EDITORIAL NOTES
28 MARCH 1964

Words, words, words will resume in our 2 May issue.

The announcing of material due to appear in the coming issue will otherwise discontinue as a regular practice. The reason for this is that writers have too often been gagged by banning orders or other restrictions between such an announcement and the appearance of their writings, thus making it impossible for us to be sure that such material will appear.

"The Ballad of the Headless Men" in our 22 February issue was composed during a period of "90-day" solitary confinement and written down immediately afterwards. The poet's name was withheld at his own request.

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MOVED TO CALEDON SQUARE

On 9 March 1964 policemen from the Cape Town Security Police headquarters, Caledon Square, raided the offices of The New African, in Parliament Chambers, Parliament Street. Four hours later, after they had left, someone pinned on the door: "THE NEW AFRICAN - MOVED TO ROOM 169 CALEDON SQUARE, CAPE TOWN".

We have not yet moved back. The entire contents of The New African office, but for copies of a few publications for which we are agents, was removed - from a locked filing cabinet carried by four (black) constables to a handful of rubber stamps carried by one (white) constable.

Legal action to obtain the recovery of the property is being taken.

We have tried to notify subscribers that they may not receive the 28 March 1964 issue until we have obtained our addressograph plates, or at least the card-index of subscribers. As this is the second time we have had our property removed by the Security Police, our older subscribers may deduce from the non-arrival of the 28 March issue that the Police have interfered in our affairs again.

We are unable to anticipate the charge that may be brought against us, for the reason that we are aware of having broken no laws. It is difficult to imagine any charge that would require examination of every copy of every back issue, back to the beginning in January 1962. All of these were taken. The suggestion has been made that the operation was intended to intimidate all concerned with The New African. We can only reiterate that, speaking for those who edit and produce The New African, the operation has failed. We confidently hope that it has not only failed for our agents, subscribers and other readers, but that the 9 March raid will inspire them to support us even more strongly even than they have done in the past.

Salahi

Illustrations on pages 60, 61, 62 and of the front cover are by the Sudanese artist Ibrahim Salahi, whose work has been described by Ulli Beier in The New African, October 1962 and 18 January 1964. Trained at the Slade School in London, Salahi is now a teacher in the Khartoum Technical Institute. "Most of his work is figurative, the basic Arab forms being still recognisable, and some of the exquisite rhythm of the writing has been preserved". Ulli Beier's view is borne out in these drawings.
“Where the hell is Shorty? Shorty’s always late?”
“You know he went for the booze.”
“So where’s Mike? He’s got the maps. He’s the bright boy who knows all the plans. Now just when we’ve got to go he ain’t here.”
“Look, Barnsey, you’re getting jittery.”
“Shit! This isn’t fun’s play. cheap dramatics. This is it!”
“Mama, give us another drink.”
“IT my arse-hole. Who d’you think you impress?”
“But where’s Shorty?”
“Look, Barnsey, the car’s not even here. You shoot your bloody nerves into all of us. Can’t we have our drink without your jitteriness?”
“T-T-To hell with you!”
“IT’s my arse-hole. Who d’you think you impress?”
“Where’s Shorty?”
“Look, Barnsey, the car’s not even here. You shoot your bloody nerves into all of us. Can’t we have our drink without your jitteriness?”
“T-T-To hell with you!”
“IT’s my arse-hole. Who d’you think you impress?”
“Where’s Shorty?”
“Look, Barnsey, the car’s not even here. You shoot your bloody nerves into all of us. Can’t we have our drink without your jitteriness?”
“T-T-To hell with you!”
"You keep getting at me, Hank. You think I'm scared of you. I'll break your scrawny neck for you."
"You and who? You can bring your mother, your father, your brothers, your aunts, your uncles, your cousins and chance relatives . . ."
"Why, I'll . . ."
"You'll get yours now!"
"Cut it out, boys, cut it out!"
"He's like that when he's drunk."
"That's the general idea. Barnes has got to be made drunk first before we can leave here."
"Pass that bottle, pally. I can't get decently pickled knowing that there's a dame here that doesn't drink, and all about: I've Got A Girl In Ramathlabama. The thing's got me so worried my intestines won't take."
"Well, son, mine are still idling just-like."
"Tell you what? Let's jazz up this party a little and forget about the Great Adventure."
"Why doesn't Mister Superior Instructions tell us something of the hazards we take in going along with an obvious deadweight like Barnesy here? I don't like the mysterious ways in which these wonders perform."
"Let's jazz up this party. Peter, give us a song, will you?"
"Git on board, ah little chillun, git on board . . . Ah, what the hell, nobody wants to sing."
"Look, Shorty, that's not three fingers, and that's not whisky."
"Easy, man. Gotta save something for the trip."
"Git on board . . ."
"I drink this to the success of Operation Rabbit."
"Sssshh, you basterd!"
"I guess we better sing."
"How about: The Doughty Men?"
"Nnnoo! Who ever heard of a girl Piet Retief?"
"Duzzen marrer."
"Come'n, Peter, give!"
"Calling all the doughty men U-Tshaka!"
"Who sought and wrought And fought and thought;
Calling them out of the pen U-Dingane!"

The bloody lot That yielded not, But fought from million down to ten. Calling all the doughty men, Le-Moshoeshoe! No-Makana! And what the bloody-hell of Pieter Retief? Of Ghandi! Of Moses! Of Jesus! UmKulunku! give us more doughty men!"

"But who wrote this moving song of the refugees? I've heard it told that it just fell together at places where fugitives have met for a night or so and wanted something to give them heart."

"Shit, that's poetry. man, heroic poetry, and such things
I don't just fall together."

"That's the lofty part of it, son. Retief in his day must have had feelings like ours. That's what heroic poetry knows; the deeper state of a man, not just the transient things."

"The only deeper states I know are in a bottle. Pass me a drink, lad."

"But when's our bloody car coming?"

KNOCK! KNOCK! KNOCK!

"There you are, me lad."

"Ja, Martina, selling liquor again."

"Nay, naas, this is my birthday party. These are all my friends and relatives. As you can see they're all kaffirs drinking within the meaning of the Act."

"Sure, now, Martina. Let's just see their papers."

"Aw, they rull right."

"Hm, What beats me in this blasted job is that the kaffirs' faces in their books and on their heads never tell you anything. You know, Gert, these kaffirs could all exchange their books with one another and I still would not know."

"Ag, mahn, so long as they got the books. It's these cheeky ones that won't carry books that get me the hell in. Now, Martina, pour me a nice, large whisky, my goodly maid."

"How come you boys can afford whisky, hey? My God, I can't. I suppose, it's all stolen stuff that gets sold here in the townships at back-door prices, nè? Not that I care much of a damn. My job is to catch communists, not to spoil the fun of people who drink decently at home."

"That's the lofty part of it, son. Retief in his day must have had feelings like ours. That's what heroic poetry knows; the deeper state of a man, not just the transient things."

"Tomboy, you're a spoil-sport."

"What I hated most was his saying that we all look alike. Fancy, my looking like Barnesy here. I thought I had individuality."

"Anyway, Martina, pour that precious whisky, and one for yourself, too. It's probably the last we shall get from such an august source, in such illustrious company."

"To the Department of Justice!"

"To Freedom!"

"To nice kaffirs scared shat in the pants!"

"To hell with it, to Aunt Martina!"

"TO AUNTIE MARTINA!"

"There's the car, folks. We better get out of hostile country."

"Goodbye, Aunt Martina."

"Goodbye, Six Martina."

"Goodbye, Martinitjie."

"Jeewheezus, the dear, old shebeening gal's actually crying at the loss of our custom."

"You've got the good taste of a polecat, get into your Boy Scout uniforms, all of you!"

"What's Jane? A Girl Scout or a Boy Guide?"

"To hell with you!"

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<td><strong>Senator A. P. Erlank (Nat.):</strong> Opposition members seemed to be concerned about the fate of 90-day detainees, but many people in the restless world of today would not mind being locked up for 90 days. Look at what people like Hitler and Martin Luther achieved after being locked up for long periods. For a man with a clear conscience there could be nothing bad in solitary confinement. The psychological effect of solitary confinement was not aimed at the innocent, but at those whose consciences were not clear.—<strong>Cape Times.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Non-White buses in Johannesburg may soon be operated by non-White crews, if the City Council approves a recommendation put forward today by the Transport Department.</strong> The introduction of non-White crews would save ratepayers an estimated R80,000 a year.—<strong>The Star, Johannesburg. (H.L.)</strong></td>
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<td>**Of course, some &quot;civilians&quot; were caught up in the desert war. The Arabs. But I'm sure they loved it. They sold eggs to both sides and turned a pretty penny.—<strong>Lieut. Gen. Sir John Cowley on &quot;the North African show&quot;, Rand Daily Mail. (N.K.)</strong></td>
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<td>**Most of us are glad to learn that the United States, after its monotonous criticism of us, now has its racial difficulties.—<strong>Major Piet van der Byl, letter to the Cape Times.</strong></td>
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<td>**Also present was Mr. Howard Odell (M.P., Maritzburg City), who recently resigned from the United Party and joined the Nationalists. Many English-speaking people in the past looked to England as a big brother, but now my call to these people is &quot;look to big brother Afrikaner&quot;—Mr. Odell said. <em>Cape Argus</em></td>
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<td><strong>Bloomfontein, Saturday—</strong> A 16-year-old Bloomfontein schoolboy who tried to apply apartheid himself—He said he was told to do so by his principal—was found guilty of the theft of a blazer this week. The boy, a high school pupil, said in the Bloomfontein Magistrate's Court that he took a school blazer from a Native child because &quot;if people came from overseas and saw a Native wearing a school blazer, they would think there is no apartheid and that schools are multi-racial.&quot; <em>Sunday Times, Johannesburg. (H.H.)</em>*</td>
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As others see South Africa

The Russian Experience

A. B. DAVIDSON

on 21 April 1808, a Russian ship named Diana reached Simonstown on its way from Petersburg to Kamchatka for the purposes of a scientific expedition. The Russian seamen dreamed of a friendly reception and rest after a long and difficult voyage. But to their surprise the Diana was met with the muzzles of guns. One of the British frigates set sail and came up close to the Russian ship, while all men-of-war in the roadstead immediately dispatched armed boats to the Diana.

