

jobs were dished out on a tribal basis. It is not unlikely that there are people in Kenya occupying certain positions which they could not earn in their own right had they not belonged to this tribe or that. This is a factual albeit obviously bitter observation; it is even bitterer because our leaders fail to pinpoint the existence of tribalism in the country.

This article is indeed aimed at spotlighting an evil whose mention in Kenya is frightening, to put it very mildly. But this is a free and frank analysis offered of a nation which is striving to eliminate tribalism. How many times have leaders in the Buluhya area complained about the appointment of Kikuyu District Commissioners in their area? Is it not tribalism that a Kikuyu, who belongs to the Kenya nation, should be regarded as a stranger by a Muluhyia who belongs to the same nation?

As observed earlier changes are rapidly coming to Kenya. But the time has not yet come when one could honestly state that, for instance, the Hon. Masinde Muliro, a Muluhyia enjoys more support among the Kikuyu than among his own tribesmen; or that more Kikuyu support Mr. Paul Ngei than do the Akamba people. To argue thus nowadays would warrant a mental check-up.

How much tribalism would you find in our local political institutions? A lot of it. The driver of any political leader who has cared to hire one is, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, a person of the same tribe; and the same could be said of clerks, bodyguards and all their other surrounding functionaries. What other incentive would there be than tribalism in compelling a nationalist leader to stick to his own brothers who alone he considers fit for everything?

It would, of course, be extremely dangerous to try and drive tribalism underground. All that needs to be done is to examine this vital subject in the most manly and patient way possible. The people should be told clearly that there is tribalism in this country; they should be told of the dangers and disadvantages of this disease.

It is quite in order to say that tribalism is still a major force in the conduct of affairs in Kenya; but this does not suggest in any sense that everything that is done is based on tribalism. It merely means that tribalism is playing a very great part in the life of the nation. Maybe one of these days things will change and we shall see a nation in which each individual, official or ordinary citizen, poor or rich, educated or uneducated is equally concerned to fulfil the requirements of national unity.

There is not any doubt that those in the country who have rejected tribalism in favour of national unity will have a greater role to play in building a strong nation in this country. No doubt as times pass the number will increase and the pace will hasten. Until that time Kenya has a lot to learn in the art of nation-building.

# The rise and fall of Grace Ibingira

## PART TWO

FOLLOWING Gulu the UPC appeared to enjoy an upsurge. In August carpet crossers from the Democratic Party and Buganda's Kabaka Yekka ("Kabaka Alone") swelled its parliamentary group to an absolute majority and the coalition with KY was ended. In Buganda, the DP made more local level headway than did the UPC but KY MP's continued to cross under the influence of Ibingira until only 7 of 24 remained, along with 8 DP and one ex - UPC trade union independent, on the opposition benches. Late in 1965 the then Opposition Leader, Basil Bataringaya (of the DP and Ankole) had crossed with 5 other MP's and - it then seemed - most of the DP machine.

Naturally the political situation seemed well in hand. Even in Buganda the KY crossings created an aura of success. A series of moves of tax allocation, kingdom border delineation (the "lost counties" issue between Buganda and Bunyoro), and procedural disputes between Entebbe and Mengo were consistently won by Entebbe - after appeals all the way to the Privy Council by the Kabaka's Government. However, these disputes greatly weakened UPC Muganda's influence wherever their posts in the Central or Kingdom government. Elsewhere the simmering local and quasi-ideological fudes were far from settled. Indeed in his attempts to purge the constituence parties of their heavy pro-Kakonge majorities, Ibingira reduced many of them to merely nominal existence. At the same time his "local notable" centered faction-building increased the level of district and kingdom party tensions while making them more dangerous by overt linking with national politics.

Early 1965 saw opposition to US support for the Tshombe regime in Congo Kinshasa serve as a focus for intra - UPC unity. A few months earlier Kakonge had returned to at least partial favour and influence appearing repeatedly with Dr. Obote at economic affairs related meetings and conferences adding to the impression that the split dangers described at Gulu were safely passed. In the summer of 1965, however, Dr. Obote made a prolonged trip primarily to Eastern Europe and China while late 1964 and 1965 saw US trips by Ibingira, Sir Wilberforce Nadiope and a number of their UPC supporters. Apparently Ibingira and Nadiope - and certainly their supporters - freely hinted that Dr. Obote would soon be out of office and that the USA could expect a more "friendly and responsible" government when they assumed power.

