

# STRATEGIC SURVEY 1983- 1984

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The International Institute for Strategic Studies  
23 Tavistock Street London WC2E 7NQ

deep strikes with nuclear systems. Clearly, NATO decisions regarding ET procurements must consider Soviet escalation incentives and disincentives – not only for escalation from conventional to nuclear war, but from peace to war itself.

#### Soviet Responses

It is clear from her reactions to the FOFA concept and the Weinberger ET initiative that the USSR will not allow NATO to realize these new military capabilities without having to face a very sustained diplomatic offensive bolstered by countervailing military responses. In a lengthy piece in *Krasnaya Zvezda* that reviewed the principal weapons systems required for second-echelon targeting and enhancement of firepower, a Soviet general noted that 'the Soviet Union cannot remain on the sidelines in the presence of this danger'.

Besides the anticipated propaganda campaign, the Soviet response to ET and its related doctrinal changes will be conditioned by two major uncertainties: whether the technologies live up to the claims made for them, and whether NATO actually fields the new weapons. In any case, simply continuing the Soviet conventional modernization programmes of the last decade – especially those emphasizing suppressive fire – will greatly aid the Warsaw Pact in coping with the implications of ET. If NATO deployments prove substantial, the prospect of expensive counter-measures could increase Soviet incentives to investigate arms-control as a means of reducing the pressure on her overtaxed economy.

#### Prospects

The debate over ET is only just beginning. There seems little doubt that NATO will have to pursue high technology in some areas and for some purposes, if only to keep in touch


with observed technological change in Warsaw Pact forces. Moreover, because NATO faces the prospect of a declining pool of manpower of military age (due to demographic shifts), there seems little doubt that it must to some extent substitute modern technology for manpower. Finally, the desire to escape from the nuclear dilemma will prompt all NATO governments to try to raise the nuclear threshold by means of conventional force improvements.

However the choice is now so wide, and the technology generally so expensive, that there is little prospect of being able to do everything that is being advocated, even if the technologies do mature as hoped. Some kind of national and alliance priorities between missions must be established. Given relatively inelastic defence budgets, it would appear that the technology for deep strike missions can only be purchased at the expense of more traditional defensive technology. Furthermore, there are already grave doubts about NATO's ability to sustain a conventional defence, due to lack of reserves, ammunition, spares and logistic support. Given the uncertainty about the cost and effectiveness of some of the more exotic technology being touted, the question will at least be asked whether the alliance should not invest more in what is already available, rather than head into the unknown. To be sure, cheapness is not necessarily a virtue if a system cannot survive or do what is required of it; but neither is extreme technological sophistication beneficial, if its high cost means that the number of units that can be afforded is too small to affect the outcome of combat. NATO undoubtedly faces hard choices in how to dispose of limited funds. That is not new. What may be new is that the range of choice is unprecedentedly wide, and it is now even less obvious than ever what it makes sense to do and what it does not.

## TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A BALANCE OF INTERESTS

It was perhaps only a matter of time before Western defence planners, particularly those in the United States, turned their enthusiasm for the advantages of high technology to thoughts of how similar advantage might be kept from their principal adversaries in the Soviet bloc. Improving the technologies

available to support military systems has traditionally been central to Western defence strategy and force planning, and the overall sophistication of today's technologies has made even the marginal improvements they offer to both production capabilities and military systems important. It has also made



it all the more important that the improvements do not find their way into the hands of a potential enemy.

The technology transfer issue is not a new one, but it has been sharpened by the fragility of the East-West military balance as it has evolved over the last decade. This has highlighted Western disagreements over the risks that Soviet acquisition of Western technology involves. The issue gained new political prominence when President Reagan raised it at the Western leaders' summit at Ottawa in 1981. A consensus has yet to be reached on the seriousness of the problem and on appropriate Western responses to it, however, and these disagreements continue to pervade political and security discussions between the United States and her allies.

#### Defining the Problem

Since 1949 the non-Communist industrialized allies have co-ordinated and controlled their trade in nuclear materials, munitions and technology with Communist countries through the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), whose modest staff of twenty is housed in a corner of the US embassy in Paris. The fifteen-nation committee (now composed of all NATO nations except Iceland and Spain, plus Japan) maintains and periodically updates a list of proscribed items that are not to be traded to Communist countries unless specific, case-by-case exceptions are approved unanimously by members. Yet there are no sanctions beyond moral pressure if, notwithstanding the Committee's view, a COCOM member concludes that its economy or individual foreign policy objectives require it to sell certain items to a Communist country.