The ship found herself captive, though her captain had a passport given by the British Government to grant him the right of free sailing. Being for a long time at sea, the crew was not aware of the war that had broken out between Russia and Britain.

V. M. GOLOVNIN, captain of the Diana and a well-known seaman, took a brave decision. Thirteen months he had to wait for a favourable moment, but, at last, on 16 May 1809, he realised his intention: the whole crew rushed up the masts rapidly set storm sails and the Russian ship left for the ocean in sight of the British ships guarding her. The weather was rather stormy and this lulled the vigilance of British sailors: they were far from expecting such audacity on the part of Golovnin.

FOR THE THIRTEEN MONTHS that Golovnin was forced to spend at the Cape of Good Hope he composed a description of the Cape's colony. His work was not the first to let Russian readers know about this country. As early as 1793, in the time of Catherine II, a book on South Africa written by F. Le Vaillant was translated into Russian. Its publication was an evidence of awakening interest in Russia to this remote area of the world.

So, Golovnin's description was not the first work on South Africa published in the Russian language. Golovnin was not the first Russian either that had stayed for a long time in the South of the African continent: he wrote that in Cape Town he had run into "Ivan Stepanov's son Seziom who came from Nijniy Novgorod. Fate had been throwing him all over the world until he found himself in Cape Town, settled in Hottentots Holland, married and the father of three children. He was called Janz- Russe, i.e. "real Russian."

But it is still Golovnin who was the first Russian to write a detailed description of Cape's Colony—The Present State of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, with a Description of Surrounding Waters and Meteorological Notes.

The Dutch settlers of those times were described by Golovnin in the following words:

"Of their vices the main is, in my mind, the cruelty with which they treat their slaves. . . . The slaves are kept in this colony very badly."

These words by Golovnin would have been of no great importance if he had attacked such a state of affairs in a foreign country and had shut his eyes to such things in his home land. But Golovnin equally severely branded Tsarist-colonialists who exploited the peoples of Kamchatka and other outlying districts of Russia.

In 1853 South Africa was visited by I. A. GONCHAROV, a well-known writer whose novels are still studied in Soviet schools. He travelled much in the Cape Colony and told Russian readers about it with a lively interest and sympathy.

How poetically he described the Southern African night:

"The Southern night is mysterious and wonderful as a beauty under a black haze: dark and silent, but boiling and thrilling inside under her transparent veil. One feels that every gulp of this air adds to one's health. It refreshes the breast and nerves like swimming in fresh water. It is warm as if this night possesses its own dark sun which invisibly gives warmth to it. It is still, quiet and mysterious. Leaves are motionless on the trees."

And here is one of Goncharov's statements about the inhabitants of the colony:

"The Englishman is a master here whatever he is: he is always exquisitely dressed, coldly and contemptuously he gives orders to the Black. The Englishman sits in his spacious office or in his shop or on the exchange, buzzing with activity on the wharf; he is a builder, engineer, planter, official; he gives orders, governs, works; it is he who rides in a coach and on horseback, who enjoys the coolness on the balcony of his villa hidden in the shade of the vineyard."

"And what about the Black? Here is a slender handsome Negro, the Fingo or Mozambique, carrying a bale on his shoulders; he is a 'coolie'-hired servant, a porter running his master's errands. Here is another, from the Zulu tribe and more often a Hottentot, who is skillfully driving a pair of horses harnessed in a cabriolet. And a third one, a Bechuana, is leading a saddle-horse; a fourth is sweeping the street, raising yellow reddish dust."

Goncharov states:

"There are no black natives in the colony, who could be called citizens of their own country. Here, they are servants, workers, coachmen; in a word, they are colonists' wage servants, and even as such they have been only lately, since some time ago they were slaves."

Goncharov wrote these words one hundred years ago.
Not all of what he and his contemporaries considered to be true, with respect to South Africa, has been proved correct by the course of time. But the major problem was comprehended by Goncharov in the right way: "At this very moment the major problems are being solved, the problems which can condition its existence, and which determine what is in store for this colony, i.e., whether it will remain a mere colony for Europeans as it was under the rule of the Dutch who failed to do anything for the black tribes, and will remain in the future a dull patch of land populated by Europeans, or the Black as legitimate children of one and the same father will on equal grounds with the White, enjoy the heritage of freedom, religion and civilisation granted to them as well."

Unfortunately, the century that elapsed since then, has failed to solve this problem. The artist and writer, A. Vysheslavtsev, visited the Cape colony several years after Goncharov in the fifties of the last century. He gave a very inquisitive look to the life of the non-white population of South Africa. The sight of a beggarly African with a yoke upon his neck, whom he ran into on the road, "very eloquently tells the passing cabs, coaches and waggons about suffering and humiliated humanity."

Vysheslavtsev was interested in the Xhosa wars. He did his best to see the famous tribal chiefs of this people, to get a knowledge of them from narratives, from literature. He visited the prison near Cape Town just to see one of the Xhosa chiefs imprisoned there. Sympathy and

**Socialist Survey**

**COMMENT**

The Word "Socialism" has lost its meaning

**IT IS CUSTOMARY** these days to assume that Socialism is inborn in the peoples of Africa because they lived under tribal communism in the recent past. But, so have most of the races throughout the world, if not in the recent past at least in the not too distant past. Pre-Roman Italy was a mass of warring tribes much on the same pattern as Africa. Caesar relates that Britain, France, Spain, and Germany, indeed all Europe was just the same in his day. Right up till the early Middle Ages the Manor in England closely resembled a tribal community. In a recent treatise on Agriculture in Tropical Africa, it was stated that "Land belonged to "the tribe, the cultivator only acquiring temporary rights and most cattle herding "was done on a communal basis". Substitute the word "Manor" for "tribe" and you have an almost exact description of the early medieval Manor, which goes to show that Africans are not so different from other folk.

The word Socialism like Democracy and many other words has in these days virtually lost its meaning. It is used generally as a lure to induce the underprivileged to hoist a dictator to power as we see in the case of Ghana and other so-called democracies in Africa. So many still believe that socialism means "Wealth without work". It is a delusion that Socialism brings with it social services or that social services are impossible without Socialism: Britain possesses what is probably the most complete system of Social Services in the world, and she owes them to two Liberals, Lloyd George, who said "Socialism is the negation of freedom" and to Lord Beveridge who drew up the ground plan of the Welfare State, as it is to-day, without the periodic shortages of food which exist in the U.S.S.R.

**AFRICAN STATES HAVE TWO COURSES** open to them. Either they opt for democracy in which case they can turn out their government by constitutional means or they choose a dictatorship, call it socialist, communist or what you will, whose chains will be riveted round their necks till the dictator is removed by violence or bloodshed by a new dictator. It looks as if most of them would choose the latter course.

R. LEATHER
sadness are well expressed in his description of this man, of his "strong-willed", "characteristic" face:

"A mass of varied feelings filled my heart as I looked at this chief. Once patriotic feelings inspired this tanned face; these eyes, once burning, were now festering and watering. Great sorrow must have fallen on this grey-haired head to turn a formerly formidable chief into a pitiful person that was sitting before us . . . "

Vysheslavtsev describes Maqoma too, who was by that time defeated and overthrown by the British.

"The famous Maqoma is decrepit and enfeebled; he is poorly dressed, if his clothing can be called dress at all; he lives wherever he can, at the expense of others, since he is absolutely beggarly. He accepts charity, but nobody has ever seen him begging— he accepts what is given to him as a due tribute. His face bears the expression of independence, his eyes burn with intelligence and his entire face manifests boldness and resoluteness."

Vysheslavtsev supposes that Maqoma served his countrymen "with unusual skill, persistency and conscientiousness" in the course of the struggle against Europeans that invaded the Xhosa lands.

From T. Pringle's book, Vysheslavtsev cites a peculiar text of the Xhosa envoy's speech addressed to the British Commander-in-Chief in the Kaffir War in 1818, and he admires the force and original poetry of his speech.

As for several large farms that he happened to come across, Vysheslavtsev wrote that they reminded him of the spirit of Russian serfdom landlords, of Gogol's characters.

HOWEVER, PARTICULAR ATTENTION in the widest circles of Russian public opinion was attached to South Africa during the Anglo-Boer war. The Russian public absolutely sincerely and unreservedly took the side of the Boers. Russian volunteers and two medical detachments were sent to South Africa. Boer fightingmen and European volunteers elected a Russian, Colonel E. Y. Maximov, as General who was to become the commander of all foreign volunteers detachments among the Boer Republican troops, but heavy wounds which he sustained in the battle of Thaba Nchu brought him out of action. The population of Russia collected money to build up a relief fund for wounded Boers. Hundreds of books, leaflets, magazine articles wrote about the South African War, newspapers were full of photographs of bearded Boers in wide-brimmed hats. Boys dreamed of running away to South Africa to fight on the side of Boers. In his reminiscences People, Years, Life Ilya Ehrenburg writes that he too tried to escape from his home and to leave for South Africa. K. Paustovsky, a well-known modern writer, writes in his autobiography how deeply impressed was his childish imagination by the stories told to him by his uncle who had returned from the South African front.

