mali, they lead mass parties based on certain Marxist theories. Liberalism might even find the social mysticism of Pan-Africanism and Negritude hard to swallow—but Senghor mixes them cheerfully into his democracy.

Julius Nyerere, a sophisticated Catholic trained at Edinburgh University, has long been the darling of liberals in the West. But Nyerere has moved strongly not being hampered by any Bill of Rights in Tanganyika’s constitution. Nor does he really want to have to tolerate any effective opposition for a decade or so while he settles the territory’s internal and external relations. The reason he gives for not wanting opposition is the same as Nkrumah’s—that it would simply make use of disruptive tribalist appeals.

(How different is the basic reason for Dr. Verwoerd’s dislike of opposition in South Africa—his fear that it will tend to play down the tribal and sectional differences!)

Then we have Kenyatta and Mboya in Kenya already struggling against a host of tribalisms and a demand for regionalism in an effort to produce an effective central Government in Kenya. The federal system which at the moment preserves democracy in Nigeria and might even help to restore it in South Africa, seems to offer only chaos in Kenya, chaos in a welter of sectional opportunism. But together with their centralism Kenyatta and Mboya, unlike Julius Nyerere with his centralism, are prepared to have a strong Bill of Rights.

In this necessarily brief survey of the more democratically hopeful signs in Africa I have touched only upon the least remarkable of the confusions. Any liberal adaptation to this continent will have to make far greater compromises with reality than I have indicated here if liberalism is to stay in the race. The basis on which any liberal reassessment must be made is put with great clarity in Thomas Hodgkin’s African Political Parties—an African Series Penguin which no liberal
in Africa should miss. He remarks:

"One common source of confusion is the European belief that, when African leaders demand 'democracy' for their territories, they are seeking to transplant to Africa modern British, French or Belgian institutions; criticisms of insincerity are then heard when it becomes evident that African political systems are evolving upon other lines. It is equally unreasonable to suppose that, if African nationalists do not use the term 'democracy' in a Western liberal sense, they must be employing it in a Soviet Communist sense.

"In fact, a fairly well-defined set of objectives have come to be associated with the term... These objectives have much more in common with the aims of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century democratic movements of Europe and North America than they have with the aims of contemporary liberals or Communists."

The first of these aims is, naturally, 'independence', the getting rid of a foreign ruling power and replacing it with the rule of a party representing the people. This means, too, full adult franchise—and the Northern Nigerians who don't allow women the vote are called 'undemocratic' by African nationalists. Another object is to weaken tribal loyalties so that they become merged into a larger national loyalty, and this also means the decline of chiefly powers. A third general aim is the rapid spread of literacy. A fourth is the conversion of the economy from what is very often a subsistence economy with a single cash-crop to a more diversified one. A new hydro-electric project is almost as essential a part of 'democracy' as an African Cabinet.

As Hodgkin points out:

"The main point to grasp here is that African parties are essentially eclectic. Methods of thought, ideas and terms are taken over, not only from revolutionary democrats and Marxists, but also from Ghandist, Islamic and Christian, as well as from indigenous African sources. They are fused together to form a new, nationalist ideology, varying according to local conditions, yet possessing a certain underlying unity."

The South African Government's ideas of 'development along their own lines' for the Africans of the Republic are only very superficially in tune with the developments of a recognisably African political thought elsewhere on the continent. There the chiefs and elder tribal systems are everywhere under attack and on the retreat—even if it is a long slow retreat as in Northern Nigeria. Nkrumah is applauded among the African masses everywhere when he says, "We must insist that in Ghana, in the higher reaches of our national life, there shall be no reference to Fantes, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagombers, strangers and so on, but we shall call ourselves Ghanaians...

Measure this against the fantastic suggestion put out to the world by our new Secretary for Information, Mr. W. C. du Plessis, when he tried to give some idea of what would result from applying Verwoerden concepts to Ghana:

"I believe that it will finally become what it should have been from the beginning: a communalist dictatorship governed by a Paramount Chief supported by (continued opposite)
thought up a good phrase here, 'all roads lead to Johannesburg') and turns tsotsi and bumps off a kaffir-boetie who is in fact the son of another kaffir-boetie who is the particular boetie of this priest-kaffir who now goes to Johannesburg along one of the roads and tries to hound his kaffir son down like the dog that he is; however he finds that the cops have done this first, and everyone dies happily ever after and this kaffir goes up on to a hill to see how great the sun looks and to think better about what a great kaffir he is."