The system has worked reasonably well and without too many bitter disagreements, particularly in its early days, when trade to the Eastern bloc was in any event small. However, as East-West economic relations expanded in the detente environment of the late 1960s and 1970s, and as Western economies became more dependent upon such trade, problems began to arise. Allied disagreements about items appropriate for COCOM embargo were further compounded in 1980, when the freeze in East-West relations that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted the US to press her

allies to impose wide-ranging political and economic sanctions against the USSR, including a total embargo on items that could directly or indirectly assist her military effort.

Since the end of World War II, Western governments have never sanctioned the sale of weapons or nuclear technology to Communist-bloc countries. Yet throughout the 1970s Western governments had been approving for export technologies allegedly destined for those countries' civilian economies, and many of them – the so-called dual-use technologies – may have been applicable to defence-related production as well. Certainly, American intelligence sources have been arguing since 1978 that such technologies were increasingly being diverted to indirect (or even direct) support of Soviet military production. Their arguments gained a new hearing with the appearance during the invasion of Afghanistan of trucks produced at the Western-built Kama River truck factory

Put generally, the US worry has been that throughout the 1970s, as Western defence budgets, scientists and inventors were stretched in order to maintain a stable military balance in the face of Soviet military expansion, their very success might unintentionally have been helping to oil the wheels of the Soviet military machine with which they were competing. To use the more dramatic imagery offered by US officials these days, the question is: Has there been a haemorrhage of technologies from Western universities, laboratories and industries into the labyrinth of the Soviet military-industrial complex, a haemorrhage induced and directed for years with great skill and cunning by Soviet military planners themselves? The US answer to this question, reinforced by a detailed CIA study released in March 1982, is clearly 'Yes'. In March 1984, for example, US Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle advised British journalists that the US believed that the 'SS-20 and, indeed, most Soviet missile systems contain Western technology, along with aircraft, communications systems, and surface-to-air missiles'. US allies are still weighing their judgments.

There is, however, general agreement among COCOM members that exports to the USSR of technologies capable of substantially enhancing Soviet military capabilities should be more strictly curtailed. The central

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question plaguing the updating of the embargo lists is: At what point does the potential military utility of a technology become important enough to justify an embargo on its export for apparently civilian purposes? No simple measure exists. Even so, judgments on what is suitable for control are too often complicated by the tendency to blur what criteria there are.

Important distinctions can be made between technologies destined for civilian applications, but which are also incorporated in current Western military systems; those that, once exported, might be modified for use in a military role; those that increase the productivity of industries building military systems; and those that simply improve overall economic efficiency, and thereby could free additional Soviet resources for investment in military systems. The first category might be exemplified by a sonar system used for both offshore oil and submarine detection; the second by a computer system which, through minor improvements, could be adapted to military applications; a turnkey truck factory producing vehicles that can serve both civilian and military logistic needs might represent the third category; and pipe to facilitate natural gas exports that will produce foreign exchange, the last. Using 'indirect military applications' as the criterion by which COCOM should restrict Western exports – which is what some influential Americans have argued – broadens the argument to the point where these distinctions are sometimes lost to sight.

#### US Efforts to Stop the Flow

The Reagan Administration came to office in 1981 convinced of the need to stem the East-West trade in high technology, and it has pursued this objective at home as well as abroad. In January 1982 it established the 'Project Exodus' programme to track down and intercept efforts by American and foreign companies to evade current US export regulations governing sales to Communist buyers. In the judgment of Secretary of Defense Weinberger and his key advisers, the Administration's 'Technology Transfer Control Program' was as integral to American defence policy as any programme within their own traditional budget responsibilities, and Project Exodus, although staffed and

operated by the US Customs Service, was initially funded with \$30 million allocated by the Defense Department from its more traditional programmes.