The book by Izyednova, who was a nurse, is among the most interesting books written by the Russian eyewitnesses and participants in the Anglo-Boer War. She was well acquainted with General Botha and his wife, with State-Secretary Reitz as well as with many other prominent persons of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics. She wrote, about living conditions of the African population in South Africa, that she was never struck to such an extent as by "the actual absence of any attitude to a Negro as to a man; he is treated here only as a working hand. This was especially striking in examination of a hospital where the section for the whites was very well furnished while sick 'Kaffirs' were lying actually on bare boards in awful stifling closets hardly protected against scorching sun rays. It is said that the black are not used to the convenience of a European bed and do not want to lie in it. I suppose, however, that any bedding on bare boards and protection against stifling heat and mosquitoes are good and pleasant for any diseased human being, and, at least, I know that in the infirmaries of the Russian Red Cross detachment, sick 'Kaffirs' placed in equal conditions (though in separate apparriments) with the white patients, not only could hear it, but also were extremely thankful for the conveniences and comfort granted to them."

Volks Radio

A satire

H. B. KIMMEL

ANNOUNCER: This is the national network of Volks Radio.

(Volks Music)

ANNOUNCER: This is the Volks Bibles Programme. Our bibles are best. Buy one of our bibles today.

H. B. KIMMEL is at present visiting England, after several years teaching in Cape Town.
The subject of Izyedinova's pride in the activity of the Russian detachment was first of all its humane attitude to the Africans.

Many of foreign volunteers who came to help the Boers were infected with the poison of racism. The French Colonel Villebois-Mareuil who had been for some time commander of all European volunteers in the Boer War wrote that an African could not even light a fire if he was not first given a flogging. In her book Izyedinova repeatedly turned her attention to this disgraceful, to her mind, point of view in contrast to her own experience of associating with Africans, especially with the Zulu.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION that took place in our country after the overthrow of the Tsarism, resulted in the fact that millions and millions of people started to strive for knowledge about the surrounding world. Interest in South Africa has grown as well. It attracts by its originality, by the complexity of its problems. Though personal contacts between peoples of different countries on the whole has greatly increased in the course of the last decades, and peoples from different parts of the world have got to know each other better, South Africa has been cut off from the USSR by the iron curtain already for the past two or three generations. This iron curtain was built up by those forces of South Africa which shunned everything that was Soviet like the plague. The world-acclaimed film "Battleship Potemkin" was banned on the screens of the Union of South Africa in the thirties. Mayakovsky's verses written for children were prohibited in the fifties. Soviet people are deprived of the opportunity to see the present South African reality with their own eyes.

Despite all this, new research works devoted to Africa are elaborated in the USSR. The readers of The New African magazine know about them for example from the article "Studying Africa in the Soviet Union" by Professor I. Potekhin, published in the June 1962 issue of the magazine.

Now, I am thinking of a particular country. In that land the name of which I shall not mention, a man, a writer from another country, used a certain library and wrote a most pernicious book, still treasured by blasphemers and materialists.

Now, if this country of which I am speaking had truly had a Christian atmosphere, he could never have completed the book. There was no love in that man's soul but at the same time Christian love had drained from all the people living in that country. He could never have written that book here and have it published. Yes, loving one's neighbour is the essence of all religious teaching. Now a certain member of my congregation once said to me, 'Dominee,' he said, 'because of apartheid the Kaffer is not our neighbour anymore so are we justified in hating him?' 'No,' was my reply. It is precisely because we love the black man that we are giving him the facilities to develop in his own area. Even if he is in his own area, he is still our neighbour and it is because we love him that we are not going to abandon him. Are we not going to look after the foreign affairs of the Bantustan and attend to matters like defence?

No, I still believe, love your neighbour as yourself.

ANNOUNCER: Next time you have an accident, ask your ambulance-driver to take you to the Yolks Hospital.

(Volk Music)
---I see. Dr. van der Merwe, did our rocket carry a passenger?
---Yes. It did. A little white mouse.
---And how did you and your fellow scientists decide on this?
---Well, we couldn’t find a black.
---Dr. van der Merwe, have you anything you would like to add?
---Yes, whenever my daughter goes out, she wears ‘Volks Lipstick’. It’s wonderful.

ANNOUNCER: It’s a fact! Most scientists’ daughters wear ‘Volks Lipstick’!

ANNOUNCER: If you are going to have a blue baby, order your blood from the Volks Blood-bank. Ours is pure European blood, taken from the veins of rugby-players.

ANNOUNCER: Next week, same time then?
- Shut-up! you’re with a white man now!

ANNOUNCER: We apologise for the delay but we had to overcome a certain amount of disturbance in one of the empty studios.

(Verse)

Everything is in order now.

ANNOUNCER: The ‘Volks Blood-bank’ presents another ‘Culture programme’.

ANNOUNCER: As the holiday season has arrived, there will be many visitors in Cape Town and today’s talk on the Cape Coloured people is presented for their benefit.

READER: When the visitor arrives in Cape Town, he will be struck by the warm, smiling faces of this naturally happy folk. A musical race, they are a great delight especially around New Year when they take part in their lively ‘Coon Carnival’.

The women make excellent housemaids and can often be heard singing in their rooms after hours, while the men are very interested in fishing although many of them are employed in the town.

They can be persuaded to work on reasonable terms although the odd worker might become a nuisance on being engaged. On these occasions it is never really necessary to give a thrashing or to call the police as with Bantus, for a good scolding will often do the trick.

For a white gentleman the correct form of address is ‘Baas’ and never ‘Sir’ while a white lady, whether single or married should always insist on ‘Madam’ although ‘Merrim’ is not meant to be offensive. This mispronunciation occurs on the part of those women who have had their front teeth extracted. This is done for the benefit of the men who find it more attractive.

The Coloured people, as old as Cape Society itself, have their own schools, universities and hospitals and provide their own teachers and quite often their own doctors. They do not seem enthusiastic about professions like engineering or architecture although, no doubt, this will come when they show greater responsibility.

The ‘Volks Blood-bank’ wishes the visitor a happy stay in Cape Town and hopes the Cape Coloured people will add to this amusement.

ANNOUNCER: Attention all Bantus! why not come into the Volks Bazaar today and see our exquisite range of leather wallets with zips. Ideal for carrying your pass.

A noted Bantu artist says, ‘I carry my pass in a Volks wallet!’

ANNOUNCER: The Volks Bazaar presents today’s chapter in our thrilling serial for children—‘Supervoortrekker’.

Supervoortrekker stands supreme in defending apartheid from would-be transgressors.

One bite of the ‘magic-boerewors’ and Jan Meintjies is instantly transformed into ‘Supervoortrekker’.

Jan Meintjies, the good-looking South African sportsman, is returning home from an afternoon of Volkspele, and is crossing a platform at the station. He has emerged from the shadows and the good South African sunlight is flooding his Aryan features. There is a look of alarm in his blue eyes as he notes a commotion in a railway-compartment.

CONDUCTOR: Come on, get out. This compartment is for white people only.

AFRICAN: But there is no room in the other coaches.

JAN MEINTJIES: Quick, where’s the magic-boerewors? Ah, here! there!

THUNDER

AH, I’VE BEEN TRANSFORMED! Supervoortrekker uniform, mask, cloak. I’m ready!

THUNDER

SUPERVOORTREKKER: Take that you black trash!

CRASH

SUPERVOORTREKKER: And that!

CRASH

SUPERVOORTREKKER: Take that hotnot!

CRASH

COLOURED: Oh!

SUPERVOORTREKKER: Here’s some more, kaffer!

CRASH

AFRICAN: Oh, Baas! oh, Baas! I’ve had enough.

SUPERVOORTREKKER: Take that you black trash!

CRASH

AFRICAN: Oh, Baas! I wish to present to you with this medal. The emblem is that of another proud country in its golden age the ideals of which now inspire our own.

APPLAUSE. VOLK MUSIC

SUPERVOORTREKKER: I am glad that you have learned your lesson.

(VOLK MUSIC. CHEERS)

DIGNITARY: Supervoortrekker, you are a true patriot and on behalf of the people of this country, I wish to present you with this medal. The emblem is that of another proud country in its golden age the ideals of which now inspire our own.

(APPLAUSE. VOLK MUSIC)

ANNOUNCER: Tomorrow, you will hear how Supervoortrekker frustrates a Bantu from stealing a loaf of bread from the home of a hardworking white businessman.

(VOLK MUSIC)
A RELIGIOUS VACUUM EXISTS OVER MUCH OF AFRICA AND ALTHOUGH ISLAM IS SPREADING, ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY IS CHANGING

AFRICA’S OWN BRAND OF ISLAM

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“Even in the Sudan region where we find a genuine Islamic culture we have to take account of the fact that it is also African.”
Sudanese wrestlers.

J. Spencer Trimingham
Reader in Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Glasgow

Although the power of religion to change and mould society has diminished, it is unwise to dismiss its significance. Islam in Africa has been one of the forces whose original inspiration lay outside the continent, but which has moulded the life and shaped the destinies of many of its peoples. Until recently the role of Islam has rarely been taken into account in studies even of people who claimed Islam as their religion. Writers of studies on social anthropology at one time used to assert that they were concerned with a people’s “original” state, and anyway, they said, Islam had had so little effect upon their social institutions that it could be ignored. Now a change is becoming apparent and the International African Institute is sponsoring a seminar on “The Spread of Islam in Tropical Africa” being held at the Ahmadu Bello University at Zaria in Northern Nigeria this week.

