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Goolam Vahed

Department of Historical Studies, University of KwaZulu Natal, King George V Ave, Durban 4000, South Africa

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Cricket and corruption: the post-apartheid relationship between India and South Africa within and beyond the boundary

Goolam Vahed*

Department of Historical Studies, University of KwaZulu Natal, King George V Ave, Durban 4000, South Africa

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International sports sanctions against the apartheid government resulted in the isolation of South African cricket from 1970 to 1991. When South Africa was readmitted to world cricket, India was the first to welcome the ‘new’ South Africa onto the international scene and the team played three one-day internationals in India to much fanfare and capacity crowds. The game of cricket has changed dramatically since South Africa’s readmission. These changes include the emergence of powerful television stations and mega-dollar payments, which has shifted the power away from administrators, the ‘invention’ of a shorter version of the game (T20 cricket), and the formation of the Indian Premier League (IPL), which attests to the power of India in world cricket, as well as betting and match-fixing. As a result of television, cricket is now a global game that can be watched all year round. This growth has been accompanied by seccier developments, with betting scandals involving some of the great names in international cricket being one example. All though this period, India and South Africa enjoyed a ‘special relationship’, one that culminated in the sack of Gerald Majola, the Chief Executive of Cricket South Africa, and Lalit Modi, Chairman of the IPL, followed by a souring of that relationship with the appointment of Haroon Lorgat as CEO of Cricket South Africa (CSA) in July 2013 against the wishes of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI).

Keywords: race; apartheid; cricket; IPL; match-fixing; neo-liberalism

Introduction

1990 was a turning point in South African history. The ANC was unbanned, Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and negotiations to end the apartheid system gathered steam. It was also a key moment in global politics. As the Cold War petered out, protests against the Soviet regime intensified and the former Soviet bloc began to crumble. A distinct ideology was sweeping the world, neo-liberalism, which was a direct challenge to inward forms of industrialisation, protectionist barriers, and state intervention. Open markets, deregulation and enhancing the role of the private sector in society were all encouraged. The ANC, given the historical legacy of apartheid, seemed at first to want to buck this trend. South African president Nelson Mandela spoke about nationalisation as a central tenet of ANC policy while a redistributive socio-economic programme, driven by the state and aimed at alleviating poverty, coalesced around the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

*Email: vahedg@ukzn.ac.za

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Did some special relationship develop between India and South Africa?

There was certainly the appearance of that ‘special relationship’ at first. Mandela’s visit to India earned great acclamation. The South African cricket team toured India to a rousing welcome in 1991. Indian consulates began to spring up in South Africa. There was an enduring universalising humanism associated with Mohandas K. Gandhi, who spent most of the years from 1893 to 1914 in South Africa, and Mandela, who spent 27 years in prison. Gandhi provided ‘the most durable ethical link joining Indian with South African projects of political modernity’ (Worsby 2011, 254). Mandela (1999) himself would say of Gandhi:

> From his understanding of wealth and poverty came his understanding of labour and capital, which led him to the solution of trusteeship based on the belief that there is no private ownership of capital; it is given in trust for redistribution and equalization. Similarly, while recognizing differential aptitudes and talents, he holds that these are gifts from God to be used for the collective good. He seeks an economic order, alternative to the capitalist and communist, and finds this in sarvodaya based on nonviolence. He rejects Darwin’s survival of the fittest, Adam Smith’s laissez-faire and Karl Marx’s thesis of a natural antagonism between capital and labour, and focuses on the interdependence between the two … As we find ourselves in jobless economies, societies in which small minorities consume while the masses starve, we find ourselves forced to rethink the rationale of our current globalization and to ponder the Gandhian alternative.

Has the relationship between India and South Africa bucked the globalisation trend? The post-1990 cricket relationship between India and South Africa serves as a prism through which this relationship is examined. Specifically, this paper focuses on three key moments viz. South Africa’s Goodwill Tour of India in 1991; the betting scandal involving South African captain Hansie Cronje in 2000; and bonus payments to the Cricket South Africa (CSA) CEO, Gerald Majola, in 2009. As a background, this paper begins with a discussion on India’s role in the international boycott of apartheid sport.