Project Exodus was intended to ensure greater effectiveness in pursuing those contravening export laws (also, no doubt, to set an example to allies at a time when the US was proposing that they, too, should pursue similar large-scale enforcement efforts), and thus to meet criticisms that Washington's own enforcement programmes had been insufficiently thorough. Both the Defense Department and key Congressional committees continued to censure the US Department of Commerce, the department traditionally responsible for co-ordinating and directing the nation's diffuse export review process, even after Project Exodus was established. A November 1982 report by the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee argued strongly that major restructuring of Washington's own law enforcement efforts would be necessary if it were to live up to the strict export-control standards which it was asking others to abide by.

In the spring of 1983 the Congress opened committee hearings in preparation for the expiration on 30 September of the 1979 Export Administration Act, the statutory authority for US export-control actions. Congressional disagreements regarding the scope and focus of the export-control regulations proposed by the Reagan Administration continue to delay final Congressional approval of the Act. Of particular concern has been the Administration's proposals to require that foreign subsidiaries of US companies follow US trade restrictions and to penalize foreign companies as well, should they wish both to do business within the US and to follow the less restrictive export policies of their home government. This extra-territoriality issue had first surfaced during the Siberian pipeline dispute in 1982 (see *Strategic Survey 1982-1983*, pp. 52-7). The principle, rejected by US allies then, is still unacceptable to them, and the US business community remains equally unenthusiastic.

Nonetheless, as Congressional debate on the export legislation has proceeded, it has become clear that general concern does exist about the wisdom of exporting technologies which might either contribute directly to the

qualitative improvement of Soviet weapons systems or enhance the ability of the Soviet industrial base to produce such systems. There appears to be general support as well for the US policy of differentiating between the suitability of China and the Soviet bloc as destinations for technology exports, with China receiving far more generous consideration. Furthermore, both the US public and their Congressional representatives share the Administration's expectations of help from its allies. COCOM is no longer an invisible international institution; if public testimony before Congress is a measure, current COCOM proceedings are being watched more carefully by the US audience than at any other time.

In December 1983, the Defense Department underlined the direction of US export-control efforts by issuing a wide-ranging internal directive formalizing the procedures, bureaucratic responsibilities and substantive objectives that would guide Pentagon review of all international technology transfers. Arms transfers, technological co-operation with neutral or non-allied countries and within the alliance are all now to be considered for the opportunities they might offer to Soviet clandestine acquisition. A very broad net indeed has been cast by the Pentagon; whether the US government will be able to manoeuvre it with finesse remains an open question.

#### International Efforts and Problems

President Reagan's 1981 summit plea for attention to the technology transfer issue spurred a number of international actions. In January 1982, for the first time in 25 years, high-level officials from COCOM countries met to discuss issues previously left to civil servants and mid-level policy officials. A second such meeting followed in 1983. In addition, both NATO and COCOM began separate reviews of the linkage between strategic trade and Western security policy. Strategic trade, and specifically technology transfer, has for the first time brought Japan - through COCOM - into direct consultation with members of the NATO alliance on an issue affecting the security planning of the Western community's two geographically distant regions. In the autumn of 1982 COCOM began to review the currency of its list of restricted exports, as it is required to do every

three years. So far, according to US officials, agreement has been reached on appropriate trade restrictions in several categories - robotics, some categories of machine tools and the control of silicon as a strategic material. However, agreement on the extent to which Soviet acquisition of computers and related software technology can and should be controlled continues to prove elusive.

International co-operation in enforcing controls on the illicit traffic in embargoed technologies has also improved. The most dramatic example came in November 1983 when the United States - with co-operation from West German, Swedish and South African authorities - at the last moment thwarted an intricate Soviet clandestine operation to acquire key components of a US-produced VAX computer system, used in missile guidance. Other indications of European concern at Soviet machinations could be seen in the substantial numbers of Soviet diplomatic representatives suspected of espionage activities, many related to industrial espionage. In 1983 alone, 82 representatives were expelled from Western European countries (France, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden), compared to 23 during 1982. France expelled 45 diplomatic and military representatives and 2 journalists - all for engaging in a 'systematic search on French territory for technological and scientific information' - and in December 1983 the journal *Defense Nationale* printed a pseudonymous article (widely suspected of being based on counter-intelligence information) which described in great detail the systematic and co-ordinated effort that funnels to Soviet intelligence agents abroad a 'shopping list' of technological items required by the Soviet military-industrial complex. But despite these signs of greater activity and concern in Western Europe, the US continues to press her allies to do more.