Now, this seems to me to be a great plot, but I'm not sure that it is original; I feel I've read a story like that before, but I don't know where. And I am surprised that he, the least colour-conscious of men, uses the word "kaffir". I think "Bantu" is so much more refined.

Anyway, kept company only by his record-player, a pair of blue-crested madrigals, his beard and the shade of Faulkner, Wild Al works on his novel; occasionally breaking off and letting the crags resound to Faulkner's Nobel Speech, muttering—after the "I decline to accept the end of man" bit—"famous last words".

"There is one word," said that other novelist, Hammering Hank James (so I read in that valuable new Pelican, The Modern Age) "which you must inscribe upon your banner, and that word is Loneliness." So Wild Al. Not so my other novel-writing friend, Dr. Anthony Barker, whose first fine book was non-fiction and called Giving and Receiving. Barker's novel is being written in the early hours of the morning and late at night, for he and his doctor-wife, Maggie, are in charge of a mission hospital in Zululand with over 400 patients. Anthony has a beard, too. He and his wife are among the great New Africans, a warm and complementary pair; Anthony is outgoing and volatile, Maggie serene and sensitive. Both have immense talents, which they put to work selflessly.

As the shadows fall across Table Mountain (where from? it worries me) and the swans twitter in the dusk I cast my eyes to the ground and examine the pensive stones and twisted toe-nails cut from the feet of who-knows-whom. Twirling a broated Arabesque across this lofty vale my thoughts surge and belch to a dying fall. Ah, nature!

The devil-may-care reader who has persisted so far will by now have gleaned the muted and throttled chaff that litters the lower layers of my pastoral journal. This column has no real pretensions to humour; a flash here and there perchance, but essentially a bucolic, nay, colic, notebook in limpid, lax and lapidary style, wafted to the New Africa by the gentle driblets of breeze caressing the rugged shale of Table Mount. If you really want to be amused, go read Great Expectations. It's a great novel. I kid you not.
In Search of Africa

LESLE RUBIN

The theme of the Eighth National Conference for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO was “Africa and the United States: Images and Realities”

For the South Africans who attended the conference, one of its highlights was the enthusiastic response to the news that Albert Lutuli had received the Nobel Peace Prize. The announcement was made at one of the plenary sessions. When the Chairman reported the decision of the Conference committee to send the Chief a congratulatory cable, there was a burst of excited applause from the hundreds of people present. And when the session ended, clusters of the remainder of the 2,000 delegates stood around discussing the timely recognition of the man’s dedicated service to the cause of reason and sanity in South Africa.

There was much speculation as to whether the Chief would be permitted to leave the country in order to receive his award. Most of the delegates I spoke to were pessimistic. This was not surprising. Dr. Verwoerd’s government has been singularly successful in persuading informed American opinion that a South African passport is one of the weapons in the apartheid armoury employed to cut the African off from the outside world. Among the delegates was Lewis P. Nkosi, already in his early twenties, regarded as a writer of considerable promise, who is studying at the Graduate Center, Harvard University. The Conference was divided into four Sections, Education, Science, Culture and Communication, and each Section, after holding one general meeting, divided into Panels. Lewis P. Nkosi was one of the four members of the Panel on Newspapers, Periodicals and News Agencies in Africa, in the Section on Communication. With him on the Panel, was Carl T. Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State. It was widely known at the Conference that Nkosi was refused a passport last year and issued, instead, with an exit permit the effect of which is to make his return to South Africa—where he was born—at any time in the future, a criminal offence. As was to be expected, delegates who heard him speak, felt a deep sense of shock at the thought that this promising young man was an enforced exile from his own country. Their comments underlined the protests voiced from time to time by Die Burger against action by the South African government which is calculated to damage South African’s reputation among the countries of the western world.

If Nkosi had been granted a passport, his criticisms of apartheid would have been listened to. But the South African government has made it easier for him to expose their policies that it could ever have been. Now it is not so much what he says, as what the government has done, which creates the picture of South Africa in the American mind. The new Minister of Information may be interested to know that the comment heard more than once was: “Where else, outside Soviet Russia, does a government do this kind of thing to a young man who seeks to take up a scholarship at a University?”