**Boycott of apartheid sport**

Deeper segregation of South African society following the coming to power of the National Party (NP) in 1948, led to mounting international pressure to boycott South African sport. Australia’s 1969/1970 tour of South Africa was the country’s last official international contact. On 17 March 1973, non-racial sports organisations within South Africa established the South African Council of Sport (SACOS), adopting the mantra ‘No normal sport in an abnormal society’, to present a coordinated response to organised white sport (Nauright 1997, 140). Externally, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) was formed in 1974 to pressure for an international boycott of apartheid sport. Dennis Brutus was president of SANROC and when he went to teach in the USA, Sam Ramsamy, a South African born individual of Indian origin was in charge of almost all SANROC activity. Ramsamy was a founder member of SACOS before going into exile in London where he joined SANROC. When Brutus went to the USA, Ramsamy (2004) resigned his job as deputy principal of a school to work full-time for the organisation.

Enuga S. Reddy, who was born in Andhra Pradesh in 1924, but has lived in the USA for most of his adult life, played a prominent role at the United Nations (UN) in ensuring that that body was actively involved in the boycott of apartheid sport. Reddy had gone to New York to study and secured a job at the UN Secretariat after completing his studies. He was Principal Secretary, UN Special Committee against Apartheid, 1963–1967; Chief of Section for African Questions, 1967–1975; Director, UN Centre against Apartheid, 1976–1984; and Assistant Secretary-General of the UN, 1983–1985. He was awarded the Padmashri, one of the highest civilian
awards of India, in 2000, and the World Peace Council Prize of the World Peace Council in 1982 for his contribution to the struggle against apartheid. A UN Special Committee against Apartheid was established in 1963 and in 1968, the UN General Assembly requested members to ‘suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime’. In 1971, the General Assembly adopted a special resolution calling on sports organisations to uphold the Olympic principle of non-discrimination.

The General Assembly appointed a committee in 1976 to draft an international convention against apartheid in sport. India was a member of that committee. The General Assembly approved an interim International Declaration against Apartheid in Sport on 14 December 1977. After years of negotiation, the final Convention approved by the General Assembly in 1986 laid down that signatories should prohibit entry into their country of sportsmen and women who participated in sports competitions in South Africa or those who invited apartheid sports bodies or teams officially representing South Africa. Aside from Ramsamy, other South African Indians in exile who actively promoted the sports boycott were Kader Asmal in Ireland; Hanif Bhamjee in Wales; and Abdul Minty, Jasmat Dhiraj and Bobby Naidoo in London (Reddy 1988).

One of India’s best tennis players, Vijay Amritraj, speaking at the UN Special Committee against Apartheid on 6 May 1988, spoke of the time he led India to the Davis Cup final in 1974 and was looking forward to winning ‘the Davis Cup for my country which had been my dream ever since I started the game’. After reading about apartheid he concluded:

Morally, it was an easy decision to make not to play the final but as a sportsman two thoughts kept coming into my mind. One was that we might never play in another final and the second was that we might never have as good a chance to win the Davis Cup. With the Government of India’s strong stand against apartheid we chose not to play. As a sportsman at age 20, I felt a little disappointed but my heart felt wonderful that I had somehow supported the struggle of a people fighting just to live like everybody else. Because of our default in that final it took just a couple of years to expel South Africa from the Davis Cup competition and thirteen years for my dream to come true and play in another final. (cited in Reddy 1988)

While non-racial cricket suffered in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, White cricket authorities broke the boycott by organising seven rebel tours featuring teams from Australia, England, Sri Lanka and West Indies at the height of the apartheid regime. These tours were orchestrated by chief honcho of white cricket, Ali Bacher, and funded by white-owned businesses. This defying of the international community allowed South African whites to remain competitive on the cricket fields. Most Black South Africans supported foreign teams during these ‘rebel’ tours (see May 2009).

Despite rapid political change from the late-1980s, SACOS stuck to its principle of ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’ and was sidelined by the ANC-aligned National Sports Congress (NSC) which had been formed in 1989 to oversee sporting unity (Nauright 1997, 154) According to an NSC discussion document dated September 1990, SACOS’ ‘strategies and tactics were static, outdated and counterproductive … Its actions are out of tune with those of the ANC which was spearheading the mass struggles … Its ideological rigidity is a fatal barrier to progress’ (Allie 2000, 194). The NSC opened a discussion with white sport bodies, mirroring the ideology of those in the ANC who believed that change would come through negotiation. Talks between the NSC, the (white) South African Cricket Union (SACU), and the ANC’s Steve Tshwete and Roelf Meyer of the NP from late 1990s resulted in SACU and SACBOC amalgamating to form the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCB) in June 1991 (Gemmell 2004, 194–197).