#### Dissenting Views

In the past year, the Western allies have tried, via existing bureaucratic channels, to resolve differences of opinion with the US about technology transfer before national tempers rise too high to manage - as they did during the Siberian pipeline dispute. Yet clear signs of irritation continue to surface. West German and British officials have already sug-

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gested publicly that US efforts to keep a *pot pourri* of technologies out of the East-West market place bear a suspicious resemblance to attempts to prevent US allies from exporting similar technologies before US companies were ready to do so themselves. Such national suspicions have pervaded COCOM deliberations over the years, no doubt fed by the US habit of blocking other members' requests for exceptions to embargo guidelines (exceptions require unanimous consent) but soon afterwards requesting exceptions for similar exports by American companies. Though US allies have noted that the Reagan Administration has made less use of this practice where exports to Soviet bloc countries are concerned, it has allegedly been less restrained over exports to China.

Another area of disagreement concerns the effectiveness of embargoes on any kind of trade. Some Western observers, in both the business and economic communities, argue that, in the long run, embargoes are fruitless, since the Soviet Union will inevitably acquire important technologies illicitly, or else develop them herself, even if at greater economic cost. Western governments, though, have been more circumspect in using this rationale to avoid restrictions on strategic trade, recognizing that even a few years' lead in a single technology offers important advantages to defence strategists. Short-run advantages are not always irrelevant, particularly to the military planner.

There is also a systemic factor that complicates COCOM's efforts to control technology transfers from the West. This was illustrated in 1978 and 1979 by the export to the USSR of dry docks from Japan and Sweden. Both countries agreed to the sales after express assurances by the Soviet Union that she would only use them for non-military naval vessel services, even though the docks were capable of supporting military vessels. Despite these assurances, the docks were transferred to the Soviet Pacific and Baltic fleets within months of their acquisition. Japan (a COCOM member) has vowed not to repeat such an error of judgment; neutral Sweden (which is not a member) has not. This highlights the fact that COCOM members control most, but not all, of the West's sophisticated technologies. Consequently, if they embargo items available from

formidable industrial democracies such as Switzerland and Sweden, which are not COCOM members, they may hurt their own economies, but do little to prevent the USSR enhancing her military capabilities.

Another area that creates opposing views is that of emergent technologies. It is tempting to believe that one can protect such technologies from acquisition by the USSR and her allies. Yet restricting the academic and scientific communities' access to general information in such basic research categories, as some Americans have suggested, is likely to hinder Western scientific breakthroughs as it is to deny those breakthroughs to potential adversaries of the West. While Western technologies should be safeguarded, they should not be stifled in the process; Western governments must be careful not to discourage their private sectors from investing in the development of technologies or their scientists from working on them.

This was essentially the message given by the US National Academy of Sciences, in its September 1982 report *Scientific Communications and National Security*, which questioned both the wisdom of excessive restrictions on scientific and academic exchanges and the justification for it. The report argued that hindering the free and open exchange of ideas among scientists, would eventually undermine the vitality and innovativeness of Western science; and its conclusion noted that very little of the Western technology which the USSR has acquired over the years and put to military use has come from contacts at the basic academic and scientific level. Many technical and intelligence specialists in fact go beyond this to argue that the Soviet Union is unlikely to be capable of making much use of technical information from the early stage in the research cycle, even if she had access to it. Soviet military planners are apparently not interested in technological development until it gets well beyond basic, or even advanced, research.

In an effort to overcome the sharp differences of view that existed, an advisory group (the Department of Defense/University Forum) was created in early 1982 to bring together the presidents of several top US research universities and Pentagon planners to discuss security problems posed by academic exchanges. Clearly, however,

unease regarding restrictions on the flow of information has not abated within the scientific and research community.

### Finding the Proper Balance

The apparent connection between Western technological advances and those observed in Soviet military systems has indeed raised questions meriting allied attention. That the USSR continues to give the acquisition of technology a high priority suggests that the West has in the past underestimated the value of such transfers. Nevertheless, efforts to achieve multilateral consensus on trade proposals which might be too restrictive carry inherent risks, particularly for the political ties binding the US and her allies. Discussions must thus be pursued with care.