The South Africans at the Conference presented a wide range of interest, background and experience. Among them were visitors to the United States, enforced exiles, voluntary exiles; men who had left South Africa to make their homes in other African countries, Europe or the United States; students, University teachers, writers, newspapermen. Rene de Villiers, of the Natal Daily News, was a member of the Panel which discussed the image—the central theme of the Conference was “Africa and the United States: Images and Realities”—of the United States presented in the African press and radio. One of his fellow-panelists was the National Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Party, Louis Martin, a Negro. Absalom Vilikazi, an early academic exile, participated in a discussion of basic African values. He is now Professor of Anthropology and African Studies at Hartford. Ezekiel Mphahlele, formerly of “Drum” in Johannesburg, was among a group of distinguished African writers who attended. Until recently on the staff of the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, he is now in Paris as Director of the African Program, Congress for Cultural Freedom.

His autobiography “Down Second Avenue,” well known in the United States, has been translated into a number of European languages. Among those who discussed African art was Selby Mvusi. I had seen him last at his home in Cato Manor. He is now an Art Teacher, at the Goromonzi High School. Southern Rhodesia. Selby Ngcobo, formerly of Fort Hare, now on the staff of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, participated in two Panels, one on Economic Planning in the New Africa, the other on University Institutions in Africa. Other participants from Natal were Leo Kuper, presently at the University of California, Arthur Lazarus, Principal of Sastri College and President of the Indian Teachers’ Association of South Africa, and Violaine Junod, now at Boston University.

These South Africans played their part in the achievement of one of the important aims of the Conference—the presentation of a true picture of the Africa of today. There in Boston, they were all-White and non-White alike—Africans. This was seen to be reality; and what was said and written in Cape Town or Pretoria by Ministers and officials, in Parliament and the Press, was seen to be fantasy. They were helping to fill in the answer to the question asked by the American today: What are the achievements, the problems, the hopes, the fears of the peoples of Africa? And they were doing so alongside men and women from the Rhodesias, Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana, the Republic of

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Madagascar, Tanganyika, the Congo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Mali; discovering through the variety of differences—in race, language, culture and history—an inescapable community of interest and destiny, as part of the emerging Africa of today.

I know of no proved means of determining whether a conference has achieved its purpose. But the overall aim of this conference was improved mutual understanding as between the United States and Africa, and if frankness on either side is a valid criterion, the conference went a long way towards achieving its purpose. It was characterised by plain speaking and blunt questions. There were many Africans who were as uninhibited in admitting their own shortcomings, as they were in drawing attention to American faults. On the opening day of the conference, Nathan Shamuyarira, a newspaper editor from Southern Rhodesia, discussing the dominant "images and realities" which influenced relations between the United States and Africa, said: "The first reality is in your own treatment of your Negro population. This population is now American in every sense of the word. But its colour and descent has an emotional appeal and is a direct link with the African peoples." Jaja Wachuku, Foreign Minister of Nigeria, expressed the same thought more forcibly—I spoke to Africans who deprecated the tone of his remarks—when he spoke of the "blood-link" between Africa and the United States, and said that the inferior status of the Negro "must be eradicated immediately in order to win the whole support of Africa." Professor St. Clair Drake, a Negro, defined racial Pan-Africanism (as distinguished from political Pan-Africanism) as the desire of Negroes, wherever they may be "to feel proud and unashamed, proud of their colour, their hair, their lips. The prejudice and propaganda of white men have destroyed this core of self-esteem or threatened it."

From Alioune Diop, Director of Presence Africaine, the brilliant African, born in Guinea, whose home is France, came the statement: "The African has suffered more from being kept from the table of human dignity, than from hunger and want."

Several African delegates told me that they had found the conference rewarding. Some spoke—they were English speaking—of the benefit they had derived from contact with Africans from the French territories. Others valued the opportunity of exchanging views with white men on concepts like "the African personality." Others again, were excited by the discovery of kinship, in many ways, with the American Negro. The Americans felt that they had learned much, and realised that they still had much to learn. The Chairman of the conference, Professor Vernon McKay, speaking about American knowledge of Africa said "we have done much to broaden it, but we have a long way to go in deepening it."