The UCB received recognition from the game’s governing body, the International Cricket Council (ICC) on 10 July 1991. India’s support was crucial. The support of the white members
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand was secured and South Africa needed the backing of at least one Black member, and that was India as both Pakistan and the West Indies opposed a speedy South African re-entry. Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in 1990, the movement towards establishing non-racial democracy in South Africa, and India’s emotional links with South Africa’s large Indian population influenced India’s decision to support South Africa’s application.

The Goodwill Tour of India, 1991

Following the ICC decision, Geoff Dakin, Krish Mackerduhj, Percy Sonn, and Ali Bacher embarked on a ‘Goodwill Tour’ of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, and Kenya. Indian officials, led by Jagmohan Dalmiya, requested that South Africa undertake a tour of that country as Pakistan had cancelled its imminent tour of India due to threats of violence from right wing elements in India. According to Bacher (cited in Vice 2011),

… when the South African party stopped over in Nairobi on the way back, he was sharing a room with Percy Sonn, ‘who said I thought we would be rushing into things if we accepted the Indian offer’. From Nairobi I (Bacher) called Steve Tshwete (democratic South Africa’s first sports minister). Latter said, “Put Percy on the phone” and Sonn changed his mind.

S.K. Reddy, an official of the former SACBOC, remembers that several Black members were reluctant to accept the invitation, but eventually agreed to break the two-year moratorium on international sport because India had been a long-time supporter of Black South Africans and they wanted to repay that support.

Events moved at a bewildering pace and barely five months after unity, South Africa found itself in India in November 1991 to play three one-day matches in Kolkatta, Gwalior, and Delhi. No black South Africans were good enough to make the team. S.K. Reddy accompanied the team and remembered being ‘treated like royalty’. In Kolkata, they were whisked off the runway and became part of a gigantic motorcade of scooters, tuk tuks and buses. It took three hours to travel 20 kilometres to the hotel as an estimated one and half million people lined the streets, waving flags and placards of support. The motorcade stopped twice to allow South African captain Clive Rice and officials to address the large crowds. The players were garlanded and vermillion, the traditional Hindu greeting, was put on their foreheads. The team was entertained in the palace of the Prince of Gwalior which set the trend of lavish extravagance. Some Black South Africans did not find it fitting, but ironical that India was the first to open its arms to South Africa, given the racial composition of the South African team, breaching of the internally agreed moratorium on international tours, and that the NP still ruled the country. All of this was ignored in the quest to fill the coffers of cricket boards. This reflected the triumph of commercialism in world sport from the late 1980s as political principles took a back seat. 10 November 1991 became a historical day, when the first match was played at Eden Gardens, Kolkata, before a crowd of 90,000. It was South Africa’s first international match for 21 years. India won the match by three wickets and the three match series 2–1.

Old anti-apartheid campaigner, Hassan Howa and several other SACOS members were critical of the tour. Howa told reporter Farook Khan that the tour was dishonest. ‘It represented only those players who enjoyed the great benefits of racial discrimination’. According to Howa, the reason for the tour was that Indian cricket chief Madhavrao Scindia was a close friend of Rashid Varachia and white officials, and the tour was just a financial arrangement. ‘It was not a South African team but a white South African team that went to India. It was a tour that should never have taken place. We were promised this when we began negotiations’. He felt
wounded because through the 1960s and 1970s, he had vetoed international tours by genuine non-racial teams, telling many great Black players to make sacrifices until genuine change had been achieved (*Saturday News*, 15 November 1991).

However, the ice had been broken. South Africa participated in the World Cup in Australia/New Zealand in February 1992 where South Africa exceeded expectations by reaching the semi-finals. The World Cup was followed by a tour of South Africa by India in November 1992. The Friendship Series, as the tour was labelled, was South Africa’s way of reciprocating support India offered to South Africa’s readmission to international cricket. According to Bacher, ‘we said to them that when we have our first international tour into South Africa, it would be India, as a gesture of appreciation for their support for our return to international cricket’ (Talya 2011). In fact, Willie Esterhuysen, a member of the Afrikaner Broederbond, recalled that during negotiations with the ANC in London in early 1990, that Aziz Pahad, who would become South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister in 1994, suggested that India should be the first cricket team to tour South Africa because of its support to the anti-apartheid movement (Hartman 2004, 231).