Efforts by the United States, through COCOM, to press her allies into adopting far-reaching controls, have inevitably touched upon sensitivities about the 'two-way street', the mechanism which is intended to encourage the spread of weapons system purchases among NATO members' national defence industries. US industries continue to dominate NATO's procurement decisions, however, and this reinforces the European conviction that Washington's arms sales and technology transfer policies are motivated by US economic self-interest as much as by concern for the alliance's common good. Hints have been dropped that failure to adopt US policies restricting technology transfer to the East might result in European allies suffering reduced access to US technology suitable for their own defence. This has only fostered the suspicion that these policies may have been influenced by the desire to deny foreign markets to European technology where it is in commercial competition with that of the US. All the European governments regard improving the international competitive position of their advanced-technology industries as central to their long-term domestic economic vitality. Moreover, efforts by the

United States to impose her own export laws upon foreign subsidiaries of US companies through the extra-territorial application of US domestic laws have offended principles of national sovereignty held dear by her allies. They feel that they have the right to judge for themselves the most appropriate means of safeguarding their foreign-policy, national security and economic interests.

Allied suspicions of US motives in proposing broad restrictions on technology transfer to Soviet bloc members may be exaggerated. Yet, when compounded by US suggestions that her allies are somehow less attentive to Western security requirements than she is, they tend to weaken the already delicate political confidence that cements the NATO alliance. This does raise many questions. Is denying Western technology to the Soviet military important enough to the US to risk curtailing technology transfer between the US and her allies? Might excessive persistence on the issue provoke those allies to reduce co-operative defence technology programmes with the US, either to pre-empt similar US action or to avoid complicating their own defence planning by accommodating US priorities which they may not fully share? How should policies of the Western allies interact with those pursued by politically neutral industrial democracies? Must Western policies on arms transfers to non-allied nations accommodate concerns about potential Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology illicitly - and, if so, how?

It must be recognized that Western security is as dependent on the economic strength of the industrial democracies as upon their military inventories. It is also fundamentally grounded in co-operation - co-operation which must take account of the differing strengths and vulnerabilities of all the partners if it is to safeguard any of them. The challenge for Western efforts to grapple with the issue of technology transfer clearly lies in finding the right balance.

## LAND-MOBILE ICBM


For the first time in the development of strategic nuclear arms, both the United States and the Soviet Union may be nearing deployments of significant numbers of land-mobile

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). In 1983 the USSR began testing a new mobile (and possibly also silo-based) single-warhead missile, the SS-X-25, and she continued test-

ing a large SS-X-24, which is being deployed in large numbers. The deployment of the SS-X-24 began as early as 1981. 'Midgetman' is on the drawing boards. A bipartisan subcommittee on deployment has been set up.

Interest in mobile ICBMs has been back over two decades by both technical and political considerations about the local and global deployment of such advanced systems against Soviet operational requirements. The mission requirements for positive co-operation with the US are most of all, the chance of these systems to be made available to the 'interim solution' mobile ICBM. This illustrates the technical, military and political implications which have nuclear force present heightening systems and judgments.

The Soviet Field Artillery The Soviet field artillery has the virtues of mobility, particularly in the mobile, paratrooper and operational aspects. The USSR's expansion goes back to the greater than deal with the porter-erect mobility programme, at systems latecept of open mobile missile the Soviet missiles at continent.



# Alliance issues face Atlantic Assembly

By Bruce George MP and Iris Portny



PARLIAMENTARIANS from NATO's 16 nations met on 12 November in Brussels at the start of a week-long series of debates on the Western Alliance's strategy and problems. Several hundred elected members from national parliaments, all delegates to the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) convened for the NAA's 30th annual session. The NAA is the only multinational parliamentary organisation which brings together politicians from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss issues confronting Alliance governments.

Each autumn delegates meet, moving their venue throughout the Alliance countries. They hear, debate and, when appropriate, vote upon the various NAA studies, reports and resolutions, conducted by the delegates themselves and the small number of full-time NAA staff.