* * *

For a South African the conference was a sad experience. It served to emphasise that his country, as it is governed today, has abdicated its right to participate in the exciting emergence of the new Africa. Its people—all of them—are, of course, unalterably part of Africa. They will take their place alongside the other nations of Africa. And they will do so—if the feeling of most American delegates is any indication—much sooner than the white man in South Africa realises. But it is sad to be reminded that the most developed country in Africa, the country which might have taken the lead in the process of African emergence, is in the grip of rulers who seem to have withdrawn from the world of reality into a dream-world of their own.

The conference made one thing quite clear. That the United States as the leading power in the western world is deeply committed to a policy of the closest cooperation with the new Africa. If the Republic of South Africa persists in resisting the tide of progress in the new Africa, she can expect only increased and new pressures from the United States.
A Case of Incompatibility

T. R. V. BEARD

"One Party Government" by Julius Nyerere,

TO THE OVERWHELMING majority of people on the
African continent political freedom is equated with
freedom from colonial domination. Put more positively,
freedom means sovereign independence, no more and
no less. This is hardly surprising when we consider that
the history of modern Africa is largely the history of
colonialism, and the history of the last decade is the
history of the attainment of independence of the larger
part of colonial Africa. This natural preoccupation
with independence in Africa has meant that comparatively
little thought has been given by Africans to the prob­
lems of self-government and to the forms of government
most suited to African states. This is not to say that
African political leaders have not realised the extent of
the tasks and the problems which face the underdeve­
loped countries of Africa, or that they have not worked
out or adapted or borrowed theories for dealing with
these problems. It is only to say that there has not yet
been sufficient time for such theories to have been fully
developed or to have been tested in practice.

So it is with great interest that we can turn to the
article by Julius Nyerere entitled "One Party Govern­
ment" which appears in the first issue (November 1961)
of the new Tanganyika journal Spearhead. I have
always been a great admirer of Julius Nyerere, for he,
more than any other African political leader in power,
talks the language of tolerance, of justice, and of sound
common sense. To me, he and the Prime Minister of
Nigeria are the outstanding statesmen in Africa. Looked
from discrimination and from indignity, but also free­

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in 1959, and is now lecturing at Rhodes University,
Grahamstown.

Tanganyika, like many other African countries, has
reached independence with only one organised political
party of significance. This is the result of historical
circumstance, for political differences were submerged
in the interests of the struggle for independence from
British trusteeship, and now Nyerere's party, T.A.N.U.,
has emerged not only as the governing party but as the
only party of any size, holding every seat in the legis­
lature. At the present time T.A.N.U. has the support
of the overwhelming majority of the people of all races
in Tanganyika and there is a manifest enthusiasm for
progress. There is little doubt that economic, social and
political development will proceed at a much greater
pace if this enthusiasm and this spirit of unity lasts, and
it would be a tragedy if serious political differences
were to arise before the economic "take-off" has become
a reality. This is what Mr. Nyerere believes too, and
this is what I take to be the raison d'etre of his article,
but I do not think that his theorising is consistent with
his own beliefs and this is what I shall devote the
remainder of this review to trying to show.

Mr. Nyerere's aim in his article is to show that not
only is his concept of One Party Government an expe­
dient one for many of the new states of Africa ("There
can be no room for difference or division" and "This
is our time of emergency"), but that it is also demo­
ocratic and therefore acceptable in principle. To do this
he makes three main points. These are, firstly that
the African concept of democracy is similar to that of
the Greeks and can be simply defined as "government
by discussion among equals". Secondly he claims that
organised opposition is not essential to democracy; two­
party government is only one of the forms, and his
concept of One Party Government is merely another, to
some people a strange, form of democracy. And thirdly
he puts forward what he says are the essentials of
democracy which consist of the freedoms quoted above,
and with which obviously the "forms" must be con­
sistent.

Athenian democracy was indeed "government by
discussion among equals"; but it was also a consciously
contrived form of government which was introduced as
an alternative to oligarchy and as a protection from
tyranny. In other words it was also a method of dealing
with the problem of power, a method of endeavou­
ing to prevent the abuse of power. Athenian democracy
was of course direct democracy, and so, as Mr. Nyerere
points out, is "too clumsy a way of conducting the
affairs of a large modern state." Common to both
Athenian and representative democracy however, is the
idea of voting, and of the people being able to change
policies and leaders if they so wish. And this is how
both attempt to deal with the problem of power. The
implication is that because of this problem of power,
the form of democracy is of the greatest importance,
for it must allow the people to change policies and
leaders by voting, if they wish to make such a change.
As Mr. Nyerere says, democracy is the opposite of
government by force, so that he must agree that the
people must be able to change their government by
peaceful means.