In the Sudan belt lying immediately south of the Sahara, Islam has become an African religion, whose agents were African, and which could therefore be assimilated into communal life without upsetting society. Islam’s greatest expansion has been within and south of this belt and has taken place since the end of the 18th century. This expansion derived first from the formation of theocratic states and then, since 1890, from the new conditions which resulted from the occupation of Africa by European powers. The result was a lack of uniformity in the assimilation and depth of Islamization. In other words, Islam south of the Sahara can rarely compare with Islam, say, in Egypt where it was a fully integrated culture, woven into the very fabric of society. The Islam of many Africans is marginal. Not merely are the peoples of the Sudan belt not all Muslim, but their Islamic culture is not homogeneously Islamic. Even in the Sudan region where we find a genuine Islamic culture we have to take account of the fact that it is also African. It is more than just a regional Islamic civilization: religious life still has strong roots in the African religious past. Only a few strata of society (the clerical and trading classes) are participating at all fully in Islamic culture.

Islam and African culture had the opportunity throughout centuries of unbroken contact, through mutual interaction, to form an African Islam with its own characteristics. This is the foundation upon
which a study of the contemporary scene must be
made, but there is now a third factor in the cultural
interaction: western secular culture whose impact
challenges all previous norms and standards. In the
early stages of colonial rule African Islamic culture
filled for many the needs of the situation, and from
the Sudan belt southwards and from the east coast
inland, Islam spread rapidly. During the last ten
years the secularizing tendencies of the changes which
began during the period of colonial rule have been
accelerated by the political changes which have taken
place with breathtaking speed. A religious vacuum
is creeping over the African soul, but it will not
necessarily be filled by either Islam or Christianity.

There is need for caution about two aspects of
contemporary Islam. In the first place, it is necessary
to take an attitude of scepticism or at least reserve
towards statements frequently heard nowadays about
the rapidity of the spread of Islam today and about
its numerical strength. On the latter point, for ex-
ample, we may mention that the proliferation of
mosques in East Africa has given many people a
deceptive impression of the strength of Islam in that
region, for many mosques belong to non-African
communities who remain insulated from East Afri-
can life.

Second, we need caution in estimating from sur-
face impressions the depth of the Islam of many of
those converted during the last 80 years. Caution in
this respect should be obvious from comparison
with the parallel spread of Christianity during the
same period. Although, it is true, Islam could be
assimilated more easily than Christianity and, where
conditions were favourable and the apparatus existed
for deepening the surface impression (clergy and an
Islamic state) it might quickly affect certain social
institutions, yet it often took centuries to change the
ethos and institutions of an African community. Not
only has the colonial period spread of Islam not had
time to deepen but its influence has also been diluted
by the new conditions in a changing Africa. It is
particularly where Islam and western influences came
at the same time that Islam lacks depth.

Africans have shown a real affinity with Islam
wherever it presented itself in a Negro form carried
and displayed by Africans. Where these conditions
were not fulfilled, for example, where it continued to
be the religion of aliens such as Arabs and Asians in
East Africa, it has failed to take root. Had Islam
been present in any significant form in South Africa
it might have answered the needs of the situation
there, and who can guess the speed with which it
might have spread and its possibly revolutionary role? However, in Central and South Africa Islam is weak: it has not become indigenous and has few African adherents. In such conditions Islam is sometimes adopted by individuals, perhaps as a gesture of revolt against a white Christianity, but such individual conversions have had little social significance since no real African Muslim communities were formed. Many examples can be shown of Muslims throughout Africa who have strong economic (and, if Africans, sometimes social) influence, but little religious influence. These include many immigrant African traders living in their own colonies in West African towns (Hausa in coastal towns, Naga in Dahomey, Yarse among Mossi), some Swahili among Bantu, and, of course, Syrians in West Africa and Asians in East Africa.

INDIVIDUAL CONVERSIONS

The rapid spread of Islam which characterized the colonial period (from 1890 to World War II) has slowed down, very noticeably in some parts. In the past, Islam offered notable advantages to Africans whose spiritual, and frequently communal, life was upset or disrupted through wars and slave-raiding and subsequently under the conditions of colonial rule. But these advantages are diminishing, especially since the withdrawal of colonial rule.

Nowadays it is often Africans not in close touch with established Islam who are impressed by it. What they hear, perhaps from neo-Muslims about its practices, flexibility and community feeling, may evoke a personal response, but especially it appeals to individuals as an alternative to Christianity. Modern Africans in touch with established Islam, especially the political type, however, are often repelled by it. They associate class and racial attitudes with it, dislike its authoritarian tendencies, and react against the conservative and obscurantist attitudes of its clergy, especially towards modern education.

Although traditional Islamic culture is stagnant or, where it is being undermined by the challenge of new values, is weakening, it is at the same time spreading in some regions (Guinea and parts of Mali, Nigeria and the Nilotic Sudan) in the old ways by gradually influencing a group (family or village). In others it is spreading by individual conversion which happened in the past in the Sudan belt only with such people as detribalized slaves, though it was the normal method in East Africa. It is offering itself to the "new men" (the évolutés) and urban proletariat as a personal religion, with positive and negative appeals for its adoption. If, under changing conditions, Islam is felt to offer social and individual advantages, it is likely to be adopted. Where it is stressed as "the religion of the African", its appeal may derive from more negative aspects. It is therefore being adopted as a religion in the western sense rather than as a civilization, but at varying rates and generally slowly and imperceptibly.

SECULARIZING ISLAM

The whole tendency in Africa is towards increasing secularization and this is what is undermining the influence of Islam. Secularization does not rule out religion of course, but it does mean a complete change of relationship and outlook, different from
that which operated in the medieval Christian and still rules the Sudan Islamic world. This is not only an important religious question, it vitally affects society.

Religion still has its place in a secularized world, but it no longer permeates and directs the stream of life. Other interests, political and materialistic, dominate men’s lives and are more dynamic than religion. Modern African politicians are aware of the uselessness of the secular trend for they are determined that potential rival forces such as Islam and the Christian Church shall not be powerful enough to affect the state, and they are prepared to use nationalism as a religion.

Thus among some modern Muslims a new form of Islamic consciousness is being formed. We find:

- a secular attitude towards religion; the restriction of the effect of Islam to purely religious aspects and such social aspects as are not likely to change society in any drastic way.
- religious tolerance (really indifference) both towards Christianity (change of religion is no longer a great crime against society) and towards African religion in the form of remnant beliefs and rituals retained by the neo-Muslims.
- dislike of many aspects and psychological attitudes in the old established Islam with its medieval outlook, legalistic morality and the like—the attitude of the religious leaders towards the new, such as modern education, modern Arabic, or the changing position of women.

Islam will have much less effect upon social institutions than it exercised in the past. Society is being moulded more and more by other forces than religion. Yet one must not infer that the old type of Islam is doomed to extinction. We know from western society that the entrenched and privileged will cling to their privileges and the institutions in which they are enshrined, and that religious forms, seemingly irrelevant to modern society, can not only survive, but even spurt into surges of popularity. Religion will continue to move and mould people but, if what is happening in the Christian world is any guide, it will be in different ways and will play a different role from what it has done in the past.

What this rapid sketch means is that we have people at many different levels of participation in Islamic culture. This is one of the ways which makes the study of modern change in Africa differ from that in long established Muslim lands where the whole population has been Muslim for centuries.

On the broadest level we need an awareness of three spheres of penetration: a) regions of established Islam, chiefly in the Sudan belt and a thin line along the east coast, and basically a medieval legalistic type of Islam; b) regions where Islam has penetrated within the last hundred years; and c) regions, basically pagan with strong Christian influence, where Islam is weak, represented chiefly by immigrants from other regions or outside Africa.

The rapidity of the changes which are taking place in Africa pose many new questions. What is the attitude of the new governments to religion, to the propagation of Islam or Christianity? Will the increased pace of secularization lead to the progressive disestablishment of Islam in the states of the Sudan belt? What is the place of religion in the life and thought of the neo-Muslims? To what extent does Islam remain a determining factor in the different sections of African Islamic society today?

At any rate the role that Islam will play in Africa will be different from the role it has played in the past, and it is perhaps important for the present seminar to concern itself with the present day significance (including the changing role) of Islam in Africa more than with the actual phenomena of the spread of Islam, though this is part of the assessment. If the seminar can coordinate the work of individual observers of the changing African Islamic scene and gain a better based overall view and relate Islam to the life of African society it will perform a useful task. But why does the idea still persist that Africa begins south of the Sahara? It is impossible to ignore the cultural influences and interrelationships between the states of tropical Africa and those of the north.

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The Conditions for National Economics in Africa

"The reaction against capitalism is on the whole less sweeping than it sounds . . ."

REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN

WHEN AFRICAN political leaders speak of political independence more than ever, they speak of economic independence after, and socio-literally, a political revolution. What can be made of the conclusion that African economics are inherently and permanently both dependent on Europe (West or East) and poor?

In part, the call for economic nationhood and national economic policy is a reaction against the unequal and warped pattern of colonial development—especially in the settler territories. It takes little insight to know why African politicians and orthodox Smithian economists alike denounce the system; when thousands of Africans are reported near starvation in the Transvaal while the Republic exports food; when until recently one could tell land ownership in the Tunisian bled by deciding arable land was French and barren Arab; when job reservation and education-training opportunities combine to bar realisation of human economic potential.