South Africa won the four match test series 1–0 and the seven match one-day series 5–2. Asked to predict the outcome of the series, Yacoob Omar, a SACBOC great, reflected the views of many Black South Africans when he said:

> I cannot identify with either team. It is difficult to forget the repercussions of apartheid which left me without a chance to compete internationally. Apartheid was destructive. I am simply a cricket stalwart now – I was born at the wrong time. The arrival of the Indian team has brought back old memories. It is opening up old scars. . . . We were not given the opportunity – there was a disparity in coaching and facilities. I cannot forget – I just cannot. (*Tribune Herald*, November 15, 1992)

Indian cricketers, however, were given a warm reception by local Indians who lined the streets of Durban to welcome them during a motorcade reception. The loyalties of many Indians lay with India, partly because of emotional ties with ‘home’ as well the alienation resulting from apartheid. Indian cricketers met Mandela at the ANC headquarters, visited African and Indian townships, and went to Pietermaritzburg where Mohandas Gandhi was thrown off the train. Almost immediately after the Indians departed, West Indies and Pakistan arrived for a triangular tournament in February and March 1993. This flurry of activity put South Africa well and truly back in the international fold. The haste, with which South Africa was rushed into international cricket, left the question of the racial transformation unresolved. Critics feel that white South Africans gained re-entry too easily, and therefore, did not have a need to truly transform the team. This issue continued to haunt the national team (see Vahed 2001a).

**Hansie Cronje and the match-fixing scandal, 2000**

Cricket betting is a multi-billion dollar industry. Fans and gamblers can bet on the outcome of matches, place bets on who will win the toss, when a wicket will fall, how many batsman will be out LBW, of which balls no runs will be scored, how many runs each batsman will score, and so on. Even if a bookie cannot determine the course of a match he or she can make lots of money through individual plays in a match. No one seems immune to betting – coaches, umpires, administrators, even groundsmen have been implicated in cricket corruption. South Africans, however, were shocked when one of their own was implicated in match-fixing.

Hansie Cronje, captain of the South African team that toured India in 2000, was a national hero. He had impeccable social credentials and, as a born-again Christian, was portrayed as an icon of purity. Given Cronje’s stature in South African cricket, there was huge disbelief when
the Delhi police charged Cronje and three other players with match-fixing on 7 April 2000. Delhi-based businessman Rajesh Kaira was arrested, while charges were laid against a London-based bookmaker Sanjiv Chawla. Cronje denied the accusations and ‘assure[d] every South African that ... I would never do anything to let my country down’. He offered his bank account for scrutiny (*Independent*, April 8, 2000).

The South African government initially supported Cronje. On 10 April, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Aziz Pahad met Harsh Bhasin, the Indian High Commissioner to South Africa, to discuss the lack of protocol on the charges and the bugging of players’ phones (*Natal Mercury* April 11, 2000). It later emerged that the police had actually tapped the phone of suspected bookmaker Rajesh Kalra, who had loaned his phone to Cronje who was thus inadvertently brought into the police net (*Mercury* April 12, 2000). The white-owned media in South Africa pronounced Cronje innocent, who enjoyed the full backing of the South African government, cricket hierarchy, and public. An irate Bacher announced that Cronje was ‘a man of enormous integrity and honesty’ and that the UCB was ‘very upset by the spuriousness of these charges ... Hansie will be cleared and we see no reason why we should support any inquiry’ (*Independent*, April 8, 2000). The *Natal Mercury* rejected the allegations as ‘Unthinkable and Bizarre’:

Ordinary South Africans will join the UCB and the government in expressing solidarity with the cricketers .. . So defamatory and damaging are the accusations, and so unnecessarily disruptive of smooth relations with India that the Indian government should not hide behind any kind of sub-judice rule ... Cronje and his teammates will be exonerated. But the bizarre episode cannot be allowed to rest. (*Natal Mercury* April 11, 2000)

The drama took a dramatic turn around midnight on 11 April 2000 when Cronje confessed to his Pastor, Ray McCauley. Following an urgent meeting between Cronje, McCauley, Minister of Sport Ngondo Balfour, and Pahad, a statement was issued that Cronje had not been involved in match fixing, but had received money, which he had not used, for giving ‘advice’ to bookmakers. Cronje handed US$8200 over to the South African Reserve Bank (*Daily News* April 12, 2000). Bacher gave racial meaning to the affair when he blamed the ‘sub-continent, that’s where the origin is .... Millions of dollars change hands in a single match .... It would appear that the authorities, for whatever reason, have not been able to cope with this particular problem’ (*Tribune Herald* April 15, 2000).

The affair was covered by news media worldwide, including leading British dailies, CNN and Time. Kamran Abbasi (June 23, 2000), Asian correspondent of *Wisden Cricket Monthly*, wrote that the ‘enigma of match fixing will remain. But the reflex judgement that white is good and brown is bad is now less sustainable than it ever was. For that at least, thank you, Hansie’. A special meeting of the ICC on 2–3 May 2000 announced a package of measures to counter corruption. These included the appointment of a special unit to investigate corruption, making players sign declarations that they had never been involved in corruption, while those influencing the result of matches could be banned for life (*Mercury* May 4, 2000).