Democracy is first and foremost a system in which
there is a 'built-in' or institutionalised method whereby
the government can be changed peacefully, and politi­

Mr. and Mrs. Eric Louw wish all their friends and other well-disposed fellow-South Africans a Happy Christmas and a Prosperous New Year—Leader page advertisement in the Cape Times.

Muizenberg is dying a slow death. Why? If one visited Muizenberg on Sunday, 26 December, one would have observed a big contributing factor. There were thousands of brief-case Natives shouting and pushing everybody out of the way — Letter to the Cape Argus.

Gentleman, 48, seeks genuine and sincere friendship, house and car. Interests general — Personal column, Sunday Times.


Kgosana tells his plans * Most gruesome murder ever — Cover of Drum.

A few years ago an annual income of R2,000 was a reasonable goal for a young man. Today, with increased taxes and higher living costs, you need R4,000 a year to buy what R2,000 used to buy. This change in values is only one of many changes taking place in Southern Africa—Advertisement in Sunday Times (E. Brett).

(a) The Maritzburg Conference also resolved . . . to call on the people to organise mass demonstrations throughout the country on the eve of the declaration of the Republic on May 31 — New Age, March 30, 1961.
(b) S.A. POLICE UNCOVER NATIONWIDE PLOT. The South African Police have uncovered a plot for nationwide non-European demonstrations when the republic is declared at the end of next month — Sunday Times main lead, April 16, 1961.

In The Story of a Crime, the Committee pointed out that in no instance was the evidence of a witness for the defence accepted in preference to the evidence for the prosecution, although more than once the witness for the prosecution was a Native and the witness for the defence was a white man or woman — 2,000 Casualties, a history of the S.A. Labour movement, by I. L. Walker & B. Weinbren, SATUC, 1961.

Africans, see NATIVES — Optima, volume 7, 1957. Index.

A One Party System is therefore a system in which it is virtually impossible to dislodge the government, and if opposition is not allowed it is impossible to change it, at least without bloodshed. A One Party System, as such then, is not one of the possible forms of democracy. The only remaining alternatives to a two party system are therefore either a multi-party system, or else a system which does not involve political parties at all.

Mr. Nyerere makes what is essentially an academic point when he writes:

"I am sure that even my friends in the Labour Party or the Conservative Party in Britain would admit that if their party could succeed in winning all the seats, they would be perfectly happy to form a one party government. They, the winning party that is, would not be likely to suspect themselves of having suddenly turned Britain into a dictatorship!"

Both parties in Britain ask the electorate to give them a working Parliamentary majority and no more. Even if one party was returned in all seats the defeated party would still have a nationwide organisation, would still have a large portion of the daily press supporting it, and as long as it was allowed to continue to organise there would still be the prospect of its returning to power. It is almost certain in any case that the electorate would swing against the government for no other reason than that it feared a single party parliament. But the main point is that only an organised party is able to dislodge an organised party, so that freedom to organise opposition to the government is crucial.

The third of the main points in Mr. Nyerere's theory is that freedom (a topic to which I shall return) is essential in a democracy, and this brings him to his
final definition of democracy which is as follows:

“When, then, you have the freedom and well being of the individual; and where the individual has the right freely and regularly to join with his fellows in choosing the government of his country; and where the affairs of the country are conducted by free discussion, you have democracy.”

The right freely and regularly to choose the government places a limit on the possible forms which a democracy may take. There can be no choice unless there are alternatives from which to choose. And it is only possible to unseat a government at an election if there is an alternative government to elect in its place. If there is only one party, whatever the purpose of an election may be it is not to choose the government. It can at most be no more than an index of the popularity of the government, an index which will be measured not in terms of who the voters voted for, but in terms of the number of votes and the number of abstentions and spoilt papers. Unless there is an opposition there is no way of unseating the government at an election, and unless the opposition is organised the chances of the government being defeated are negligible. In short, a free choice implies that if there are to be parties at all then there must be at least two parties. Mr. Nyerere insists that “we should not let our unity be destroyed by a desire to follow somebody else’s book of rules”, but this is not a matter of “books of rules”, it is a necessary condition of free elections. The theory of One Party Government is not a democratic theory for it does not provide for a ‘built-in’ and institutionalised method of changing the government.