HOWEVER, the distortions of colonial economics are often more subtle. M. W. K. Chiume has pointed out how Malawi was "developed" as a tea plantation and labour pool combined with a settler-centred economic union; while at the same time the Shire hydroelectric-irrigation-drainage project was left unconstructed, Malawi was stripped of her most able manpower, and African agricultural and fishing reserves were not only underdeveloped but largely unexplored. In several ex-French colonies the Associate Membership provisions of the European Economic Community perpetuate the Zone Franc's support of a small planter-traditional ruler oligarchy who benefit from subsidised primary product export prices; meanwhile the whole nation pays for equally artificial import prices and the stifling of industry.

FINALLY, national economic control is viewed as essential to political freedom of action. Sylvanus Olympio posed the problem squarely:

"The investment and involvement of . . . former colonial powers is still considerable . . . everything suggests "development" will make it greater . . . idle to pretend that these powers are prepared to see Africa "go it alone" or that Africa desires it . . . Guinea made a courageous effort [but] abandoned by France . . . found that major-power partners were indispensable.

And at the Afro-Asian Conference in Moshi last year President Nyerere of Tanganyika warned against the "easy" ways of escaping ex-colonial power relations:

internationally, even between socialist countries, the class divisions are getting greater . . . socialist countries are now committing the same crimes as were committed by the capitalists . . . on an international level . . . to use wealth . . . for the acquisition of power and prestige.

Positive statements of economic outlook tend to be pragmatically socialist, (Nyerere, Nkrumah), communistist (Chisiza, Dia), or welfare-statist (Ohibbo, Bourguiba).
particularly stressed by Kofi Baako of Ghana and President Nyerere. Historic African land-tenure tends to be some form of use-tenure; in the same way the idea is widespread that wealth should be properly gained or held only for “the banishment of poverty” and not “for acquiring power and prestige”.

The provision both of a place in an ordered and comprehensible society, and a role in transforming and building it for the common man, is also viewed as essential to an acceptable economic system. No society which either makes Africans “strangers in their own country” or denies them the right to shape its socio-economic patterns is viewed as either conducive to maximum effort or consistent with nationhood.

WHAT CONSTITUTES a national economy? To what extent is such an economy within reach of African states now, or within the “plannable future”? The central elements, both from the African politician’s and the political economist’s point of view, are integration, modernisation, rationalisation, and national participation and direction.

INTEGRATION poses the need for two sets of policies: firstly, to increase involvement in the modern, market-oriented sector of the economy; and to generalise the modern sector so that it is nationally centred, promotes development and is not metropot-tied and enclavised from its “hinterland”. On the one hand a national economy requires expanding opportunities for participation in the market economy and a growing network of economic ties between segments of the producing force. On the other it requires that the market sector be more than a “bridgehead” of overseas importers of primary products but a dynamic force related—at least through the provision of government revenues and domestic private purchasing power—to the support of a national productive and infra-structure.

MODERNISATION, in the sense of introducing advanced technology and upgrading human skills, is central to greater productivity and to allowing greater savings for capital goods. A number of African states—unlike most in Southeast Asia and Latin America—have explicitly recognised that higher per capita incomes must be based on greater productivity and on provision of investment by short term semi-austerity, rather than on redistribution of currently foreign held incomes. The latter are quite inadequate—with the exception of the Republic and the Rhodesias—to raise average income to acceptable levels.

RATIONALISATION involves planning of public investment in physical and human capital, and of policies to promote and direct private sector and public corporation activity. The central goal is national welfare, not territorial product or export-import maximisation. National benefits and external economies have been a focal point of political speeches and are becoming equally key in the new and more sophisticated economic plans which are now gradually replacing the old colonial “government shopping list” variety.

NATIONAL DIRECTION of, and participation in, the economy poses several requirements. The nation (government) must be able to formulate economic policies designed to fulfill national aims. To do so it must develop the capacity to secure data, undertake research, and evaluate results. Equally, it must educate cadres of professional and skilled manpower to evaluate and apply the data. Perhaps less obvious, it must be politically competent to accept technically and economically practicable plans; a very weak government tends to aim for the impossible and then fail to achieve even what was potentially within its powers. Finally the government must secure the acceptance of the plans. The national government must, for this purpose, be stronger than any interest group or firm (domestic or expatriate) within its territory and it must be able to bargain from a tenable position internationally; in practice this will mean, for an emergent nation, the ability to turn to other markets, sources of supply, investors or assistance-givers, if one of them seeks to drive too hard a bargain.

DESPITE THE WORDING of some political speeches and newspaper editorials, the African approach to attaining a national economy takes a rather pragmatic view of foreign investment. Equally the majority of major African-oriented firms are prepared to operate within definite profit limitations and in the context of an economy directed to ultimate socialisation if they view as adequate probable profits and guarantees in regard to taxation and to compensation in the event of nationalisation. These two viewpoints in practice admit of considerable common ground, vide FRIA in Guinea, Valco in Ghana, the mining companies in Zambia, United Africa Company in Nigeria and the Congo; indeed the Katanga-Union Miniere debacle may not only prove exceptional but also a warning to companies to abstain from overt attempts to create or control governments as opposed to bargaining with them.

Modiba Keita of Guinea states the more radical Africanisation position in arguing “since Africa has not
had time to build up capital, if we want to construct the country we need not only technical resources but also financial resources.” He couples with this an explicit preference for UN-IBRD, bilateral public, and private capital, in that order. He concludes, perhaps somewhat sanguinely, “I think that, so far as we are masters of our programme and our legislation, the concessions which we can make to public or private capital are concessions freely made by us”.

Nigeria exemplifies a less radical approach in seeking both public and private foreign funds. The latter are sought particularly to complement private and public Nigerian investment in mixed corporations with Nigerian majority control. The theory is that substantial foreign technical and managerial resources and training combined with substantial—but minority—ownership interest offers a speedy way to develop efficient industrial units; these have built-in technical-administrative Nigerisation programmes. To date this appears to be working well.

There has been a growing responsiveness by industrialised countries to the concept of aiding industrialisation and accepting manufactured goods from the Tiers Monde; for previously even the Soviet Bloc has been hesitant about the latter despite tentative Czech and Polish commitments to Cuba and Mali. This new outlook was articulated in the 1963 US Economic Report of the President:

Systematic economic development...will result in large shifts in the structure of world trade...these [poor] countries cannot develop without an increasing demand from abroad;.. diversify their economies without export markets for their new products—especially light manufactures.

Three growing beliefs on the part of large expatriate companies are also hopeful in their implications. As expressed by Taylor Ostrander of American Metal Climax they are:

1. No company can afford an open break with the government in power (a position that in transitional and independent states has favourable, but in more “firmly” colonial, troublesome results);
2. The training of local technicians and managers combined with high wages leads both to high productivity (and low labour cost per unit) and to a more substantial domestic market (based on the higher purchasing power) thus putting profit and national development motives in at least basic alignment;
3. “Stability and order” based on repressive measures by unpopular governments create a bad climate for business investment and expansion [vide Zambia vs Zimbabwe today].

To assume these views are universal or that general congruity of interests will avoid hard bargaining and occasional clashes would be absurd. However, to view “Africanisation” of the economy as a philosophy rejecting needed foreign resources or current private and public investor attitudes as in inevitable conflict with national economy building, is equally unrealistic.

The most vital elements in creating African national (or supranational) economies are institutional and economic unit building. The Senegalese economist Mamadou Dia has centred his work on the economic aspect of this question, although this is often overlooked in concentration on the social aspect.

 Properly speaking, there is no development of an independent economy—in so far as that can exist—without a network of economic, financial, and technical facilities, and above all, without a total reconversion of relationships between evolved economies and younger economies—of whichever camp, of whichever ideology. We know now that neither examples taken from the socialist camp nor those from the capitalist camp can serve as models without serious modification or thorough and profound readaptation.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PHASE of economic building in Africa involves, as the author of this article has argued at greater length in the Journal of Modern African Studies, four major principles:

1. The creation of flexible policy-implementing institutions designed in the light of both present and desired economic structures;
2. A deliberate interrelated approach to sectoral institutions and policies to create reinforcing rather than competitive structures;
3. Progress toward functional multi- or supra-national economic co-ordination-integration in the areas of economic plan formulation, common services, exchange of data, and joint production (not merely vis à vis continental free trade);
4. A constant realisation that policy-institution complexes in emergent African economies must be different from those of the evolved economies for historic and cultural, as well as stage and goal reasons; and that a patchwork of diverse borrowings without national adaptation, synthesis, and creation is often little better than a unified copy.

Self-Portrait

I, the light in this long house
Of bone and little muscle,
Must praise this cancer of words
Which lurches through my body:

(No curse on my father's blood
For the lie of my country
That jabbers in my image,
And on my brothers of Africa
Who preach freedom to my pulse,
With time's mock and thorny.)

Where the cells of my ancestors
Are buried in the church's burial,
I shall burn too in this bone-dry house.

C. J. DRIVER
Dear—,

Perhaps, as you have always said, I am "too clever for my own good," I am always causing friction by my pig-headed, stubborn refusal to acquiesce in your mutual discreet agreement to avoid certain subjects. I am too stupid to accept certain tacit assumptions and ignore certain things. I am too foolish to keep my nose out of certain matters that "do not concern me." I have always found it difficult to bite back my tongue, but to suppress my conscience is something I cannot, thank God, do.