On his return to Uganda, Dr. Obote was greeted by a concerted series of increasingly bitter challenges to his visits and foreign policy. In a blazing speech - whose lack of specific names was a device which left few Ugandans in doubt as to its targets - Minister of State Grace Ibingira claimed that Dr. Obote had aligned himself with the East, forfeited Uganda's independent external position, and betrayed his party. For this, Ibingira held, he must be summarily removed from Office. Speaking for the Prime Minister, AAA Nekyon (Obote's kinsman from Lango and his regular hatchetman) and John

and governmental *éminence grise*.

Baganda votes were needed both in Parliament and the UPC. They were to be had at the price of supporting continued semi-autonomy for Buganda, the rule of the Kiganda aristocracy in the Kingdom, and the retention of the Presidency of Uganda by the Kabaka more or less as a perquisite of the kingship. Despite the contradiction between these and the demands of his non-Baganda Southern supporters – Ibingira wooed the Kabaka's men increasingly ardently as the grave limits of a "Bantu Group" excluding Buganda became increasingly clear. How the cross promises were to be resolved is unclear. Certainly the Ibingira Group's growing identification with the KY Floor Crossers and with the Kabaka (the rumour that Sir Frederick planned to join the UPC clearly meant the Ibingira UPC and was advanced by them – in certain quarters – as an index of their success) weakened the "Bantu Group". Since February this identification has been stressed to the point of distortion by the government in a successful campaign to wipe out all trace's of the Ibingira group's political influence by picturing them as the "servants of one man" (Sir Frederick Mutesa, the Kabaka).

Two of Ibingira's moves involved close- and unwise in the event – co-ordination (or collusion) with KY and the Kabaka. First he leaked "data" on supposed corruption in connection with Congolese revolutionary government, on a "subversive guerilla camp" on Mount Elgan, and on an Obote-Nekyon-Onama-Col. Idi Amin (Deputy Army Commander) "coup" plan. These formed the basis for the Ocheng motion. The go-between was quite probably the last KY floor crosser = saturnine, sardonically brilliant, vitriolically anti-Obote, deeply frustrated in his high ambitions Abu Mayanje. The charges were not new, the "documentary evidence" and Ibingira's manipulation of the Cabinet and Parliament led to the call for a Commission of Inquiry and for the suspension of Colonel Amin.

MEANWHILE, both the Kabaka and the Ibingira Group involved themselves in clearly seditious plotting. (Cabinet Minister stage managing of charges that the Head of Government is planning seditious coups is certainly improper and may justify the term "plotting" as used in Uganda but it is not *per se* seditious.) In February the Kabaka approached the United Kingdom High Commissioner to inquire whether he could secure Her Majesty's forces to cover him should he decide to remove the government and either rule directly or install a new government. The Foreign Ministry (to be precise a relative of Ibingira's in the ministry) was informed of the meeting but not of its substance. (The answer, it should be noted, was "No" by the High Commissioner). The Kabaka also approached one or more judges seeking advice on the removal of the Prime Minister and the appointment of a new government. Finally Sir Frederick was in touch with army officers regarding their support for engineering and covering such a change in the government. Whether the Army Commander Brigadier Opoloto was among those contacted (as whispered by some Obote supporters) and whether Attorney General Binaisa was among those contacted on the legality of the President's suspending or removing the government (as asserted by the Kabaka) are matters open to doubt – the rest of the coup plot by the Kabaka can be established from testimony of both sides.

Ibingira had also approached Army officers in terms of supporting a take-over of the government. Among those presumptively contacted was Ibingira's close kinsman who is a senior officer in the recently organized "Bantu Battalion". Following the Obote counter-coup Army Commander Idi Amin (Brigadier Opoloto having been kicked upstairs as Advisor to the Ministry of Defence) charged that the central staff officers had been privy to coup plans by Ibingira and apparently further charged

Kakonge in substantively near identical addresses blasted certain Ugandan politicians – self-evidently the Ibingira Group – as bought agents of a foreign power (presumptively the USA in Kakonge's speech, slightly more flexibly identifiable in Nekyon's) whose betrayal of the people of Uganda must lead to removal by the proper authorities (Dr. Obote and a UPC Delegates' Conference), despite the terminology of the "debate", foreign policy was not central in the thinking or strategy of either camp – the prize was Government – UPC control.