A similar, less formal meeting is held each spring, usually in May, for the full delegations to consider the progress of continuing studies (JDW 26 May). Work, small-scale meetings and study missions continue throughout the year, but it is at the autumn session that the formal judgments and policy pronouncements of the NAA and its committees are reached.

The substance of NAA proceedings is particularly helpful to Alliance policymakers for one principal reason. This is the only forum in which consultations among representatives from NATO countries take place between members of parliaments rather than between representatives of NATO's ruling governments. As such, it is the forum in which public perceptions and domestic priorities receive fullest airing. Since domestic opinion has become increasingly critical and uneasy about NATO security policies in recent years, the spring and autumn NAA meetings offered unique opportunities for national concerns to be shared directly among the elected officials who hear those views most fully, the Alliance's parliamentarians and legislators.

## Astuteness

NATO and government officials are both close observers and occasional participants in these proceedings, illustrated by this year's programme. The opening plenary session on 14 November was addressed by Belgian Foreign Minister Wilfried Martens and NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington. This was Lord Carrington's first appearance before the assembly since he assumed his new post, and parliamentarians throughout the Alliance are likely to leave Brussels impressed by his substantive and political astuteness. His participation contributes one of the session's high points, with the Wednesday address followed on Thursday by his participation in a plenary question-and-answer session with NAA delegates.

Presentations from NATO officials were interspersed throughout the week with those of the NAA's committees, offering their reports and resolutions for consideration by delegates during plenary sessions. On Thursday and Friday reports were given by representatives of the military, economic and political committees; the scientific and technical committee; and the committee on education, cultural affairs and information. This year the NAA delegates also received the final report of the NAA Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Previously, the Special Committee had recommended that short-range nuclear weapons in Europe be reduced, a concept later implemented by NATO's October 1983 Montebello decision.

The concluding plenary session on Friday morning returned to broad issues, James Schlesinger, a former US Defense Secretary, opening the session with an address on Western security and policies. Delegates then turned to their final wide-ranging debate: 'A new strategy for NATO? Reconciling political, military and economic

demands', a theme which aptly characterises NATO nations' most pressing task.

The delegates met against an international backdrop fraught with change and conflict and the American election year, for both Presidential and legislative candidates, concluding the week before. Uncertainty will have been put to rest regarding the helmsmen and political ideology guiding US policies for the next four years. The Soviet leadership continues to muddle through its transition crisis, with its eventual outcome and timing still a mystery. International violence and tragedy continue to spread with Soviet military activities in Afghanistan beginning to encroach on Pakistani territory, as one example.

Politics within Alliance countries has become increasingly polarised on security issues, and disagreements have assumed an uneasy sharpness. NATO governments' ability to implement the 1979 Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Force decision was an impressive example of Allied unity. The residue of the bitter domestic disagreements it touched off throughout Europe, however, continues to hamper public consensus on Alliance security strategies. The German and British political parties have been the most visibly split by the issue but wounds throughout the Alliance are real. Feuding between Greece and Turkey continues to erode Alliance political unity and military planning.

Arguments abound within the Alliance about the appropriate levels of defence budgets for the near future. Long-standing Allied disagreements, regarding relative burdensharing commitments, assumed the quality of high drama when, earlier this year, the US Congress almost succeeded in mandating a reduction in US NATO-related defence expenditure and troop commitments if its Allies fail to increase their defence budgets by the annual 3% rate agreed by NATO Ministers in 1978.

For their part, US Allies are concerned about the unabated defence build-up. The implications for international financial markets of US budget deficits, exacerbated by its defence spending, seem likely to hamper economic recovery outside the US borders. American enthusiasm for new weapons programmes, such as the Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars) and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, have also contributed to making the Allies uneasy. They remain unconvinced of either the wisdom of the programme or of the propriety in taking budget precedence over more urgent defence needs in more traditional non-nuclear and readiness areas. This second concern has also been prompted by US proposals for Alliance-wide investment in non-nuclear emerging technologies as a means for bolstering conventional military capabilities.

The fact that the major nuclear arms control negotiations remain stalled continues to create anxieties throughout the Alliance. That Soviet truculence has been largely responsible for this stalemate does not reduce its corrosive influence upon the East-West political climate. Continuing intra-Alliance disagreements about appropriate Allied export restrictions governing technology transfers, have complicated both defence co-operation and commercial relations between Allies. These are but some of the issues which NAA committees are currently studying and debating.