When I see your intimate fears I understand why you try so desperately to wear an ill-fitting mask of harshness, and want to believe that "everything will turn out all right" so urgently that you will even make up justifications. I almost sympathise with your efforts to turn a blind eye to any injustice whose removal would threaten your position, each time I see the shudder of fear you feel for your status as a white.

I tell myself not to judge you for doing to others what you would not like others to do to you. I tell myself that I am unfit to judge you; that a person cannot be blamed for desiring the snug inconspicuous security of the herd; that it is only natural to desire the best pastures for oneself. I tell myself, but I cannot convince myself. I am incapable of bartering my conscience for privilege. I am not very brave, but I think I could marshal sufficient courage to face any penalty in order to resist any command that contravened my conscience. "Obeying instructions" is the escapist's way out. It is hard to suffer, fighting for one's ideals, but harder to suffer fighting against them.

My conscience can never accept the Nuremberg-chicited excuse of "following orders". One has a yet greater duty to obey a higher set of orders. Perhaps it may even be best to leave this country—our country. Perhaps this is a coward's escape, avoiding putting my morals to the test. But it is less of an escape than saying "ours not to reason why", or "my country right or wrong" a breach of the higher set of orders, the justification and rallying-cry of all those who can, but do not wish to think.

When you can address, or refer to, a middle-aged person as a "boy" or "girl", without even understanding it is wrong, then truly has your mind become irreparably warped by paternalism. You have been absolutely corrupted by absolute power.

I have decided that discomfort will not drive me from a decision to learn, because every time, everyday, when in a thousand and one small ways your sub-conscious snubs of non-white people sharpen the sword of your own destruction, it feels as if boiling water has been thrown in one's face. One feels sick from repulsion. Physical discomfort is nothing to this.

These days, one hears the following argument very frequently: Our country has great economic prosperity, look at all the fine hospitals and schools, the best in the world, especially for the Black people. Much better than what is found in other loud-mouthed independent African states.

Yes, buildings are fine, impressive, concrete things, able to convince any casual visitor, able to convince all who want to be convinced.

But there are other things, things that are not so impressive or concrete, things that cannot even be seen, yet even more important than all the fine hospitals and schools.

Is civilisation measured in cubic yards of concrete, millions of gallons of petrol, or kilometres of railroad line? No, it cannot be. This is the way to measure technology, but civilisation is morality as well as technology. Morality cannot be measured by what man does to things, but by what man does to men. Can a millionaire with a D.Sc. (to create an extreme example) throwing acid at someone be more civilised than an illiterate peasant sharing a stale crust of bread with a stranger?

It is said that one can judge a person's character by the way he treats his subordinates. I feel that one can also judge a civilisation by the way it treats its underprivileged. One which, however poor, spares no effort to alleviate poverty, ignorance and disease is surely better than one which however wealthy the ruling classes are, largely ignores the bottom of its pyramid.

It is tragic and ironic that you are the helpless and unconscious catalysts that, start, guide and propel down its irreversible path the very thing you fear.

White South Africa, so fearful of genocide, is a textbook case of auto-genocide; a "nation", who, having sacrificed Democracy and Civilisation on the altar of power and privilege, now finds that it has no alternative but to follow in a vain effort to appease its unquenched, and unequivocable, thirst.

That is another reason for leaving. There is nothing, utterly nothing one can do, but helplessly watch the abbatior of arrogance and self-deceit hypnotically beckon the whole white "nation" towards it.

Yours sincerely,

KEITH
In a Zambian Secondary School

Syllabus and Staff backgrounds

STUART GRAHAM

Even a cursory glance at the class timetables will reveal that the boys at our school are receiving as good an academic education as they would at any first-rate White government school in South Africa: such a comparison is not quite just, since teachers here are able to enjoy a greater degree of academic freedom than is possible in any state institution in the Republic. Ours is a senior secondary school, preparing boys for the General Certificate of Education ‘Ordinary’ Level examinations, a course, judging from my own experience, far more demanding than the South African Matriculation especially in science subjects and in history and geography. A further examination has to be taken, though not at this school, to gain university entrance qualifications.

The subjects taught in the senior school are: English, Mathematics, Cinyanja, French, Latin, Physics, Biology, Chemistry, History, Geography, Art, Woodwork, Religion (Christianity). Of these English, Maths, History, Geography and one Science are compulsory, and pupils can choose two from the remainder. In the junior school, Forms I and II, Latin and Art are not offered, because there are not teachers for them. In addition to these subjects, each class has a weekly period for general discussion, during which the teacher will either answer questions on current affairs, or give talks on whatever takes his fancy.

Perhaps the most surprising thing after being in South African schools, and having some knowledge of Bantu Education, was the complete absence of any restraint on a teacher's beliefs, or on the way he taught his subject. This is not very important in the sciences, or in maths, but for history, geography and language teachers to be able to do their work without having to worry about a summons to the Principal's office for putting too much emphasis on this or that, gives the school an atmosphere of openness in which the less tangible aspects of education can be handled without a yawning gulf of suspicion between pupils and staff. A few examples will show what I mean: in History, trade unionism, the Russian revolution, and decline of the European empires are studied, as is the pre-colonial history of Africa; boys in the senior French classes have been collecting material on the French-speaking states of Africa, by writing to the governments for information (one reason for learning French is the proximity of the Congo, and to be able to study at Louvain or University, Leopoldville); senior and junior English classes read West African novels (Ekwensi and Achebe mostly), and (seniors) write essays on “Is a United States of Africa desirable?” or “Elvis Presley is killing African music.”

It is during the 'general' periods that the most startling questions are asked, and usually answered. A few examples: What is a flea circus? What was the connection between Profumo and Christine? How are European girls prepared for marriage? Why do the Boers oppress the Africans in South Africa? Why have Africans got flat noses and crinkly hair? Is it really true that Africans are not represented in the South African parliament? Is it true that an atomic bomb can kill millions of people at once? What is Malaysia? Is there a God?

It is sometimes difficult to interpret for these enquiring minds the bewildering world beyond this corner of the country, which most of the boys have never left, and if they have, only for Lusaka or one of the Copperbelt towns (the South African equivalents of which would be, say, Pietermaritzburg and Benoni). The central position of the country in relation to the rest of the subcontinent made foreign penetration later than in other parts, and although this has prevented the consolidation of foreign power, as in Mozambique or South Africa, it has also had the effect of limiting the inhabitants' range of reference, so that teachers are sometimes like builders who have to erect the walls and lay the foundations at the same time. After a long explanation of the making of margarine, a geography teacher was recently asked whether it was not produced by storks—so the teacher has to explain the commercial system of brand names.

The process of adjustment is not helped by the schooling many of the boys receive before coming to us, as many of the primary schools are run and staffed by obscurantists like the Seventh Day Adventists and the D.R.C., and also because the standard of teaching in the primary schools cannot be as high as is needed because of the poor facilities and a wide measure of dissatisfaction among the teachers over pay and general conditions. As a result of considerable pressure from the Union of Teachers, the Government now seems to be ready to reform the whole system. On the average, a boy's home does not prepare him for school at all, primary school only just manages to prepare him for a secondary education, and secondary education has to prepare him for his job on a copper mine or for further studies. The task is made considerably easier than it might be by the boys' desire to learn, but unfortunately the impression left by eight years of Gradgrind primary schooling is that education, on their part, is a passive action, the teachers ladling out facts and pouring them into opened heads. The first task then, with Form I, is to make the boys realise that they have to do as much as, if not more than, the teacher. It is in this that our freedom from ideological restraint is of most ad-
vantage, because it makes it possible to use pupils' inherent curiosity about the world as a method of teaching: the example I have given of boys writing to Guinea for information, not only gets them the information but also teaches them to write and read French better. Once school work is seen by pupils as part of the process of getting to know their country, their continent and the world, the ghost of Gradgrind and M'Choakumchild are beaten into retreat.

An obstacle with which teachers of English have to struggle are the peculiarities of language that arise in the primary schools as a result of being taught English by French Canadians, Afrikaners, Frenchmen or Hollanders (and by teachers who have been taught by them!) A typical sentence in this strange Zambian English might read: "I had to try by all means yesterday to foot to town if at all I wanted to go for shopping." Another, almost insurmountable, difficulty are the confusions which arise in pronunciation owing to the multitude of vowels and diphthongs in English as compared to the five in most Bantu languages: a few examples will explain—There are many beds in the game park; he buttered a sack of maize for a ship; people shouldn't eat too many potatoes because they will make them fat. To make things worse, there is no differentiation in Nyanja (the local vernacular) between L and R, so one gets sentences like this: A teach man does not rike to eat lice. The permutations are innumerable.

By the time the pupils are preparing for their G.C.E. exams, though, they are usually able to write creditable English, and to write interestingly on many subjects. The former ability is the result of the English teacher's work as a language teacher, the latter, of the spirit of free enquiry (and its corollary, free expression) which is the guiding motive in the education system. Boys are encouraged to use the library, to read newspapers; old Observers go to the house common rooms, the library subscribes to the Listener and the Central African Examiner (among others); the French teacher gives the class Jeune Afrique. They debate or discuss controversial issues: birth control, should beer be part of school rations? (carried by one vote), school integration. They attend lectures (the One Party System, the Crimean War), and listen to the radio. There are also regular film shows, usually of general interest films from the British Council, the (Federal) film library, the USIS, the French Embassy, the Indian High Commission, and an occasional treat, like Richard III or Great Expectations.