In South Africa, Justice Edwin King was appointed as a one-person commission to investigate whether match fixing had occurred during the period 1 November 1999 to 17 April 2000 (*Sunday Tribune* May 7, 2000). The King Commission got under way on 7 June 2000 in Cape Town. The director of public prosecutions, Bulelani Ncguka, offered Cronje immunity from criminal prosecution in South Africa if King believed that he had told the whole truth. Cronje’s testimony and cross-examination lasted four days. He announced his retirement from the game before outlining his involvement with bookmakers. Indian captain Mohammad Azharuddin introduced him to bookmaker Mukesh Gupta, ‘MK’, who paid Cronje US$30,000 in 1996 to lose against India;
when India toured South Africa in January 1997, MK paid him US$50,000 for team selections, predictions and forecasts; Marlon Aronstam, a bookmaker, paid Cronje US$7000 and gave him a leather jacket to present England with a reasonable opportunity to win in January 2000; ‘Banjo’ Cassiem, owner of a sweet shop in Johannesburg and friend of Azharuddin, introduced Cronje to ‘Sanjay’ from London who handed Cronje a cell-phone containing US dollars for ‘advice’ in February 2000; finally, when South Africa toured India during February and March 2000, Hamied and Sanjay called Cronje regularly for ‘advice’. Cronje blamed the sub-continent for his crime. He was ‘hooked’ by bookmakers who’s ‘incessant nagging’ made him feel ‘increasingly trapped’; ‘by the end of the tour I was under severe pressure to produce results’ (Natal Mercury June 16, 2000). The impression that it was impossible not to be corrupted on the sub-continent reactivated racial stereotyping of Indians as dishonest, which has a long history in South Africa (Vahed 2001b).

Judge King’s interim report was released by the government on 25 August 2000. On 12 October 2000, Cronje was handed a life ban by the UCB. The hearings ended in an anticlimax when King closed the Commission because the hearings were postponed for a fifth time on 19 February, 2001, due to protracted legal challenges by Cronje’s attorneys (Cricinfo March 5, 2001). King’s final report, made public on 29 June, 2001, did not make a finding as to whether Cronje had told the ‘whole truth’ and the matter was handed to Cape Attorney-General Frank Kahn for further investigation (Daily News June 29, 2001). Nothing further happened due to a lack of political will at the highest levels. As cricket writer Peter Robinson pointed out, the Sports Ministry and Bacher had one eye on the Cricket World Cup 2003 which was to be staged in South Africa and were concerned that publicity would tarnish the country’s international image (Cricinfo June 3, 2001).

The Indian Central Bureau of Investigation, meanwhile, presented its findings to Indian Sports Minister Sukhdev Singh on 31 October 2000. Nine players were implicated in match fixing, including Indian captain Mohamed Azharuddin. The BCCI imposed a life ban on Azharuddin. It lifted the ban in 2006 and honoured him along with other Indian test captains in a ceremony in Mumbai during the 2006 ICC Champions Trophy. The ICC insisted that it alone had the right to revoke the ban. Azharuddin, meanwhile, entered politics in 2009 and won a seat in Parliament as an Indian National Congress candidate from Moradabad constituency, Western Uttar Pradesh. Azharuddin challenged his banning in court and on 8 November 2012, the Andhra Pradesh High Court lifted the life ban on the grounds that it was ‘unsustainable’. In July 2013, thirteen years after the original match fixing scandal that rocked the cricket world, Delhi Police filed a 90 page charge sheet in a court against Hansie Cronje, who died in a place crash in 2002, Kishan Kumar, London-based bookmaker Sanjeev Chawla, bookmaker Mannohan Khattar, Delhi-based bookmaker Rajesh Kalra, and Sunil Dara. No other cricketers were named in the charge sheet (The Hindu, July 22, 2013).

IPL II and the demise of Majola
Cricket was a late comer to neo-liberalism and its faith that an unfettered market is both efficient and coagulates with the public interest, but now treats it as indisputable (Marqusee 2010). Since the early years of 2000s, television has brought cricket matches and stars into the homes of millions globally and made them part of everyday life. Cricket, in short, has been drawn into the ‘wider world of celebrities, controversies, and contexts outside of sport’ (Appadurai 1995, 36). In stitching together private ownership of cricket, the brand of choice was T/20. Traditional cricket, test cricket played over five days, has been swept aside. The new powerhouse in cricket is India and the new generation of players is cosmopolitan, prepared to ply their trade as private contractors to the highest bidder even if this means shunning the ‘nation’, such as West Indian Chris
Gayle. Traditionalists are in a fix; they may detest T20, but realise it is the only way to enable players to match the kind of money earned in other sports.