Also in the fall of 1965, Attorney General Godfrey Binaise (a Muganda radical who usually backed Obote although by no means a stalwart) and an Obote-Kakonge slate of officers had been installed by a Buganda UPC Regional Conference engineered by Nekyon and Kakonge. This result was challenged by Ibingira and the KY carpet crossers who succeeded in achieving a UPC Executive order for new elections and, in February days before their own arrest, installing a slate headed by Minister of Health, E.B.S. Lumu.

After the October speeches rumours of coup d'états filled the air and an officer was arrested – rumours that, in fact more arrests had been made in October 1965 came up in conjunction with the first in a series of court martials relating to February 1966 army activity. The bridges between the Obote and Ibingira groups seemed burned and an immediate showdown inevitable. However, an apparent truce suddenly descended until February. Dr. Obote had clearly decided to seek the political life of Grace Ibingira; however, at a time and on issues of his own choosing. Ibingira almost certainly had an Executive Committee and probably a tenuous Cabinet majority but almost certainly did not have a UPC Parliamentary Group majority (witness the Kakonge election) nor – with the Binaisa Group installed in Buganda – at a UPC Delegates' Conference.

UP to this point Ibingira's strategy was clear and cogent. He sought to organize non-Buganda Southerners into a working alliance – the so-called "Bantu Group" – and to secure some understanding with the Kabaka. To a degree he did both, but the two legs of his policy were presently to become mutually contradictory and his coalition to show increasing tendencies to come unstuck.

The "Bantu Group" was always a "fabulous" entity in the true dictionary definition of that word. Ibingira's men were all Southerners (apart from his ally, KY's Daudi Ocheng who was an adopted Muganda even if originally from Gulu) but not all, probably not even a majority of, Southern politicians followed Ibingira. Obote's core supporters – Nekyon, Sam Odaka, Felix Onama – were Northerners but Odaka and Onama were (like DP and Opposition Leader Alex Latim) Sudanic not Nilotic. Many Southern areas e.g. Busoga and Bunyoro detest the Baganda and fear any increases in the Kabaka's power. Originally, indeed, Sir Wilberforce was apparently promised the Presidency by Ibingira with B.K. Kirya (of Bukedi in the East) to serve as Prime Minister and Ibingira himself as Secretary General

CIA involvement, judging from testimony at a rather inconclusive court martial of two of these officers. Certainly February saw a series of odd troop movements unauthorised by and unknown to Brigadier Opoloto or Col. Amin both of whom acted to halt and reverse several of the potentially most threatening shifts of "Bantu" or "Bantu Officered" units from Junja to Entebbe or Kampala.

OBOTE, meanwhile, had been laying a base for action. He skipped the Accra OAU Conference to concentrate on rebuilding his home base. A series of tours and speeches strengthened his image in the rural areas. In Bunyora he turned back a November-January attempt by the Ibingira forces to take over the Kingdom UPC. The pro-Ibingira Nyoro Minister of Labour in the Central Government George Magezi had planned a no-confidence motion in the Bunyora Rukurato, supposedly in the Kingdom Government but fairly overtly actually against Obote. The motion's failure by ten votes marked the first clear crumbling of the "Bantu" group - the Northerner Obote had triumphed in a clearly Bantu Southern Kingdom battle. In Ankole, Minister of Interior Basil Bataringoya was diligently taking over that Kingdom's UPC thus cutting Ibingira's home base from under him. In Sir Wilberforce's Busoga, the UPC loyalists made common cause with the local anti-Kyabazinga opposition after an Obote speech skillfully covering but hardly hiding a sweeping denunciation of Sir Wilberforce with apparent praise. (I come not to bury Sir Wilberforce but to praise him ... ) February 10 the Ocheng Investigation motion passed Parliament. February 13 the Lumu Group took over the Buganda UPC. Coup rumours spread like wildfire and Dr. Obote's days in office were seen as numbered on the fingers of, at most, two hands. Correspondents descended on Kampala like vultures (or perhaps, to be kinder, carrier pigeons) to see the end, then drifted away as the PM apparently unconcernedly continued his Northern tour.