All this is not to say that the boys do not have to work hard. Applied Mathematics and Latin have to be learned—or that there are not a good number whose only interest is the Certificate, and the good job it brings as its reward (£800 a year after 6 months training as an Assistant Inspector of Police, or a rosy future as a copper mine technician). Teachers hope that some of the attempt to foster a critical and thoughtful approach to affairs will eventually bear fruit.

BRITAIN IS SHORT of 90,000 teachers, the newspapers tell us, and Zambia is proportionately just as badly off, so teachers are overworked and schools understaffed. A critical stage will be reached soon when the expansion of secondary education will depend entirely upon the availability of staff. Our school was short of two last year, but other schools have had to run double sessions to make up for their shortages, while the ministry seems to have been obsessed with the problems of taking over the former Federal schools, many of whose staff were not willing to teach or care for African children. It seems now to have become accepted that all the secondary schools will have to be staffed from abroad for many years to come: the 'localisation' of the civil service, the police, the army, and Anglo-American has absorbed most school-leavers this year, and will next year, and will probably for a generation. Those Zambians who should have been teachers and are now working in other jobs, are being replaced by South Africans (mostly Black), young British volunteers (who will stay for three or six years on contract), and no doubt by the Peace Corps, which is doing well in Malawi but is not officially welcomed here yet. The backbone of the teaching service is the permanent establishment, who provide most senior teachers and most able administrators: these people are British, were part of the colonial regime, and seem now prepared to stay on doing their invaluable work (to my knowledge not one NRG secondary school teacher has resigned with approaching Uhuru).

Of our staff, five are on the permanent expatriate establishment, the rest on local conditions of service. Most have British university degrees, though one was at Fort Hare and another is studying by correspondence with the University of South Africa. The woodwork teacher received his training at the Polela Institute, near Bulwer in Natal: a new member of the staff is a South African, and perhaps Zambia's greatest gain in the teaching world had been the Leshoais' move from Lady Selborne to Ndola. The ministry has announced that it has a 'pool' of South African teachers from which it can draw, men who presumably want to escape from Bantu Education. Did Dr. Verwoerd realise in 1953 that many teachers who could not stomach his education policy would be staffing the schools of South Africa's first independent non-racial neighbour?
Socialist Algeria & Autocratic Morocco

MARTIN LEGASSICK

THERE IS A TENDENCY, in a brief encounter with a society, to try and rationalise one's subjective preconceptions. But for this reason, anything that jars with them is instantly recognisable. But for this reason, anything that jars with them is instantly recognisable; perhaps one sees with a fresher eye than those who have absorbed or lived with the whole. Six days in Algeria and Morocco give, though, only superficial glimpses—a series of kaleidoscopic pictures filtered and fitted together.

The army, for example, in Algiers, was what I had expected. But two armies? I had forgotten the anachronistic French, stationed there under the Evian agreements to protect the enclaves, the majority of whom subsequently left anyway. These, immaculately uniformed, strolling in pairs or sitting in cafes as if on the Champs Elysees, contrasted poorly with the casual, bushjacketed, warsoiled FLN youths. The FLN sing their Stenguns with as much ease as the French soldiers light their Gauloises. These French boulevardiers could never have fought a war: and indeed they are probably not the ones who did. There are less of them than the 100,000 stipulated in the Evian agreements, but they are an obvious irritation. Talking with a former member of the Algerian underground—now a translator in the Foreign Ministry—I noticed his nervous reaction on coming upon two around a corner. “Yes,” he said later, casually, when I asked, he had been tortured. “Water, electricity, and beatings. But electricity was the worst.”

I ARRIVED ON the October day that the Kabylie disturbance broke out: but the first indication in Algiers was the 6 p.m. B.B.C. news. There had been an army check on the road from the airport—which led on to Tizi Ouzou in the mountains—but this was normal anyway. The airport is called Maison Blanche, incidentally: despite Ben Bella's royal welcome in his visit in 1962 to Kennedy (he was the first leader to be flown from the airport to the White House in a helicopter) I presume the French named it.

Two students that I met certainly had the standard reaction to “Yankee”—gleamed more from cartoons than anti-imperialist literature, I felt, as they described to me the Uncle Sam hat, the large stomach and the pockets . . . they could not find the English word, “Poches remplies d’argent”; I suggested (a phrase from my Teach Yourself French) and this hit home.

Algiers lies around a bay, curving around a low hill on one side. It is for all the world like Cape Town without Table Mountain, Descending from the Forum (where Ben Bella addressed 10,000 people on the crisis just after I left) is a foreboding Aderley Street, dropping in a flight of steps every fifty yards towards the harbour. It has recently been renamed after Mohammed Khemisti, the brilliant Algerian student leader who became the world's youngest Foreign Minister and was tragically assassinated by a madman some months ago. In this area there is now, too, a President Kennedy square.

The buildings, faded brown, rise shuttered and balconied in a manner as reminiscent of Spain as of France. In this central region, before the war, only French lived, and a Muslim would hardly have been seen: residential segregation was as strict as it had been legislated. The Roman Catholic Cathedral, converted from a mosque (and now, thank God, reconverted) was in the Casbah. I asked how the French got to it and my companions silently pointed out a route which avoided the Casbah. The departure of the French has hastened integration: all vacant flats are taken over by the Government and allotted to the homeless, so that Algerians avoids, at present, the worst urbanisation problems. The offices of the South African ANC, I believe, were previously the flat of an OAS member. When they moved in they found guns and a dud bomb in one cupboard—his wife's hat in another. The rest had been stripped bare.

ALGERIA HAS ITS PROBLEMS—the main ones being unemployment and lack of teachers. Some secondary schools had not started because there were no teachers for them. And when I commented on the number of buildings in the centre being repainted, I was told cynically that it “gave people something to do.” Descending from the airport bus, I had been met by a crowd of at least thirty young men—willing to carry my baggage anywhere—at a high price. The youth of the Maghrib population is startling; in Algeria there are 125 infants and adolescents for every 100 adults—and in Morocco 41% of the population is under 15.

But one cannot escape the dynamism and optimism in the air here. The exodus of the French is welcomed (not in any racialist sense, for their return and that of other nationalities is sought) because it necessitated the rapid training of large numbers to fill the jobs. It forced a revolution—a social revolution to succeed the military one—to drag the country up its bootstraps. No matter if the Algerian post office clerk is not quite as efficient as the French—he will learn, and will take a pride learning and performing the job for a new Algeria. Everywhere people are galvanised into action. Posters said “GUERRE CONTRE LES POUJADES” (War against filth) and notices outside shops advocated the use of “poubelles” (dustbins). “Organise yourselves so that each house and each estate has dustbins. Without them you risk being reported.”

Shortly before I arrived, the town's leading hotels and cafes had been nationalised. Each is put in charge of an elected committee of the employees, in the same manner as the farms and factories, with technicians appointed to the committee where necessary, to give advice or do the books. A geophysicist from Ireland, told me about the oil industry, describing how the French companies flew their own Caravelles directly

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from the head office in Paris to the Sahara.

"Think how much revenue Algeria is missing by not having the head office in Algiers. I wouldn't blame them if they nationalised." But he would quit, he said, "I wouldn't work for them."

He was on his way to Morocco as well, to prospect there in the mountains. Morocco, Fage tells us, has always been the mountainous area of resistance to change and alien rule, while Tunisia has served as the flat fertile base of civilisations. Algeria is a region of transition: in which the rulers of Tunisia and Morocco have competed for control. Now for the first time, perhaps, Algeria sits in the middle with a strong army. Power based on one of the ends has been unstable: what will this new power in the centre entail?

**BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA**

The conflict is as much of ideology as of border; it is contained only by the framework of African unity. It is one of the ironies of Africa that adjacent countries seem at loggerheads: Ghana and Togo, Kenya and Somalia, Niger and Dahomey; all relics of colonialist hankarisation. Meanwhile Algeria preaches and practices pan-African solidarity with South African liberation. Is propinquity the greatest barrier to pan-Africanism?

Politically the Morocco-Algeria difference is great. All the difference between a country that has fought a seven year struggle for liberation and one in which the French ambassador's residence physically adjoins the Ministry buildings. Perhaps it is right, as Fanon says, that in Africa there is only one chance for Algeria, Angola and South Africa to achieve the necessary radical social development towards an egalitarian society: in all other countries the continuity with the past is too strong.

One is rapidly reminded of inequality in Rabat. The city stretches up from the sea, its population like the markings on a slide rule—getting less dense as one progresses. Wedged between sea, river, and twelfth century, beautiful red-brick city wall, is the Medina—the old quarter—teeming with people, fruits, nuts and clothes. At night, lit only by a single bulb in each shop falling on the wares laid out on the pavement, with their interplay of greens and reds and browns, the effect is captivating. But in the day it is squalid: beggars and the deformed abound. At the other end of town are spacious lawns, and the only sound the day it is squalid: beggars and the deformed abound. At the other end of town are spacious lawns, and the only sound is the splash of the water sprinkler, and the click-click of garden shears. Here is the King's palace guarded as I walked past, by sentries dropping slightly in the afternoon sun. (In Algeria, on the other hand, in a previously French "exclusive" suburb, one caught the sounds of military drill). In between is the scruffy commercial centre—no different from hundreds around the world. My hotel was set on a square between this part and the Medina: passing a veiled woman in the town, it was hard to believe that one might have seen her in the "otherworld" of the old quarter.