* * *

I began this review with the observation that to the majority of people in Africa, freedom means sovereign independence. This is in striking contrast to the liberal idea in which freedom means freedom from the constraint of the government, or liberty from the state. Mr. Nyerere’s concept of freedom obviously includes this idea of freedom from the tyranny of the state, but he is naturally more concerned with what is popularly known as freedom from want, for this is at present the most pressing problem in Africa. As he puts it, “Freedom alone is not enough; there can be a freedom which is merely the freedom to starve.”

In short the welfare state is a minimal need in Africa, and in all probability socialism will have to be taken further than it has as yet been taken in Britain for example. Mr. Nyerere however has nothing to say about how political socialism can be protected in Africa and his theory of One Party Government makes no allowances for the guaranteeing of individual rights, and the limiting of the powers of the state over the individual. The best way of retaining unity in African states and of ensuring that full attention can be paid to economic development would be by first securing political freedom so that people may then go on to devote themselves to the social and economic issues. It would be a mistake to ignore political rights in the meantime because the other needs are so pressingly urgent. If people begin to feel that they lack political rights they will turn from the problems of economic development to fight for these rights, and the very lack of political rights will be the cause of the disunity that Mr. Nyerere so fears. With political rights secure people will feel free to tackle poverty and starvation, illiteracy and education, health and economic development.

The incompatibility of Mr. Nyerere’s theory of One Party Government with his own concepts of democracy and freedom, is further illustrated when he asserts “Given a responsible opposition I would be the first to defend its rights.” I said earlier that Tanganyika and some of the other African states will have a better chance of rapid development if they can go forward in unity and with common purpose, and I agree with Mr. Nyerere that it would be a tragedy in the case of Tanganyika if political disunity and opposition were to arise before economic take-off has been achieved. But they should go forward not succouring any theory of One Party Government; rather should they go forward attempting visibly to further the interests of all the people within the country and so maintaining a voluntary and enthusiastic unity, while leaving the way open for the development of an opposition. The answer then to the allegation “This is a one party state and therefore undemocratic” is simply “There is nothing to prevent people from organising an opposition if they so wish, and this is a one party state only because there is no significant section among the people at the present time who are opposed to the government”. This is quite a different kettle of fish from the theory of One Party Government, and this is what Mr. Nyerere himself implies when he says that he would be the first to defend the rights of a responsible opposition.

On the other hand Mr. Nyerere states that “It is... the duty of the government to safeguard the unity of the country from irresponsible and vicious attempts to divide and weaken it...” and he is concerned about people who create problems of law and order. This of course does constitute a problem, but it should be made quite clear not only that such matters will be dealt with in a manner consistent with the Rule of Law, but that the laws under which subversives are dealt with are consistent with political freedom.

The problem of the power of the state is one which will have to be faced in Africa, and I hope that it is soon realised that a single party system does not provide a solution to this age-old problem because it contains no built-in check to the abuse of power. This too was one of the main failings of Marx, for he thought that once classes had disappeared there would be no problem of power, and this paved the way for the abuse of power by the so-called leaders of the proletariat, so that in the name of the proletariat the proletariat are themselves oppressed. We in South Africa, are certainly aware of this problem of power, more so than anywhere else in Africa, but I am not sure how many of our unenfranchised majority realise that mere enfranchisement is itself no guarantee of freedom. It is an essential condition of freedom, but it is only the beginning of the story. For, as Mr. Nyerere so aptly observes, “True democracy depends far more on the attitude of mind which respects and defends the individual than on the form it takes.”
Cattle

DENNIS BRUTUS

"THEY'RE HUMAN," Peter said bellicosely, his words spurred with sleep. We stopped chatting, waiting for the cascade. Sylvia stirred expectantly, pink knees showing, and then saw brightly, seeing nothing was going to happen again, "Go on." She twinkled her eyelashes at me.

"I said they're not all cattle," Peter asserted stubbornly. But I went on talking, trying to get them on my latest hobby-horse.