Returning a week later, Dr. Obote immediately set to hammering out details of a Commission of Inquiry made up of three distinguished non-Ugandan East African High Court Judges. On the 22nd the Cabinet was to meet to discuss this and other matters. At that meeting the para-military police Special Force burst into the room and whisked Ibingira, Kirya, Lumu, Magezi and Mathias Ngobi of Busoga off to detention in the North under the old British written "Deportation" Act. Assumption of full powers, suspension of the Constitution, removal of the President and Vice President (Sir Wilberforce in fact fled to Kenya for about a fortnight), and announcement of the Commission of Inquiry's appointment followed in quick succession.

Fence mending meetings were held with district constitutional heads (except the Kabaka) and with other political leaders. Full publicity was afforded to the Commission's hearings - which *de facto* demolished the charges. Active support for the Gbenye Regime - based on both a Uganda Cabinet and an East African Head of State consensus was demonstrated and, for the first time, explained in detail to the public by Uganda ministers. However, the corruption claims fell distinctly flat as Thomas Kanza, Tony Nyati, and Cristophe Gbenye took the stand to declare that their funds had been efficiently and honestly handled by Col. Amin with their knowledge and consent as well as that of the Uganda Cabinet. The guerilla camp in the Mount Elgan area (whether Congolese or Ugandan - the charges did not really appear clear on that point - proved to be an *ignis fatuus*, and one Dr. Obote had devoted a good deal of energy trying to run down as he had feared it *did* exist and was directed against himself. The purported Obote-Onamo-Nekyon-Amin coup plot turned out to be even more fabulous than the Bantu group - the official Commission Council in his summing up concluded that no evidence at all had been offered in support of that charge.

On 30 April Dr. Obote presented a very long and exceedingly tedious speech to Parliament. In its last few minutes he turned from minor detail to grand policy (presumably and possibly, intentionally after most of his radio audience had given up and switched off). A new Constitution featuring radical changes from 1962's independence document was outlined by the Prime Minister and immediately passed 55-4. (All but two of the less than a dozen opposition MP's initially present walked out - the 4 "nays" were UPC members). Obote was then elected Executive President under the terms of the new document.

APRIL 30 was not an end. From Dr. Obote's point of view and that of most Ugandans outside Buganda - it was a beginning.

## Tanzania after five years

Each Tanzanian feels  
he is a free Tanzanian

N.E.R. MWAKASUNGULA

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9th December 1966 was the fifth anniversary of Tanganyika's independence. In this period of time both Tanzanians and foreigners may want to judge what Tanzania has achieved in development. Strictly speaking a Tanzanian in Tanzania may not be able to see much change because the changes which have taken place have come to him, as it were, spontaneously and naturally, and therefore they are part of him. But most certainly a colonialist who left Tanzania immediately after independence would be surprised at the very great developments which have taken place in this short period.

The first and foremost of these developments is Nationalism. Before independence people in Tanganyika used to identify themselves by their tribes and they took pride in their tribes rather than their nationality. This was no fault of theirs because when the colonialists arrived in Africa the first step they took in an effort to weaken African power was to adopt the policy of divide and rule. This method was so successful that Africans accepted it whole heartedly and started to identify themselves by their tribes. It was only after realising the danger of this that changing inter-tribal organisations into political parties became necessary. And, of course, where inter-tribal harmony failed to materialise the result was that independence was delayed, or if it was granted later on troubles erupted having their origin in tribal differences.

In Tanzania today no-one talks of belonging to such and such a tribe unless it is absolutely necessary. The national cohesion is so strong that many M P's contested their seats in constituencies where they thought people would like them and know them better instead of contesting in their home constituencies. With this strong national feeling Tanzania has been able to advance tremendously.

Again, if you took a person who left Tanzania in 1961 back to Tanzania now he would be very surprised to see the great

For them it was a beginning toward a more efficient, more popularly oriented, more honest (especially on the Kingdom and District levels) government. They hoped to begin building a united and prosperous Uganda, and doing it faster. The immediate symbol of their hopes was Work for Progress, the ambitious new development plan launched by President Obote and Planning Minister Kakonge in May.