The man who became synonymous with the Indian Premier League (IPL) was Lalit Modi, whose rise to power began in the early 1990s when he persuaded American cable sports channel ESPN to show cricket in India. In 1996, he tried to get the BCCI to organise a limited-overs league for television, but then BCCI President Jagmohan Dalmiya turned down his proposal. Modi rose to power in the BCCI and became vice-president when Sharad Pawar became President in 2005. India’s T20 World Cup win in 2007 was the moment that Modi needed to convince the BCCI to launch the IPL, which began on 18 April 2008. It catapulted Modi to a super-power status as he provided a cocktail of Indian industrialists, Bollywood stars, and high-profile international and Indian cricket stars who were bought and sold for exorbitant amounts (NDTV 2010).

In South Africa, the candy floss of the IPL proved too sweet a temptation for Gerald Majola, CEO of CSA. A terror attack in Mumbai in early 2009, shortly before IPL II was to start, almost put a spoke in the wheel of the tournament. Faced with the possibility of cancellation because of safety concerns and with an impending election in India that was to run concurrently with the tournament, Modi opted to move the competition to South Africa. The inaugural T20 Cricket World Cup, which was played in South Africa in 2007, both showed Modi that he could count on fan support in that country, especially amongst diasporic Indians, and it also captured the diasporic connection to India starkly. India emerged victorious after beating Pakistan in a tense final. Significantly, the Indian team was supported by thousands of South African Indians donned in Indian shirts and waving Indian flags. This irked many non-Indian South Africans who questioned their patriotism to South Africa. ‘Go Home if you are not proudly South African’ was the message. The perception that Indians could never be real South Africans was reinforced even though supporting India did not mean being anti-South African. There remains an emotional attachment to India and many Indians are still angered by the fact that their own non-racial cricketing history has been virtually erased.

The IPL is an incredible money spinner and it was a sell-out success in South Africa, filling the coffers of the CSA. The ICC Champions Trophy, played between the T20 teams from various countries, followed in South Africa in October 2009 and was equally successful. While Modi portrayed this as a triumph for South Africa, Haigh described the ‘benefit’ to South Africa as confined to ‘the sterile measure of the hotel rooms and airfare tickets that the IPL consumed’ (Haigh 2010, 135). The manner in which Modi and the IPL ran roughshod over their hosts irked some sections of the cricketing fraternity in South Africa. Affiliates were paid R125,000 per match hosted, but had to give up their stadium, including parking, ticketing, and prime corporate suites to the IPL. When Alan Kourie, CEO of the Gauteng Cricket Board (GCB), refused to give up the corporate suites, he was warned that he was in breach of the contract that Majola had (privately) signed with the IPL and that games would be taken to other grounds. The GCB was forced to give up the seats (quoted in Desai and Vahed 2010, 208). Haigh (2010) describes this as cricketing ‘imperialism’, as the IPL did ‘not to bring attraction to another country, but to create a satellite India on that country’s soil… South Africa accepts colonisation; India runs the show for its own benefits, and then scarpers home’ (Haigh 2010, 136).

Other global sporting events such as the football World Cup operate on the same principle, with administering bodies exerting a monopolistic influence on host countries, creaming off the media and broadcasting rights as well as massive profits, while host countries are left to pick up a crippling tab for new mega-stadiums, which are subsequently under-utilised (see Desai and Vahed 2010).

In India, Modi’s star was on the decline as a series of off-the-pitch misdemeanours were exposed. In 2008, stories came to light of criminal charges against him in 1985 whilst he was a student in the USA for possession of cocaine for which he received a suspended two year
prison sentence. Chasing the white line also got him into trouble in the United Arab Emirates in 2006. Tax evasion and financial mismanagement allegations resulted in 20 court cases involving Modi as defendant (Haigh 2010). In 2010, allegations of money laundering and the improper awarding of franchises arose, as well as a liaison with 2009 IPL Bollywood contestant, Gabriella Demetriades. Modi denied these allegations, but there was furore around the Rendezvous Consortium’s bid for the Kochi team of Kerala which had all the elements for a classic denouement between sport and politics. On 11 April 2009, Modi twittered details about the ownership structure of the newest franchise, Kochi, in which Shashi Tharoor and his girlfriend (undisclosed) Sunanda Pushkar were amongst high-profile investors. Questions were raised as to why Modi would reveal ownership details around the successful bid of US$333 mn. In turn, Minister Tharoor claimed that Modi had bribed the consortium and was in cahoots with a rival bidder. The Minister resigned and a probe into Modi’s tax affairs began.