Consensus may well elude delegates. Debates on their merits represent the range of views throughout the Alliance. NAA national delegations include parliamentarians from across the political and philosophical spectrum. Labour and Conservative Parties are always well represented. The German delegation included a Green representative for the first time in its May delegation; and the Italian delegation, for the first time, included a Communist Party delegate. The Spanish delegation, facing a national referendum soon on whether Spain will remain in NATO, also participated.



IRIS J. PORTNY

Resume

International Institute for Strategic Studies  
23 Tavistock Street, London WC2E 7NQ, United Kingdom  
Documentation  
Centre

BUSINESS ADDRESS: International Institute for Strategic Studies  
23 Tavistock Street, London WC2E 7NQ, United Kingdom  
phone: 01-379-7676

RESIDENCE: 154 Gloucester Terrace; Flat 10  
London W2, United Kingdom  
phone: 01-402-1840

D-o-B: 1 September 1950      Place: New York, N.Y.      Citizenship: US  
Marital Status: Single      Children: None      Health: Excellent

#### SPECIALIZATIONS:

- \* East-West trade and technology transfer (6 years)
  - intra-West defense and technology cooperation
  - West--East export control issues (NATO, COCOM, etc.)
- \* US defense budget--force posture, policy and procedure (10 years)
- \* alliance politics and security (including comparative domestic politics as affecting security and defense planning)
- \* nuclear strategy and arms control (10 years)
- \* foreign military sales and government economic and military assistance programs (13 years)
- \* environmental and maritime issues (3 years)
- \* government relations:
  - 4 years in executive branch (Office of Secretary of Defense)
  - 2 years on House of Representatives staff (advisor to Armed Services Committee member)
  - 1 year Senate staff (advisor to Appropriations Committee member)
- \* public interest/non-governmental organizations (2 years)
- \* professional writing and editing experience and skills
- \* public speaking experience (including radio and television interviews on national and international channels)

#### AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, 1981  
Finalist, Rockefeller Foundation International Relations Fellowship,  
1982  
New York State Regents Scholarship (1968-72)  
National Merit Scholarship Letter of Commendation (1968)

ACADEMIC BACKGROUND

GRADUATE: GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY School of Foreign Service

1972-74, candidate, M.S.F.S. program (M.Sc. of Foreign Service)  
(30 hours completed towards degree, first full-time, then  
part-time while employed at Carnegie Endowment for  
International Peace, Washington, DC)

Principal subjects: Statistics, international economics and  
trade theory, political analysis, energy policy,  
national security seminar with Chester Crocker (then-  
director, MSFS program)

UNDERGRADUATE: CORNELL UNIVERSITY School of Arts & Sciences

Degree: Bachelor of Arts, May 1972

Majors: Government and English

Minor Concentrations: US diplomatic history, Asian studies,  
20th century American literature

Senior year research project: US level of involvement in Vietnam  
War as reflected by economic and military assistance patterns

Advisor: Prof. Walter LaFeber, diplomatic historian

Extra-Curricular Activities:

- Editorial board, CORNELL DAILY SUN (daily Ithaca newspaper)
- Guest writer, CORNELL ENGINEER (quarterly magazine)
- Employed 15-20 hours weekly on campus

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

French (written and conversational fluency)

Spanish (basic reading)

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

November 1984- : Visiting fellow, International Institute for Strategic  
Studies, London.

Separate research for publication, with British Member  
of Parliament Bruce George (Defense Committee member),  
comparing roles and procedures of parliamentary  
committees within NATO countries.

1983-84: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Position: Research Associate

Topic: Western security and technology transfer

Study for IISS examines three issues: (1) Western allied  
and neutral perspectives on West-East export controls;

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (cont.-IISS)

(2) technology transfer and Western defense cooperation, including the implications for such of West-East trade controversies; and (3) general problems posed for first two issues by commercial competition between ~~Callied~~ industries.

1982-83: US SENATE (office of Arlen Specter, R-Pennsylvania), Wash, DC

Position: Senior Legislative Assistant, national security issues.

Job description: Issues

Defense budget, foreign policy, economic and military assistance, and international economic legislation considered by Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense and Foreign Operations.