For the Kiganda aristocracy led by ex-President Sir Frederick Mutesa, The Kabaka February-April events also seemed a beginning. For them, however, they were seen as portents not promises, portents moreover already backed by heavy losses of power. The Kabaka and his circle planned resistance and reversal. Their symbols were a series of Kabakal statements and

Lukiko resolutions rejecting the new constitution, asserting that Sir Edward was still lawful Head of State, and with increasing explicitness styling President Obote a seditious rebel. On May 20 the Lukiko passed a resolution declaring Uganda had seceded from Buganda (by rejecting the 1962 constitution without reference to Kingdom and District Assemblies as provided in the 1962 instrument) and therefore ordering the Central Government to evacuate Kampala, Entebbe, and all other facilities on Buganda soil by midnight May 30. The stage had been set for the Kabaka's Insurrection of May 23 and the Buganda Emergency which followed. The Kiganda aristocracy's prophecy of discord and violence was to be fulfilled - fulfilled by their own acts and by the hands of their followers.

developments of her towns. Dar es Salaam serves a good example for this. The narrow Arab orientated streets have been widened, lofty buildings have been erected and areas which used to be slums now shine like golden mirrors.

New factories for a wide range of manufactures have been installed. Admittedly these industries and the great part of the commercial sector are still owned by Asian ex-patriates or by foreign companies. The government is quite aware of the situation and something definite is being done to encourage Africans to join the commercial sector.

Although industrialisation has not been fully developed the few things which are manufactured here add pride to the people. In the colonial days even the simplest things like razor blades and soap were made in England. Today things like shoes, twine, rope, matches and ready-made shirts are made in Tanzania. In the Five Year Development plan which ends in 1969 the government is determined to expand the processing, manufacturing and mining activities.

While commerce and industry is still in the hands of expatriates, the face of the civil service has entirely changed. In December 1961 nearly all district offices were headed by a European administrative officer, let alone other departments which were technical in nature and therefore which very few Africans could fill. This definitely did not give the impression of an African government being run by Africans. Instead it was an African government being run by expatriates. This caused great concern among the politicians.

It was therefore necessary to set up an Africanisation committee which recommended various ways of Africanising all posts as far as it was practically possible. Today all district and regional offices are headed by Africans and nearly all principal secretaries in the ministries are Africans. The Civil Service Commission itself is headed by an African and its members are Africans.

The implementation of the Africanisation policy presented some difficulties because of lack of manpower. But African leaders realised this long before independence and therefore decided to build a college for Tanzania. The University College, Dar es Salaam was thus started and temporarily housed in the T A N U headquarters building. The college started with six students. Today the college has over 500 students. It occupies a large area about seven miles outside Dar es Salaam. Its buildings are the most modern and most beautiful, compared with its sister colleges of Nairobi and Makerere.

Two more colleges have been built, the Dar es Salaam School of Medicine which aims to produce doctors who will practice in Tanzania only, and The Agricultural College, Morogoro which produces agriculturists with Diplomas in Agriculture. Apart from these three colleges Tanzania students also go to Makerere College for medicine and to University College Nairobi for Veterinary science and Engineering and other general degrees which are also awarded at the University College Dar es Salaam. Leaving aside the development of the Colleges and of Kivukoni College for economic and political studies, the number of primary and secondary schools has increased considerably.

Politically Tanzania is a very mature nation. From 1961 to date she has never faltered with her policies or withdrawn her decision because of threats from outside forces as some African states have done.

Western Germany tried to interfere with her non-alignment policy but Tanzania stood firm and preferred to lose economic aid rather than sell her policy.

In the O A U Tanzania has made it known that it never changes or fails to fulfil her promises. So that last year when the O A U members decided to break their diplomatic relations with Britain when she failed to crush the illegal Rhodesian regime, Tanzania abided by her decision and broke off her relations with Britain, alongside four other African states, while other African states remained quiet and some even went as far as criticising and questioning the validity of the decision.

Her determination to work towards the union of Africa is no less remarkable. In 1960 President Nyerere suggested the idea of East African Federation which was, at least then, supported by both Kenya and Uganda. President Nyerere went as far as saying that he was ready to delay Tanganyika's independence to wait for the other two states so that they could become independent together in a federation.

Today the words East African Federation have fallen into oblivion. But, again, Tanzania decided to go ahead with her promises and formed a union with Zanzibar.

Apart from the 1964 army mutiny, which put a black spot in Tanzania, the progress she has made is very remarkable. There is every hope that in the next five years to come Tanzania will advance far more than it has now, With this harmony and great understanding among her citizens, one expects prosperity to lie ahead. Each Tanzanian feels he is a free Tanzanian, free from foreign rule which by itself is an achievement and works hard to promote the good name of his nation. Long Live Tanzania.