"That is one thing," I repeated defiantly. "This is the thing that can keep whites and blacks together. It won't be whites versus blacks. Already we've got some winces—and there will be more when things get really tough."

"You hope," Peter grunted. "How do you know you're right? What evidence have you got for this optimism?" He shook his head like a dog and straightened up from the table. The table wobbled on uneven legs and he reached out a hand to steady the chipped cup on the table. He looked at it curiously, studying his gnarled hand that curled round the earless cup. Then he half-filled it. Gulped it down. "What this country needs is a dictator who has specialized in appued psychology. Need I add," he turned his small eyes up to the ceiling so that the whites showed "for the benefit of the uninitiated, that that is what we have?" He looked at Sylvia in offensive inquiry and she shifted in her chair.

I nodded meaningfully.

He looked at me, eyebrows pushed up to form deep furrows in the short forehead. "This optimism, how do you arrive at it? 80,000 voted. About half the total white electorate. And they voted for 'No Change'. Sure, about 80,000 voted Prog-Liberal. You know what that means? Less than one-tenth."

"Some people," he cut in rudely. "Some people react in stupid ways. When a house catches fire some run for the fire-engine. Others," he thrust his squat nose and heavy jaw at me contemptuously, "fiddle with their fly-buttons." We drank together, the mixture of brandy and meths clawing at my throat as I swallowed.

"I was listening," he grinned again, wiping the liquor from his lower lip with a calloused hand. "It's the advance-guard of Spurious optimism. Why, some of them even think that—" he broke off again, his face stretched tautly in a rictus of amusement or strain. His mouth stood open. a string of white slime pushing down from the corner to hang whitely against the purplish darkness of his thick lower lip. He swivelled from the table to the corner.

"But that's not my point," I defended myself. "I said I thought the Convention Movement offered real hope—sometime in the future," I added hastily. "Of course, of course," he soothed. "I'm coming to that."

I looked at Sylvia. It was part of the show. His ability to take different threads and work them into a closely woven fabric out of which pattern emerged was part of his reputation. Often our crowd used to take bets about how we would trap him into failing to link widely different points. We hadn't succeeded yet.

Peter propped his elbows on the table and settled his chin in his hands. The light from the unshaded bulb shone harshly in his eyes and he bent forward so that the light caught surprising glints in the tight curls of his lifeless hair. He was greying already, I noticed, although he was not much over thirty.

"This Convention. I was listening." He grinned briefly with broken teeth. "It's the advance-guard of your 80,000—say 100,000—if you add the uncontested constituencies. And what does it represent?" He stared down into his cup and then re-filled it.

"Yes, but—" I protested.

"Some people," he cut in rudely. "Some people react in stupid ways. When a house catches fire some run for the fire-engine. Others," he thrust his squat nose and heavy jaw at me contemptuously, "fiddle with their fly-buttons." We drank together, the mixture of brandy and meths clawing at my throat as I swallowed.

"I was listening," he grinned again, wiping the liquor from his lower lip with a calloused hand. "What do they mean, these people? Your Malton—architect of qualified apartheid. Your Woolhope, covering a multitude of injuries with charity blankets. Your Scott, hiding the wounds of Miss South Africa with an inadequate sash. Your Silverberg, guarding the golden fleece of a liberatory movement that hasn't been built up yet, guarding it from your Yew who's so busy watching Silverberg that he can't see more than one-eighth of Verwoerd's iceberg on which they'll all be wrecked. Sunk—drowned!"

He looked into his cup moodily. Re-filled it from the bottle at his elbow. Sniffed at it puckering his face disgustedly. He looked up, his disgust taking in the noise from the other room where a voice went on monotonously "patha-patha, patha-patha" while hands chopped rhythmically.

"But there's hope for them. Hope for us all," His voice brightened. "They're not all voting cattle. That's the real ground for optimism—not your spurious optimism. Why, some of them even think that—" he broke off. "Of course, I don't qualify for any kind of qualified franchise." He drained his cup, grimacing at the liquor or the thought. "Some of them even think that I'M—"

He broke off again, his face stretched tautly in a rictus of amusement or strain. His mouth stood open, a string of white slime pushing down from the corner to hang whitely against the purplish darkness of his thick lower lip. He swivelled from the table to the corner.

From the dark corner came spasms of bestial sounds.

