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SUMMARISED MINUTES OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN  
SOUTH AFRICAN AND UNITED STATES DELEGATIONS,  
27 JANUARY 1984, FLEUR DU CAP, SOMERSET WEST

The two delegations were led by the Honourable R F Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Dr C Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Annexure A gives the names of other delegates. Formal discussions lasted three hours and were followed by a working dinner and informal talks lasting five hours.

MINISTER R F BOTHA welcomed the United States delegates and expressed the view that events in Southern Africa had reached a stage where a breakthrough was possible but that it was in fact a delicate phase. THE MINISTER then indicated to the United States side that he had a number of aspects to discuss, notably SWA/Namibia and Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and certain bi-lateral questions.

DR CROCKER thanked the Minister for his welcoming words and after agreeing with the programme for the discussions, replied to the Minister's initial remarks with the observation that time was in fact ripe for talks.

THE MINISTER opened the discussion on the SWA/Namibia and Angola subject and mentioned that he had an idea to discuss and "test". It had not yet been discussed with the South African Government but the idea was to discuss the matter and to see how it would fit into overall events. The Minister's idea was that it may have become time for wider discussions to be held by representatives of Angola, Unita, the SWA internal parties, Swapo and South Africa.

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As things stood, Luanda said the Cuban forces in Angola were there because of South Africa's aggression but South Africa believed the Cubans would stay in Angola because of the successes of Unita. Unless something happened, the position would remain the same, the civil war would continue and complicate matters in SWA/Namibia.

THE MINISTER continued to advise the United States delegation in confidence that a Zambian emissary of Pres. Kaunda had been to see the Minister and had indicated that Pres. Kaunda was very concerned about the war situation and was appealing to the South African Prime Minister to use his influence to stop the violence and to get rid of the Cubans. In a further communication, Pres. Kaunda blamed South Africa for the war. South Africa replied inter alia that Africa's poor administrations were responsible for the fact that Africa was the laughing stock of the world. Two interesting elements had emerged from these contacts:-

Firstly that according to Pres. Kaunda, African leaders were interested in developing a group of leaders to form a defence line in Africa against the Soviet Union.

Secondly, Pres. Kaunda thought South Africa should meet with Swapo.

The Minister had stated publicly that Swapo could meet with the SWA/Namibian Administrator General but Swapo's reaction to that was such that it had become difficult to agree to such contact at this stage. The South African Prime Minister also stated that South Africa would guarantee the

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safety of Swapo leaders visiting SWA/Namibia for such talks. Pres. Kaunda had also asked the Minister to issue a statement to say that the idea of a meeting was not dead. The idea was to get some action before 31 January 1984. If the ceasefire (suggested in December 1983) could come into force both sides would get a taste of peace. But it was important that no information should leak out beforehand because it would damage the chances for peace.

THE MINISTER then put it to the United States delegation that South Africa's willingness to engage in a ceasefire and communicate with Swapo formed the basis for the idea to spread the net wider. If South Africa was prepared to talk to Swapo, Luanda should be prepared to talk to Dr Savimbi of Unita. Against that background, the comprehensive talks suggested could take place in the United States of America or elsewhere in the form of proximity talks or any other acceptable form. There was also a chance for talks between the South African and Portuguese Prime Ministers. It was clear that it may be difficult but South Africa had indications that Swapo was even prepared to hold talks in Pretoria.

The fact was that opportunities had to be used - also to get the MPLA and Unita to talk. Enough spadework would make it possible. THE MINISTER concluded that it was a good stage to pursue the idea and suggested a discussion.

DR CROCKER agreed and said that he had a few questions to ask. Was Zambia under the impression that South Africa would talk to Swapo?