Principal legislative controversies during my tenure: MX funding, general defense budget priorities, Central American economic and military assistance programs, nuclear freeze and build-down proposals, International Monetary Fund emergency funding.

1981-82: CONSULTANT, National Security Policy, Washington, DC.

Analyses of Congressional positions on foreign policy and defense budget issues, including NATO cooperative programs and US economic and military assistance to Southeast Asian region. Completed individual study for Congressional Research Service, evaluating US Air Force proposal to end activities at Duluth Air National Guard Base.


1977-81: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Washington, DC

Position: Special Assistant to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Harold Brown) for Legislative Affairs.

Job description: Issues

Arms control and nuclear policy and programs, technology transfer and export control, US-Soviet issues, bi-lateral and multilateral cooperative defense agreements between the US and its allies, and regional issues: Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Asia and Pacific.

Reviewed for approval all studies and communications on above issues that were to pass between the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (and their supporting officials and staff) and officials and staff in US Congress. Advised directly the Secretary, the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Research and Engineering, the Director of SALT Task Force, and other Defense Department officials of Congressional positions on national security policies and defense budget legislation. Designed and implemented legislative strategies, often in concert with State Department, White House, Commerce Department and National Security Council officials.



EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (cont.)

1977: Consultant to CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Washington, DC

Job description: Authored study, published by House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, examining the arms control implications of the enhanced radiation (neutron bomb) warhead being developed for US artillery stationed in NATO Europe.

1975-77: US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (office of Patricia Schroeder, D-COLO)

Position: Legislative Assistant, armed services committee legislation

Job description: Issues

Was Congresswoman's only advisor for all defense budget-related issues that came before House Armed Services Committee (on which she sat), with emphasis upon subcommittees on seapower and on research and development.

Drafted legislation and amendments (especially regarding arms export control act and defense budget), wrote speeches and testimony.

1974-75: CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, Washington, DC

Position: Co-director, Project Dialogue (joint venture with CEIP)  
Newsletter editor (and creator)

Job description: Designed, administered, and raised funding for projects located at universities throughout the US (Massachusetts, Oregon, California, Michigan, Connecticut, etc.), that were staffed by on-site graduate students, focussed on a single international topic affecting the community hosting the project, and had the objective of bringing labor, business, academic and professional experts together in conferences and small discussions to consider the communities' relationship to the international activity. (e.g. Law of the Sea effects upon San Francisco and Boston industries, timber export policies on Oregon, economic conversional projects in Connecticut and Massachusetts)

1973-74: THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, Washington, DC

Position: Research assistant to the director of publications and editor of THE LIVING WILDERNESS quarterly magazine (Richard Olson).

Description: Reviewed freelance articles and photographs submitted for publication, assisted in editing and technical in-house production of newsletters, wrote occasional articles.

Represented Wilderness Society on a "public interest advisory panel" working with Arthur D. Little, Inc. (Cambridge, Mass.) on its technology assessment of solar energy, conducted for National Science Foundation.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

"Public Opinion as Both Means and Ends for Policymakers", included in THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE 1980s, Part III, Adelphi Paper No. 191, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Summer 1984. (Papers presented at the September 1983 IISS annual conference.)

"Technology Transfer: A Balance of Interests", essay included in STRATEGIC SURVEY, 1983-84, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, May 1984.

"Arms Control Implications of the XM-753 Nuclear Projectile", ANALYSIS OF ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS SUBMITTED WITH FY1978 BUDGET REQUEST, Committee Print, Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees, US Congress, May 1977.

SELECTED PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS

"Congress and US Defense Policy: Current Issues", speech at IISS, London, March 1984.

"Congressional Role in US National Security Policymaking", lecture presented at University of Aberdeen, Scotland, April 1984.

"Technology Transfer and East-West Security", lecture to graduate students and faculty, University of Lancaster, England, June 1984.

"Technology Transfer and Western Security", testimony presented to the North Atlantic Assembly Scientific and Technical Committee, at Spring Parliamentary Session, Luxembourg, May 1984.

"US Politics and Defense Spending: The Current Congressional Debate", presentation to the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, September 1984.

Occasional radio and television commentaries (including BBC World Service and London television) discussing alliance security and US defense budget issues.