DENNIS BRUTUS is secretary of the South African Sports Association, a body to co-ordinate nonracial sport, and is prominent in the South African Convention movement. He was banned from attending meetings, and dismissed from his Government teaching post, in 1961.

THE NEW AFRICAN JANUARY 1962
Realities of Conflict

RANDOLPH VIGNE

Guilty Land, Patrick van Rensburg (Jonathan Cape and Penguin, London).

I value Patrick van Rensburg's book for the way it sets down the realities of conflict in South Africa. I value it for the way it separates out the issues of Africanism and liberal non-racialism in their present stage and in the phases to come. This has not been done before. Certainly no one has so bravely and sincerely committed himself in public to convictions about courses of action before us. And this in a situation of such rapidly changing conditions.

While groups of Congressmen, Africanists and Liberals are still pondering the points Mr. Van Rensburg has made up his mind about, even aware minds in this country who are not in these groups know nothing of the issues. Who has read Contact's leaders regularly, or Mafube or Fighting Talk outside the Faithful and the Special Branch? From Mr. Van Rensburg the growing hundreds of new Progressives, stirring from an age-long political sleep, must learn what it took the "genuine opposition" (Van Rensburg's phrase) so long and so many mistakes to find out about the people of this country and the political forces at work among them. Mr. Van Rensburg has also a sort of Burgess-and-Maclean interest for Afrikaners that will draw many to this book.

They and other interested parties will find in the opening chapters a sketchy autobiography which hardly gives enough for those who want to do Mr. Van Rensburg's introspecting for him. He sums up the years to the break with Government service as: "My childhood memories were of something different from Afrikanerdorn, and my first passion for Afrikaners was for a misunderstood and maligned people." The childhood memories are interesting as they build up the picture of the Natal high school boy from a broken home and a strong-minded grandmother's care, to the consulate at Leopoldville, and a slow change at the hands of one Roger M — who showed Van Rensburg "a life in Africa of which I knew nothing". On the pattern of South African diagnoses that have been appearing for a hundred years, autobiography, or travel notes, are followed by the author's personal account of South African history, in this case a sort of liberalized version of the nonsense he learned at school. After describing the career of the Nationalist government and cataloguing its repressive legislation, we reach these end chapters, which breathe a vitality rare elsewhere in the book. They cover the birth of the "genuine opposition", "Africans and Africanists", "The Role of the Liberals" and the West's burden of responsibility for overthrowing White domination.

He sees Verwoerd toppled by the West, which "owes Africa a debt of honour". He lays down that anti-whiteism will make immense strides in South Africa, and we will have our colour revolution. Black nationalism will have its hour and its purgation, and "somewhere in the future there is hope for an end to the agony". Mr. Van Rensburg gives the West and the Liberals their instructions in clear terms, and takes his leave.

Between finishing his manuscript and getting it to the public Mr. Van Rensburg will have heard of the sabotage at Fordsburg, New Brighton and Dube. He will have been amazed by the outcome of the sanctions failure at the U.N. — the decision to arrange for the freeing of South West Africa in May 1962. The courses of action Mr. Van Rensburg explores and pronounces upon have in fact already been broached. Parts of his book will date rapidly as his judgements are queued by events ahead. And when he says, for instance: "I no longer believe—as once I did—that the (Liberals) have a really major role to play in the liberation of Africans" one can well believe that Mr. Van Rensburg's other beliefs may well change, and change back again, as time passes.

There are also mistakes and gaps. He seems purposefully to ignore—since he does not even try to assess it—the chance of communist revolution. More seriously, he misses a point of real consequence: the failure of the Congresses or Liberals to gain a mass following, due to the lack of rapport between these organisations and the mass. (Yet in his appreciation of the growing force of black racialism, he is suggesting just such a drawing power as does not exist now.)

For all that, it is, I repeat of great value to have this picture of Mr. Van Rensburg's thoughts and convictions a few moments ago in the rapidly developing situation here. Mr. Van Rensburg may have taken risks with his absolute judgements on delicate, half-formed issues but all can learn from the picture, and admire the example.

The story of the resistance to the introduction of women's passes in Zeerust

THE DOMINEE AND THE DOM-PAS

MARY ANN WALL

This is a summary of the Rev. Charles Hooper's book Brief Authority which was banned in 1960. As Anglican Rector of Zeerust he saw the grim repression of the Bafurutse by the police.

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