Veils . . . in Rabat I saw a woman with veil and sunglasses. The addition destroyed the alluring half-concealment. An Algerian friend told me that before and during the war the veil had been worn to preserve the Algerian personality. It gave a sense of mystery and isolation—of independence. But women discarded their veils to fight and die side by side with men in the army, and had not taken them back. He thought that Islam was still significant only for a few: though it is noticeable that Ben Bella treats its influence with respect. There were in fact more veils in Algiers than Casablanca (another amorphous blos of westernised Africa a dirtier Nairobi): but most of all in Rabat. In Algeria the veil is pure white: in Morocco there are colours.

I SAT IN A PARK in Casablanca beside the Cathedral, and met a French schoolboy who wanted me to translate an English word. He read me a letter to a German friend, in English, on the geography of Morocco. "In Morocco we have high mountains where there are winter sports and we also have fine beaches where we can swim. There are also 10 million inhabitants of whom 50,000 are Europeans. 50,000 of the inhabitants are Jews. Rabat is the political capital of Morocco and Casablanca is the economic capital. Casablanca has 1 million inhabitants. Morocco is a monarchy, and the present King is Hassan II. He is the spiritual and political leader of his people. He is very religious and goes to prayer every Friday." And, he might have added, "the King is very political and puts all his opponents in jail," but, being French, he supported the King's party. None of them have become naturalised Moroccans since independence but almost all have stayed. He did point out, however, that the system of Government was "like in France, except that there the President is elected for seven years, and here the King rules for life." Elections were held under a new constitution last year at which the King's party (verbosely named the National Fedération for the Protection of Democratic Constitutions) did less well than he had hoped, despite intimidation and the other electioneering tactics of an autocrat. There is strong opposition to him in the large towns, and from the students and trade unions. Religion inhibits rural resistance. About 5,000 members of the radical UNFP (Union National des Forces Populaires) were imprisoned after their Congress last year for "plotting against the monarchy." I chatted to one of the "disinherited" urban unemployed in Casablanca, in my broken French. We established agreement at the start: "Ben Bella good, Hassan not good."

There have been improvements since independence much more widespread education, (It was remarkable how many exercise books were on display in the shops) and insurance schemes for unemployment, accident, or numbers of children. The society is that which Aper characterises as "modernising autocracy".

The essential weakness of the Moroccan regime, however, and the strength and very basis of the Algerian, is in land reform. Both are peasant countries: the development of efficient and productive agriculture, with equable land distribution on a viable basis (therefore probably communal) and the improvement of techniques, is a priority task. The Algerian expropriations and system of worker's management committees are bold and imaginative steps towards socialism. Hassan has only been graded into reluctant action by the UNFP electoral success based on a drastic agrarian reform programme. He has nationalised some land—and has bought tractors to let out to farmers. But it is based on expediency—not ideology, nor even conviction.

**MANY IMAGES TUMBLE from the kaleidoscope; the pattern making is more difficult. In Algeria the need is for trained men at every level "from people who can mend a fuse to professor of philosophy" to help continue this exciting venture in socialism adapted to African conditions (distinct from "African socialism") and to administer the society efficiently. In Morocco it is difficult to see whether the necessary land reform can take place without the replacement of the monarchy or at least the drastic castration of its powers. Ben Barka, UNFP leader, in exile, is reputedly one of the most intelligent socialists of the continent. The answer, in both cases, rests in the last resort with the peasants—the people of the soil.**

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What are the aims of the new Africa, and how far do we in Britain share these aims? This is the key question we have to answer before we can say that Africa and Britain, which have so much to give each other, will, in fact, march forward together towards a more prosperous, tolerant, free and peaceful world.

If I were asked to summarise these aims, I think I would describe them as follows, placing them in order of urgency:

1. The decolonisation of Africa.
2. The economic and political integration of African countries.
3. The rapid development of the economic resources of the African Continent to the point of self-sustaining growth.
4. The safeguarding of peace by non-alignment with the rival power blocs and support of the United Nations.

I have already pointed out that we welcome the movement towards closer political and economic association between that this is essential to the strength, stability, and economic growth of Africa. I am, therefore, left with questions (1), (3) and (4).

(1) We are, of course, committed to a policy of decolonisation in Africa.

I believe there are good reasons why we have had to move more slowly in granting independence in southern Africa than we moved in West and East Africa. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had to be liquidated before Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland could become independent as separate States. This process is now going forward though we hope that they will rejoin South Africa. But if we make up our minds to neglect their economic development there is no reason why Bechuanaland and Swaziland should not become fully independent countries, while Basutoland should at any rate be able to manage its own internal affairs. Whatever may happen, Britain will never surrender these territories to South Africa.

But the real challenge to Britain is our attitude to white domination in Southern Africa, as exemplified by Portugal and the Republic of South Africa. We realise that Africans will judge our sincerity by our reactions to apartheid and Portuguese colonial policy, and that this is far more important to them than our own colonial record. World opinion is being brought to bear (we hope it will always be peaceful) on the policies of South Africa and Portugal, because they cannot be changed by the actions of any single country. This is also the policy of the African countries at the U.N. We are not in favour of expelling any country from the U.N., because we believe that the value of the U.N. lies in its universality, and that if you start to expel countries on ideological grounds it will be difficult to stop. But we do believe that arms should not be sold to these countries of a sort that would be needed to enforce apartheid or an unacceptable colonial policy respectively.

This shows that in spite of British investment in South African industry, and in spite of the importance of South Africa to British trade, there is a large section of public opinion in Britain that puts moral values above material interests. It is certainly true that the ordinary Englishman is disgusted and horrified by apartheid and, so far as he understands events in Africa, is on the side of the African when exploited or oppressed by the white man.

(3) Africa is a so-called "developing" area, like Asia and South America. Its export earnings depend too often on one or two crops. The vast majority of its people depend for their livelihood on cultivating the soil, on subsistence crops and on the export of foodstuffs and raw materials. The incomes of primary producers are more
susceptible to changes in terms of trade, and in this context the Africans have suffered particularly during the 1950s. But the "developed" countries and their diversified economies (that is the industrial nations of Europe and North America) have through the deployment of their scientific techniques, raised their standard of living to the level they enjoy today from the low level of a few hundred years ago, which compared more closely with the African standard of living today.

The difference between Europe and Africa is that Africa began later, and must, therefore, reach the point of "take-off" into self-sustaining growth much more quickly.

The success of this economic revolution is as important to the West as it is to Africa. Its economic importance is that it will provide an expanded market for the exports of Western countries with the new purchasing-power generated by higher wages and salaries. Its political importance is that if the democratic procedures and economic assistance of the West fail to improve the lot of people living often on a bare subsistence, they will adopt the totally different methods employed by Russia and China.

It is, therefore, in the interests of the Western countries, as well as in accordance with their humanitarian feelings and their long record of association with Africa, to provide the capital and technical skill required to raise Africa to the level of material well-being enjoyed by the West.

What Africa needs is a rapid and sustained expansion of world trade in primary products, and a great increase in financial and technical aid to hasten forward the day when Africa starts to pay its own way. By commodity agreements, which prevent violent fluctuations in world prices for primary products and the reduction and removal of tariff barriers, we have been doing our best to promote trade with Africa.

We have already made agreements to fix the price of a number of commodities, of which the most recent was coffee. We have reduced many tariffs through the instrumentation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and we would have secured free entry for African products from former British as well as former French African Territories into the whole of Western Europe if we had succeeded in entering the European Economic Community. We may still join it. We would like to see easier access for Africans agricultural products to the markets of the West, and we recognise that the new industries in African countries must also be able to sell us their products.

Trade is more important than aid, and more lasting, but money and skill must also be forthcoming without any immediate return if we are to speed up the economic development of Africa. Aid "without strings" is a national policy. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has just described Britain's "aid programme" as "a great outlet for the energy and enthusiasm of the British people".

The British Government has given large sums in grants and loans to British independencies and to independent Commonwealth countries in Africa. In the last six years Britain has doubled the amount of its capital aid, and it is still rising. It is now running at about £150,000,000 a year, and is expected to exceed £200,000,000 in the 1963/64 period.

Britain has just set up a new government department, the Department of Technical Co-operation, to deal with technical aid. This Department is responsible for the 15,000 British civil servants, advisers, teachers and technical officers serving in British dependencies or newly-independent countries, mainly in Africa. It also recruits teachers, doctors, agricultural and veterinary officers, as well as members of the professions, to serve on short contracts with the governments of these countries. About 1,000 highly-qualified persons are going overseas in the current year, of which about half are young people who want to serve Africa in the same way as the American Peace Corps.

These links of trade, aid, and investment are taking the place of the old political links between Britain and Africa and are forging a new relationship based on equality, mutual respect and mutual advantage.

(4) So far as foreign policy is concerned, we respect the desire of African countries for neutrality between the contending power blocs. We share with African countries their loyalty to the United Nations. While we do not wish to involve them in our alliances, we hope that those who belong to the British Commonwealth will stay, as the Commonwealth represents a wide area of the globe in which war has been renounced. Peace and disarmament are our mutual objectives.

We have now examined the principal aims of African policy, decolonisation, African unity, economic development and world peace, and compared with them the aims of the British policy. It appears that there is no fundamental divergence between African and British policy. Where they differ, the differences concern methods and timing, not ultimate aims.

On the contrary, the interests and the welfare of the peoples of Africa and the peoples of Britain are so intimately connected that their happiness and prosperity and agricultural products, whether available, in the future, to work even more closely together. This will benefit, not only Britain and Africa, but the world community of nations and races to which they belong, and whose welfare is inextricably bound up with theirs. We have the same vision of the future of Africa, and its place in the world. Together we can achieve it.