It was not Modi’s Indian dealings that engulfed South African cricket in scandal, but his relationship with CEO of CSA Gerald Majola. After the IPL was over, the GCB requested details of the agreement between CSA and IPL. On 10 July 2009, Majola showed CSA President Mutuzeli Nyoka, and Skjoldhammer, Chairman of GCB, the Heads of Agreement with the IPL which made no mention of any bonus, Majola also did not disclose that he received a bonus for the IPL and ICC Champions League Trophy (SGHC). CSA punished the GCB by moving the ICC Champions Trophy matches from Johannesburg to Pretoria. In April 2010, at the end of CSA’s financial year, Nyoka praised the work done by Majola during the IPL and ICC tournaments and motivated for the payment of an ‘extraordinary bonus’ to him. Shortly before the external auditors could sign off the financials, however, an independent auditor revealed on 13 July 2010 that a pool bonus of R2,732,172 had been received for the IPL tournament and R2,024,951 for the ICC Trophy. Most of this went to Majola and his financial officer D. McIntosh.

Nyoka was not satisfied and demanded an independent inquiry. The knives were out for him and the CSA board pushed for his removal from Presidentship. On 19 January 2011 Majola wrote to Nyoka that affiliate presidents had requested a special general meeting on 12 February at which a resolution would be tabled to remove him as president. The general meeting of 12 February 2011, which Nyoka did not attend, adopted a motion of no-confidence and resolved to remove him as president. On February 28, Nyoka filed an urgent application in the South Gauteng High Court to have the decision set aside. The court ruled on 14 April 2011 that Nyoka’s sacking was unlawful as he had not received proper notice of the meeting and reinstated him as president. On 15 October 2011, the next election for president was held and Nyoka was replaced by vice-president A. K. Khan. This seemed to have brought to an end the 16 month battle between Majola and Nyoka.

However, the Minister of Sport Fikile Mbalula stepped in and on 4 November 2011 announced that Judge Chris Nicholson would chair an inquiry into the financial affairs of the CSA. The Nicolson Commission presented its findings on 9 March 2013. It found that Majola had ‘surreptitiously’ negotiated the bonus payments of almost R4.5 million with the IPL, about which he did not inform Nyoka, nor did he provide a schedule of payments, ‘thereby misleading Nyoka [and REMCO] in the process’. The committee concluded that ‘there is a prima facie case
that Majola contravened sections 234, 235 and 236 of the Companies Act in that he had failed to disclose the said bonuses’ (M&G online March 9, 2011). The CSA, which had suspended Majola when the commission was appointed, dismissed him for his part in the IPL II bonuses, following a disciplinary hearing.

The ‘special relationship’ between India and South Africa was under strain as this paper was being completed. The problem arose when CSA appointed Haroon Lorgat as CEO to replace Majola. Lorgat rubbed BCCI the wrong way during his tenure as CEO of the ICC over his attempt to push the Decision Review System (DRS) which India opposes, his support for the 2012 Woolf Report which recommended reducing the powers of Test-playing countries, and the removal of the 2011 India–England World Cup match from the Eden Gardens because the stadium was not ready. When the CSA announced fixtures for India’s tour to South Africa from late November to mid-January, the BCCI announced fixtures against West Indies and New Zealand which overlapped with this tour. Cancellation of the tour would result in a loss of R500 million to CSA and in a move to appease the BCCI, CSA accepted the BCCI’s invitation for its president Chris Nenzani to visit India without Lorgat to meet with its boss, N. Srinivasan. Following the meeting between Nenzani and Srinivasan on 12 October 2013, there were reports that CSA would send Lorgat on ‘long leave’ during an abridged tour of South Africa by India. The reported compromise underscores the BCCI’s stature as the most dominant power in global cricket (Times of India online, October 14, 2013).

Conclusions: cricket, and India–South Africa relations

What does this story of the post-apartheid cricket relationship between India and South Africa tell us about both cricket as well as India–South Africa relations in general?

As far as cricket is concerned, the ‘cricket fan’ is now ‘cricket consumer’ and the task of administrators is to sell the game and its players for the largest amounts of money. How do we understand the IPL, which is an extreme reflection of this thinking? What does it mean for the medium and long-term future of the game?

T20 is cricketainment that brings Bollywood directly into the inner portals of the game. Like capital there are no boundaries. The speeding-up of cricket is symptomatic of the speeding up of capitalism – just-in-time production, de-skilling, multi-tasking, the mix of entertainment and money. As Haig (2010, 251) put it, ‘a pre-industrial game does not make a natural fit with a late capitalist economy … In this latest incarnation, cricket is mainly an effective means of conveying goods to market; in and of itself it is arguably of dwindling significance’.

Majumdar sees the IPL as an example of ‘atypical globalisation’ where the West has turned to the East. He describes it as ‘…a breath of fresh air, which has converted…India into the real nerve centre of the gentleman’s game and is completing the process of Indian cricket’s decolonization’.

Commercial dominance in cricket has eroded Indian inferiority and along with that has significantly enhanced the process of making India into ‘a world player in an era of globalisation’ (2011, 176).

However, Majumdar fails to question who the real beneficiaries of the IPL are, what the long-term consequences of the ‘privatisation’ of cricket will be, or that ‘decolonisation’ has been followed by a re-territorialisation of the game by the Indian capital. Guha (The Hindu May 25, 2012) criticises the IPL on the grounds that

it has ‘given capitalism and entrepreneurship a bad game’; it has ‘been bad for Indian democracy, in that it has vividly and even brazenly underlined the distance between the affluent, urban middle classes and the rest of India’; and it displays ‘an aura of exclusivity in one of the worlds’ poorest nations.’
For Gupta (2011, 1316), the IPL’s success is symptomatic of something much larger:

The success of the Indian Premier League (IPL) is not only about the Indian control of international cricket, it is also about the rise of India. It is about the move away from a restrictive command economy to a free market economy with all the attendant dangers of rapid success, high rewards and growing potential for corruption. It is also about an India which increasingly sees itself as playing a greater role in international affairs and, in the natural course of events, becoming a great power.

The market too has come to dominate the relationship between India and South Africa over the past two decades. Within a few years of taking power, the new ANC government abandoned the RDP and adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan which had all the trappings of neo-liberalism. Tariff barriers are tumbling down, exchange controls are lifted and nationalisation is jettisoned. The key to redressing the past and building a vibrant economy was seen to be international competitiveness, tight fiscal and monetary discipline, and an environment conducive for foreign investment. This went down well with the Washington-based institutions.

These developments paralleled what was going on in India and the nature of the relationship has changed. When Nehru and the Indian Congress supported the anti-apartheid struggle, they saw it as part of the broader struggle against colonialism and imperialism. While they worked hard inside of the UN on South Africa’s behalf, they also sought to build a political bloc around the non-aligned movement (NAM). The NAM, however, was largely ineffective, and found it hard to carve out a space with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the past decade, there have been some attempts at realignment around BRICS, but there seems to be little in the way of tangible results to show for this association.

Much of this has been over-determined by the struggle between India and China for markets in Africa. The India–South Africa political relationship is strong, but it is no different from South Africa’s relationship with China. In fact, it seems that China has stolen the march. Given the nature of the political configuration, the Chinese state remains a powerful player supporting its business interests overtly. While Chinese business and the State both are acting in tandem, the situation in India is somewhat different. Indian capital has overtaken the Indian government as the face of India. Indian capital does not need the support of its government to enter South African markets.

It appears that the Indian government has not been able to build on the principled relationship it enjoyed historically with the ANC. When it does enter the public domain, the Indian government’s role is reduced to a few cultural events on the side. This was exemplified by the T20 game between South Africa and India at the Moses Mabhida stadium in January 2011 to mark the 150th year anniversary of Indians arriving in South Africa and it also marked the farewell game for South Africa cricketer Makhaya Ntini. The President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, was there along with a slew of Ministers. The Indian government, however, was absent. Instead, it was the Gupta family that sat alongside the president. When Bollywood superstar Shah Rukh Khan spoke, he thanked the Guptas for making the trip possible. Indian capital and Bollywood were the main actors and the Indian government had at best a cameo appearance. This is something that South Africans have become accustomed to. It is time for reflection on whether this is the best way to continue a relationship that dates well over a century.

Notes on contributor
Goolam Vahed is an Associate Professor in the Department of Historical Studies, University of KwaZulu Natal. His research focuses mostly on Indians in the diaspora and the role of sport and culture in South African society. His co-publications include Blacks in Whites: A Century of Sporting Struggles in

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